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ABSTRACT 
The avowed purpose of Lucretius' poem is the ethical conversion of the 
reader, but ethics comes a very poor second to the physics in apparent 
importance within the text. This thesis argues that for Lucretius ethics 
is closely linked to aesthetics in the following ways: 1) ethics for 
Lucretius is a matter of seeing the truth about the world and thus relies 
on our senses and a'{aeT7OlS 2) the wise man is advised to watch the 
world aesthetically with all its sufferings rather than become involved in 
politics and love himself, the aesthetic appreciation of the spectacle 
being recommended as the ethically correct way to live. This last is a 
theatrical stance and is well supported by Lucretius' debt to the theatre 
which underlies so much of the poem; the poem draws on the theatre as 
a metaphor and simile as well as using examples drawn from plays, both 
tragic and comic, in preference to taking ethical examples from Roman 
'life'. The status of the ·wise man looking down is also close to that of 
the Homeric gods and gives the poet and the reader the divine life which 
the text promises both in the freedom from fear and pain and also in the 
serene appreciation of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon; it also 
explains the sense in which Epicurus is seen in the poem as divine. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM 
The de rerum natura is a poem whose avowed purpose is to 
change the way we live, and whose poetry is presented as ancillary to 
the message which it propounds1. This thesis is asking a fundamentally 
simple question: 'what is the good life towards which the text appears 
to be directing the reader?' The thesis starts from the position that 
previous readings of the de rerum natura have not succeeded in 
accommodating the conflicts, inconsistencies and apparent 
inadequacies of the text as a protreptic poem, but that an alternative 
reading might make more sense, a reading which I am choosing to 
call 'aesthetic'. The definition and use of the term 'aesthetic' will be 
discussed in detail shortly: the first task is to show the need for this 
thesis. 
The primary problem is the status of ethical teaching in the 
didactic syllabus of the poem and also the sort of ethics being 
propounded. The poem, after all, appears to be addressed to the 
poet's own Roman audience and claims to aim to change the way we 
live and to be a recipe for happiness, and yet there is a serious lack of 
consistent ethical advice targeted at the Roman reader. 
In the first place there is far more factual science than ethical 
advice. If one examines the 7,415 lines of the poem, one soon 
1.936-950 = 4. 10-2S 
4 
discovers that only about 823 lines are explicitly ethicaJ2, leaving 6,592 
lines of 'pure' science. 89% of the text is thus concerned with science 
rather than the ethical advice which is its avowed purpose, and much of it 
(e.g. magnets and waterspouts in book 6) has no obvious ethical 
relevance. The poem's very title of de rerum natura is eloquent of this 
confusion; it suggests that this poem is going to be descriptive rather 
than prescriptive, examining the nature of things rather than telling us 
how to live - a promise he more than lives up to - and yet the poet assures 
us] that his purpose is to change our lives as well as to show us things. 
The two ideas mingle together in the te~ so that we are sometimes 
promised the reward of being rid of fear and thus given happiness4, at 
other times we are offered enlightenment, knowledge and insight for its 
own sakes, and one purpose of this thesis is to explain the unity of this 
apparent clash of ideas. 
Many responses have been mad«-: to the ethical poverty of the poem. 
In the first place, it is urged that the science is there to prove the atomism 
which explains the nature of the world, ourselves included; ethical 
propositions are as deducible from the atomic facts as any other 
propositions in a universe made up entirely of atoms, and it is important 
for the Epicurean to demonstrate that his ethical 
% The passages are: l. 80-135,2.1-61,3.31-93,830-1094,4. 1058-1287,5. 1117-1135, 1151-
1240, 1390-143S. 
] e.g. 1. 931-50, 2.1-61 
4 e.g. 2.55-61 
~ 1. 143-5 
6 
7 
5 
statements are based on solid atomic facts and are not simply 
emotional states of mind. Furthermore, as Costa6 puts it: 
'The moral ideas of the Epicureans - the value they placed on 
friendship, their contented quietism, even their unusual definition of 
pleasure as the standard of conduct - could probably be grasped in 
essence by the serious inquirer. But Atomist physics were technically 
difficult to the point of obscurity~ they needed skilful, patient 
exposition~ they were a real challenge to a poet~ and success in 
explaining them should lead logically to an acceptance of Epicurus' 
moral teaching.' 
It could, in particular, be urged that a great deal of the 'science' 
in the poem is tilted against the theological interpretation of the world 
and thus is aimed at replacing the view of the world as ruled by 
whimsical angry deities with a mechanistic picture which would 
remove our fear of the gods and thus aid our ethical development by 
substituting ratio for fear. Mankind is not (in fact) subject to sudden 
attacks of divine wrath and so our decisions can be taken rationally on 
the basis of known facts rather than irrationally out of fear of the 
unknown: 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.7 
Costa (1984) xvi-xvii 
l. 146-148 
6 
This argument in particular would 'reclaim' the theological and 
meteorological arguments for the ethical side and help to redress the 
balance~ and ethical points do peep out from behind the most scientific 
curtains - one thinks immediately of the sacrificed calf causing grief to 
its bereaved mother to demonstrate the finitude of atomic variety and 
also attack the superstition of sacrifice8. These are certainly all good 
arguments to justifY the presence of science in the poem at all - and 
they raise interesting questions about the nature of didactic poetry - but 
they do not fully exhaust the need to explain the overwhelming weight 
of science and the paucity of ethical teaching in the text. 
For it is not merely quantity of ethical teaching which is missed, 
but also quality. A quick look at the ethics of the poem shows it to 
boil down to a negative series of satirical warnings against certain 
forms of extreme behaviour (love, politics, religion) and a few 
generalised pictures of happiness in rural settings avoiding luxury for 
the sake of peaceful simplicity. The passages referred to above in 
footnote 2 contain the foUowing ethical precepts~ 
1. 80-135: religion brings fear and cruelty with it 
(Iphigenia), aU of which should be avoided. 
2.1-61: avoid engagement in war, trade, politics~ avoid 
luxury and through philosophy pursue simple life free of fear 
3.3 1-93: fear of death causes avarice, ambition, cruelty, envy~ 
so avoid the fear of death. 
8 2.352-370 
7 
830-1094 adopt a 'philosophical' attitude to death; 
allegoresis of mythical sinners tormented as types of inadequate living 
humans tormented with superstition (Tantalus), passion (Tityos), 
ambition (Sisyphus), discontent (Danaids), all of which are to be 
avoided. 
4. 1058-1287: the perils of romantic love and the joys of 
contented philosophical cohabitation. 
5. 1117-1135,1151-1240,1390-1435: description of the 
ambition for power, of true religion over against superstition, and the 
nature of true pleasure over against luxury. 
Ethical philosophy usually concerns itself with far more than 
this. There is the whole question of political involvement (or lack of 
it), the wise man's attitude to the state and the laws, political freedom 
and stability; then the competing claims of friendship and love and the 
wise man's attitude to attachments in general and his pursuit of 
autarkeia, including the place (if any) of altruism over against self-
interest. Many of these issues are debated by Epicurus, and all of 
them are discussed by Plato and Aristotle; none of which is found in 
this poem. Instead we have rather dogmatic statements dotted 
through the text with no attempt to reach an argued conclusion but 
rather a series of mocking sketches. If one looks at Lucretius' 
contemporary Cicero - or the inscription of the later Epicurean 
Diogenes of Oenoanda9 - one finds in their ethical writings a great deal 
more discussion and logic than one finds here. Most decisive of all is 
8 
the evidence from Diogenes Laertius of the amount of ethical writing 
in the work of the master himself, bpicurus~ of the 41 titles listed in his 
famous 'three hundred rolls'lo, 14 are certainly 'ethical' and a further 13 
may well be. This is a far more plausible ratio of ethics to physics, of 
between 34% and 66% ethical content, and it is his ethical ideas which 
prompted the greatest discussion in the ancient world. 
All too often in the case of Lucretius, then, the ethical 
position on issues such as kingship has to be inferred from other ideas 
which are there rather than simply read from the text. Furthermore 
the style of the poet in these ethical sections is more caricature of types 
such as the insane 10ver11 , the bored rich manll, the politician 13 , the 
impotent manl4, the society madam l !!, the pantomime villains who will 
murder their own kinsfolk for powerl6, the rich addicted to their 
luxuryl7, kings who murder their daughters to make the wind blowl8 (a 
safely remote example from Greek mythology). The examples chosen 
are often exaggerated types drawn from the theatre rather than real 
examples of Roman life in need of conversion: to condemn irrational 
superstition, for instance, Lucretius tells the story of Iphigenia being 
slaughtered by her father, when he could surely have found examples 
of religious atrocities in his own era such as the human sacrifice 
'J see now Smith (1993) 
10 Diogcnes Lacrtius 10. 26-8 
11 4. 10S8-1191 
12 3. 1060-7 
13 3.99S-1002 
14 4. 1233-38 
" 
4. 1180-7 
16 3. 59-73 
17 2.24-36 
9 
associated with unchaste Vestal virgins19 or (for that matter) the abuse 
of religious ritual in the misuse of obnuntatio by Bibulus in 5920 or by 
Milo in 5721 . The analysis of romantic love finds its examples from 
the comic stage rather than the real life around him. The use of 
apparently legendary or plainly fictitious stories to back up ethical 
points is odd if the text has the protreptic purpose and the Roman 
audience which it claims. The reader is advised to reject the behaviour 
of theatrical types both by the folly they display and by the loaded 
language in which such behaviour is described, the case being often 
carried by reductio ad absurdum, and yet the contemporary reader 
does not find his life depicted in the text, for all that he is a character 
drawn into the didactic process of the poem by explicit remarks such 
as: 
omnia quo pacto fiant quareve creentur 
cum bene cognoris elementis reddita quae sint22 
'Do not behave like these «((artoon-figure or mythical) people' 
will not get the reader very far in his new Epicurean life. The supreme 
Epicurean moral behaviour is, we are told, friendship, and yet there are 
very few hints here to that effect23 . Further problems arise when one 
examines the adversaries whom the poem addresses~ one chief target 
16 1. 80-lUl 
19 a practice which went on until at least 89 AD (Pliny 4.11) and had been famously 
performed in 114 BC when two Greeks and two Gauls were executed in the Fonun Boarium - a 
trial which went on into 113 and caused a good deal of publicity (see e.g. Cicero Brutus 1S9, de 
Inventione 1.43, Plutarch Roman Questions 83, Dio Cassius frag. 87.S (Boissier). 
20 Suetonius Divus Julius 20 
21 Cicero ad Atticum 4.3.4 
22 6. S33-4 
10 
of Epicurean polemic was the Stoics, and yet this missionary text fails 
totally to mention them by name or counter their argumentsl4. Instead 
of this we read abundant criticism of the views of the presocratics -
philosophers whose ideas had been superseded long since and who 
found no followers in Rome of the time. This last is less of a problem 
on the ethical side - the criticisms of the presocratics are for their 
views on the nature of matter rather than the life of man - but the 
question of the poet's attitude towards the ethical views of the Stoics 
. . 
remalOS a cunous vacuum. 
This line of questioning is not particularly new. Kenney, for 
instance, begins by endorsing the ethical poverty of the poem: 
'Thus the physical doctrines. though they are fundamental and 
though the exposition of them occupies most of the poem. are in the design of 
Lucretius' great enterprise functionally subservient to its main end: the 
scientific argument provides the premiss for the destructive argument which in 
tum provides the premiss for the final positive ethical conclusioos - the 
statements about how men ought to live. But those final COIlclusioos are not 
drawn, the statements are not made: the last link in the chain of argument 
Lucretius takes as read or leaves for others to provide. Thus, though the 
argument often takes a particular Epicurean ethical position for granted. there 
is very little in the poem that may be called ethical doctrine. '2' 
23 1. 140-S; 3. 83; S. 1019-20; friendship was the subject of books 8 and 9 of Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics (see Price (1989) 103-61) 
24 on this see Furley (1966) 
2' KeMey (1971) 9-10 
11 
He then, however, tries to rescue the poet from these 
criticisms: he believes that it can be 'proved unequivocally' that the 
poem 'had not received its final revision at the poet's death126 which 
allows the poet endless scope to have wanted to say more about 
whatever we are missing in his text. Presumably he does not simply 
mean that book 6 is unfinished27 but that the poet would have inserted 
ethical sections in the existing poem. He then, however, asserts the 
contrary that the poet would not have wanted such ethical disquisitions 
anyway, as (Kenney asserts) ethics just would not have made good 
poetry: 
'Is a metrical acx:ount of Epicurean ethics (which were fimdamentally 
very simple) imaginable? Poetry, especially poetry such as Lucretius', 
cannot thrive upon an unmixed diet of abstractions; it must have its roots in 
and be nourished by bodily images and COIlcrete associaticms. '28 
This line of reasoning simply will not do. Ethical teaching can use 
bodily images and concrete associations if the author so chooses - the 
language of2.l-61 for instance is highly specific. In the second place, 
Epicurean ethics can be made comprehensible and practical but are not 
'fundamentally simple' as Kenney asserts. If the master's intuition that 
pleasure is the ultimate good, for instance, is to be accepted it would 
26 Kenney (1971) 13 
27 see e.g. Clay (1983) 2S1 ('The end of book 6 is the end Lucretius inteDded for the. 
Rerum Natura'), Gale (1994) 224 ('Few critics would now deny that Lucretius intcndcd his poem 
to end as it does in our texts. ') 
28 Keaney (1971) 10 
12 
reqUIre a great deal of discussion29, and the concept of personal 
pleasure as good leaves the system open to a great deal of questioning 
on the nature of justice towards others, all of which is more urgent and 
potentially more interesting to a Roman than the finer points of 
waterspouts. Epicurus had an ethical theory which embraced both 
private and political30 issues, but which could not, pace Kenney, be 
boiled down into a few words; if the ethical 'conversion' really were the 
end of the poem, then it is hard to see why the poet did not explore it 
further. 
Kenney's other point - that ethics makes for poor poetry - is 
also unsound. He states in defence of it that 'Lucilius' well-known 
fragment on Virtue (1326-38 M.) is as dull as ditchwater; and no 
writer is in general more lively and pungent. '31 but ignores the whole 
history of such ethical poetry from Hesiod onwards and seems almost 
unaware of the ethical nature of the concluding lines of the very book 
he is editing. Lucretius was working in a generic tradition which gave 
him non-ethical predecessors such as Empedocles and Nicander and 
also more ethically involved writers such as Hesiod; none of which 
tradition requires him to follow his predecessors slavishly when he in 
fact more than once claims originality in his blending of Greek and 
Roman, ethics and science. There is also the example of other 
writers from the ancient world who did produce great poetry out of 
discussion of Epicurean ethics: Horace in particular showed that 
29 the sort of discussion to be found in e.g. Gosling and Taylor (1982) 365-413 
30 see esp. Fowler (1989b) 
13 
Epicurean ethics makes for very lively and entertaining poetry - one 
need only think of the town mouse and the country mouse - which 
could be presented in either a racy manner (as in the Satires32) or more 
'straight' (as in the Epistles and Odes). The passages of the DRN 
which deal with ethics are not the poor relations when compared to the 
physics - quite the contrary, in the experience of many readers, who 
often prefer the 'human interest' of the 'purple passage' to the recondite 
physics - and if there is a reason why the poet does not draw explicitly 
ethical conclusions, then it will be necessary to find it if this poem is 
not to collapse in on itself as a failure. 
A further line of argument is simply to deny that the text has any 
'final' or protreptic purpose at all. It might after all be urged that the 
primary purpose of the poem is to be a parade of poetic ability and the 
ethical purpose merely a formal excuse. Just as the Epistles of Horace 
are not real letters and Ovid's Ars Amatoria is hardly serious 
protreptic, so also this poem is mock-didactic rather than the real 
thing. The didactic tradition has hexameter verse used simply to 
expound philosophy (Parmenides, Empedocles etc) and also 
'metaphrastic' versified accounts of prose treatises where one suspects 
that the poet had little if any first-hand knowledge of the subject being 
explained (Nicander of Colophon's Venomous Reptiles is usually cited 
31 Kenney (1971) p. 10 n.3 
32 on which see now Freudenberg (1993) chapter 1 on Horace's poetic use ofpopular 
philosophical ideas. 
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as the classic example of this33). In between these two lies a vast 
spectrum of poetic and protreptic style, with some of the greatest 
examples of the genre being constantly revalued for their position: 
look for example at the figure of Manitius, whose work was ridiculed 
a generation ago by Housman as 'skilfully versified sums' but whose 
religious and political philosophy are now being seen as the motive 
force behind the astonomicallore and who therefore needs to be placed 
higher up the protreptic scale than had been thought but whose factual 
side is of less importance than would at first appear. Vergil's 
Georgics, also, is superficially a treatise on farming and yet the poem is 
of little practical use in the field; its meaning as a text is for that reason 
elusive and the factual subject matter is now more frequently seen as 
synecdochic of a far wider world-view34. Lucretius' poem seems to be 
clearly an attack on the theological view of the worldJS and the 
accompanying superstition surrounding death16 and also a 
recommendation to the reader to embrace the Epicurean way of life of 
ataraxia and yet it is always possible to read the text as a poetic tour 
de force with no extrinsic ethical force at all. 
This would certainly solve the question outright. There is -
on this account - very little in the way of ethical advice in the poem 
because the poet is not really trying to change the way we live at all 
JJ 'The poem is ostensibly an aid to those suffering from the bites of noxious animals; but 
the poet's sollicitous professions of concern for his "patients" should fool no-one. His real aim is 
to astonish the reader with a mixture of highly incongruous basic ingredients. viz. epic language 
and the tectuca1 vocabulary ot zoology and cllmca1 medleme.· tHoplaDSOn t 1 ~~) 143) 
34 e.g. Lyne (1993) 203 
3S found in e.g. the rationalistic account ofthundetbolts in 6._379-422 and the aa:ount of the 
world not being made by the gods in S. 91-41 S 
36 
37 
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but merely imitating the ethical appearance of other didactic epics with 
a view to demonstrating his poetic ability. His purpose is as 'sincerely' 
protreptic as Nicander's interest in snakes and should not be taken 
seriously. Critics of this school would immediately point to the un-
Epicurean nature of poetry and how unorthodox the poet was being in 
writing in verse at all~ his choice of verse form is a clear coded 
message to the reader that the 'teaching' is not to be taken as seriously 
as the verse of which it is composed. Epicureans were often seen as 
being hostile to poetry and yet this one wrote an epic poem, complete 
with invocations of gods whom Epicureans did not usually invoke~ but 
the 'coded message' theory depends on the reader being familiar 
enough with Epicurean thought to know its views on poetry before he 
has begun to read the poem which is going to educate him in 
Epicureanism and thus creates a circular argument. 
The hostility of Epicurus to poetry has aroused a good deal of 
discussion37. From the evidence available, however, there seems 
nothing to stop us arguing that Epicurus' hostility to poetry was above 
all an aversion to superstitious stories which inflamed fear and 
ignorance~ that in the right hands such poetic skill could be turned to 
better effect - why, after all, should the devil have all the best tunes? 
Traditional paideia was rejected, but future paideia might take a very 
different shape; there was nothing intrinsically bad in the poetry itself, 
it was simply the nonsense which it propounded which annoyed him - a 
which occupies most of book 3 
e.g. Gale (1993) 14-18, Godwin (1994) 244,(;, Waszink, Classen. 
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point proven by Epicurus' ready agreement that 'it is reasonable to cite 
even poets, sophists and orators, so long as they (say something) that 
admits of a correct application'18. Content, then, rather than form, 
was the focus of attention. There is no barrier to an Epicurean poet 
rehabilitating the form of ancient paideia to create a new paideia 
which will replace it~ and Lucretius - it might be argued - does exactly 
that. 
The prologue remains a problem, of course. Epicurus was 
strict in his rejection of the superstition which believed that the gods 
hear us and can affect our lives, and the poet faithfully tells us on 
several occasions19 that the gods do not hear us - and yet he begins his 
poem with an extended hymn to Venus complete with a request for her 
help: 
te sociam studeo scribendis versibus esse"'> 
although his theological views explicitly deny any possibility of the 
gods taking any part in human affairs. Gale's theory that 'having once 
offered the reader the honeyed cup of the proem, L. proceeds to 
substitute the medicine of Epicurean pbilosophy'41 is attractive (but 
inevitably a speculation) and lends some weight to the theory of the 
Epicurean attitude to poetry being advanced here. The sage can not 
only steal the devil's tunes in composing traditional poetry: he can even 
Fragment of On nature 14 col. 29.18-22 Vogliano, cited and translated Gale (1994) 16 
n.42 
19 1. 44-49, 150.158; 2. 167·183,646.51, 1090-1104; 4. 1233-1239; S. 76-90, 110-234, 
1194-1240, 6; 58-89. 379-422 
40 1.24 
41 
42 
43 
44 
17 
dance with the devil and get away with it in traditional poetic costume, 
so long as the illusion is dispelled by the philosophy, rather as 
metonymic mythological terms are perfectly allowable as long as the 
reader does not believe in the superstitions lurking behind them. 42 
The poet's use of poetic mythology is provocative and ironic, just as is 
his invocation of the Muse Calliope in book 643 . There are other 
things going on in the prologue, and it is a text to which we will return 
later~ it is not fatal to the protreptic purpose of the poem. Certainly 
the apparent hostility of Epicurus towards poetic composition in 
general does not warrant a sweeping dismissal of this poem as a 
protreptic text. 
We are a long way, then, from the extreme position of De 
Lacy's judgement that all that we know ofEpicurus' hostility to art and 
poetry makes Lucretius seem more and more 'outside the .. tradition of 
Epicureanism'44. Such theorists would have to be arguing that the 
poet either did not know about the Epicurean hostility to poetry - in 
which case he cannot have had a very thorough education in the 
philosophy he propounds - or that he did not care about it. This is 
also to ignore the other Epicureans (such as Philodemus) who wrote 
poetry with a clear conscience, and also Lucretius' avowed intention to 
illuminate the truth with the clear light of p0etry4' rather than to cloud 
the imagination with awful fears and superstitious stories, a fairly clear 
Gale (194) 211 
aok2.Spp~ 
6.92-S 
De Lacy (1939) 91 
18 
reference to precisely the distinction drawn above. Lucretius 
successfully uses the language of traditional mythology a good deal in 
(for instance) his use of the imagery of gigantomachy46, but this is for 
good reasons which we shall examine later. 
A more immediate issue is the relative priority of the poetry 
and the philosophy. If, after all, the poet's ethical aim is paramount, 
then we should expect it to be stated as such: and it is. The 
programmatic passage in book 147 is quite unambiguous on the subject 
and is a key text for this thesis. This is, after all, the text which 
'proves' that the ethical purpose of the text is paramount and one which 
therefore merits more attention than the poet appears to give it. 
avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante 
trita solo. iuvat integros accedere fontis 
atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores 
insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam 
unde prius nulli velarint tempora Musae: 930 
primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis 
religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo, 
deinde quod obscura de re tam lucida pango 
carmina musaeo contingens cuncta lepore. 
id quoque enim non ab nulla ratione videtur~ 935 
nam veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes 
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum 
contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore, 
ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur 
labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarom 940 
absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur, 
sed potius tali pacto recreata valescat, 
sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur 
tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque 
4' cf 6. 39-42 
46 Hardie (1986) 209-213, Gale (1993) 43-5 
47 1. 921-S0:o: 4. 1-2S 
48 
49 
SO 
19 
volgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti 945 
carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram 
et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle 
si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere 
versibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem 
naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem. 950 
Notice the purpose of freeing the mind from religious superstition (931-
2) and then the therapeutic imagery of the poet as doctor healing the 
sick child of a patient (936-42). The ethical purpose - the medicine - is 
the end, the poetry is the means to that end. 
This has occasioned surprise. The de rerum natura has been 
called 'the greatest poem in Latin'48, and yet the poetry itself, Lucretius 
himself suggests49, is merely the honey on the cup, the cosmetic 
dressing to render dull science more palatable to the audience. The 
poem's ostensible purpose to convert the reader appears to take 
precedence in the poet's objectives over the desire to write poetry for its 
own sake, a tension which has prompted critical debate ever since 
about whether Lucretius is 'really' a philosopher or a poetSo. a 
metaphrast looking sincere or a philosopher with a knack for verse. 
Those who regard Epicurus as steadfastly opposed to poetry might even 
claim that Lucretius is being apologetic to the memory of his master for 
having composed a poem rather than prose treatises as Epicurus did: 
West (1969) p. vii 
l. 921-950, = 4.1-25 
see e.g. Gale (1994) 1-2, Costa (1984) pp. xiii-xvii 
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'Lucretius is so eager to justify his un-Epicurean use of verse, 
playing down the role of his poetry by contrast with the healing power of 
Epicurean philosophy, that he perhaps underestimates his own genius'sl. 
There are traces of contempt for some forms of poetry: 
Lucretius is scathing - on good Epicurean grounds - about the poetic 
language of his predecessor Heraclitus, whose work he describes as 
follows: 
Heraclitus init quorum dux proelia primus, 
claros ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanis 
quamde gravis inter Graios qui vera requirunt. 
onmia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque 
inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cemunt, 
veraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt 
auris et lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.52 
This sounds inconsistent on the part of the poet whose own work is to 
be filled with divine /eposSJ and the sneer at words which belle tangere 
possuntl auris again is odd from the poet who claims to have the 
intention to 
quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle54 
but is obviously the sentiment of one whose master Epicurus had 
advocated oatL>~v£la above all else and whose philosophy rejected the 
obscure language of his predecessors. Lucretius aspires to a poetic 
language which will sweeten but not obfuscate his message. 
A further problem has been perceived in the ending of the 
poem. The purpose of the poetry is, according to the poet, to give the 
,. Gale (1994) 2. 
52 l. SP8~ 
53 1.28 
54 
55 
56 
57 
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reader the honey he needs to enjoy the learning; and yet the ending of 
the poem appears to be a false c1osure5s as the text breaks off in the 
middle of the picture of the Athenian plague, leaving the reader with 
anything but a honeyed taste in the mouth. The closure of any work of 
literature can be looked towards for a clue not only as to the bounds of 
the enterprise but also its purpose, its 'finality'S6. and the ending of this 
poem is apparently eloquent in its unhoneyed emptiness. This again is 
an interesting dilemma, and answers to it will illuminate the poet's 
method and the true nature of this Epicurean poetry. It does not in 
itself render the ethical side of the poem worthless; but it does show 
that the ethical conclusion towards which the poet is arguing will be no 
simple panacea or trite happy ending. The ending of the poem shows 
us the pain of the plague and leaves us with a vision of human society 
emotionally, physically and morally bleak. This is not made up by the 
poet solely to depress the reader - it comes with the pedigree of 
Thucydides attesting its veracity - but the decision to put it in at all and 
to end the text with it is clearly significant and in need of an answer later 
on. 
The real Epicurean is one who enjoys poetic shows. The 
wise man will enjoy dramatic shows more than the next manS7, and 
Plutarch is probably right to claim that there is a contradiction here: if 
poetry is bad for us but pleasure is the good, and if the wise man will 
4.22 
see D.P. Fowler, (1989) 7S-122 
on this whole topic see Fowler 1989a 
D.L. 10.120 
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derive more pleasure from theatre then he will derive both good and 
bad at once. Gale is, however, right that the wise man will 'be immune 
to the disturbing influences of muthoi and thus derive a 'purer' pleasure 
from such eventsD~8 but this does imply that he will be able to enjoy the 
pleasure (good) without suffering the bad (superstition) because he 
knows that it is only fiction after all. Poetry, in other words, is only 
bad if people believe it to be true~ and so it will be quite safe to send 
the reader of the DRN into the theatre. It will also be quite permissible 
for the Roman reader to pick up the poetry of Lucretius if he is 
educated in the truth: otherwise the analogy with the doctor and the 
child breaks down completely. If, after all, the child were told that the 
cup contained bitter wormwood behind the honey, then he would not 
drink it~ and yet here the reader is being told that the poetic honey is 
disguising that which is tristior. The poet thus gives the game away 
and breaks the illusion - unless the illusion needed to be broken for the 
full effect to be worked. Unless, that is, the wise man needs to know 
that poetry is mendacious. 
The key text on the subject is to the effect that the Epicurean 
wise man may be a good interpreter of poetry - which perhaps means 
he can see its mendacity - but he will not write it himself: 
pOYOY TE TOY aotfK,Y op8iiY; ay trEpl TE potX1lICijs #cal 
trlfNTngCij~ 8far~baSal. tro111paTcl TE EYEpyEiq. aU#c aY trOlijaal.59 
Quite apart from the textual difficulties here60. the emphasis on 
EYEPYEia is surely significant~ the wise man may well compose poetry, 
~8 Gale (1994) IS 
S9 
60 
61 
62 
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but he will not work at it to the detriment of his contentment61 . This 
does not sit with the total dedication of a Lucretius: 
sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas 
suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem 
suadet, et inducit noctes vigilare serenas 
quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum 
clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti 
res quibus occultas penitus convisere POSSiS61 
but then that passage is very much in the mould of Diogenes Laertius 
10.37, where we read Epicurus claiming the same sort of total 
dedication to the subject which however grants ataraxia, peace of 
mind and contentment: 
1raperrviiJv t'o ouveles eVEPr1Jlla ev qIvmoAori~ K'at 
t'OlOV't'q> ,.uz).JOt'a erraA.1Jvl,rov t'qJ f3lcp 
Again, the nice metaphor of erraA.1Jvl,rov perfectly expresses the 
argument of this section. Epicurus has no objection to metaphor 
itself, or else he would not use such a word; he clearly savours the 
literary pleasure of the mode of expression and also the literary and 
philosophical effort which goes into it, producing the sort of 
provocative paradox - labour producing rest, effort creating calm -
which Lucretius uses in abundance. 
To sum up so far; the ethical and protreptic message of the 
poem is paramount - the poet claims that the poetry is no more than 
the honey to sweeten the pill - but the wise man needs educating in the 
Diogenes Laenius 10.120 
the InS reading Svspysw is surely wrong 
'the wise person does not make a practice of composing poetry' Asmis (l99S) 32 
1. 140-14S 
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truth and thus to be enabled to see through the charming veil of poetry 
to the reality which it expresses. 
There is thus no room at all for the notion that the ethical 
'message' is simply an excuse to bring the poem into line with other 
didactic epics, a literary showpiece of generic composition. All 
didactic poets parade knowledge, be it venomous reptiles or the 
constellations, and there is usually a covering suggestion that the 
knowledge will be useful (e.g. to the farmer or mariner) as well as 
interesting to the curious. The 'use' of this poem is impressive: nothing 
less than human happiness and freedom from fear, both secured by a 
knowledge of the truth of the entire universe. We are left with the 
problem with which we began: the attention to ethics in the poem is 
short and unsatisfactory for an ambition so massive, and yet the text 
clearly asserts an ethical protreptic purpose. This thesis attempts to 
solve this problem by arguing that the poem does have an ethical 
stance which offers us a way of living which could be called 'aesthetic' 
and which (in so doing) solves the long-standing critical dichotomy of 
poet and philosopher in a new way which does justice both to the 
poetry and to the philosophy. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ETHICS OF PERCEPTION - SEEING THE 
GOOD 
The first chapter of this thesis examined the disparity between 
the ethical claims of the poem and the paucity of ethical advice delivered 
in the text. Lucretius, it has been suggested, does not address the 
specific ethical questions of everyday Roman life which would equip his 
newly converted reader to put the master's precepts into practice. This 
chapter will now examine the nature of the ethical advice which the poet 
does give the reader and assess its consistency and suitability for the 
purpose. 
The purpose of ethics was usually in the ancient world defined 
as answering the question 'How should men live?', to identify and seek 
what is the good - usually defined as happiness and well-being for 
human beings as they engage in societal living - and the general 
purpose of all such ethical writing was to define the term 'good' in 
actionl. The language and scope of such ethical enquiries adopted a 
'medical' and therapeutic tone in placesl and Lucretius adopts the 
stance of the doctor on many occasions. 3 
The ethics of the poem bears this out further. The poet 
appears to assume, for instance, that 
1 cf. e.g. Rowe (1976), 9: 'For [Greek philosophers] the aims of moral pbilosopby were at 
all times essentially practical in nature. Its chief concern was not with the theoretical analysis of 
the nature of moral discourse, but with the establishment and the justification of particular 
systems of conduct. ' 
2 'Throughout the late fifth and early fourth centuries .. Greek thinkers and writers were 
finding it increasingly easy to think of ethical/political argument as similar to medicine and to 
look to it for 'healing' when confronted with seemingly intractable psychological afflictions. ' 
(Nussbaum (1994) S2 
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pleasure is the good 
pleasure is the removal of pain 
therefore removal of pain is the good 
and so his principal target in this objective was to remove the 
unnecessary mental and physical pains of fear and mental and physical 
suffering~ fear of the gods interfering in the world by sending plagues 
or thunderbolts4, fear of torments after death', and pain caused by the 
misguided seeking of pleasure. If pain is removed, then, Lucretius 
implies, happiness will inevitably follow. There is nothing in the 
universe which is not material and atomic, and so all propositions - even 
ethical and moral normative statements - rely on sense-perception for 
factual verification and can be demonstrated by reference to the natural 
sciences. The priority of sense-perception in ethical (as in all other) 
judgement is going to be crucial in the argument and will be discussed in 
some detail. The first and most obvious demonstration of this 
priority of sense-experience is the frequent use of words denoting sight 
and light in the poem. Time and again the reader is told that he will see 
the truth, for example: 
unde anima atque anirni constet natura videndum6. 
or agam: 
quas ob res ubi viderimus nil posse creari' 
J most obviously 1. 935-50 = "'.10-25 
4 6.379-422 on thunderbolts: the plague is explained in wholly naturalistic terms at 6. 
1090-1286 
s 3. 31-58 
6 1. 131 
7 1. 155 
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and he is also promised that apparently contradictory evidence (e.g. the 
seeing of ghosts 'proving' that we can live after death) will in tum be 
explained. He does not deny that the sense-experience itself is valid, but 
rather asserts that our interpretation of the sense-data is faulty. 
In doing this, Lucretius differs toto caelo from Plato and the 
whole metaphysical tradition. For Plato, reality cannot be apprehended 
by the senses but only by reason: higher good qualities such as justice, 
beauty and so on do exist as perfect Forms but are not accessible to the 
senses, and even where we recognise these qualities in the world of sense it 
is not that we have learned from sense-experience to perceive them but 
that we recognise them from our pre-natal knowledge of the perfect 
Forms. True knowledge is of the Forms, sense-experience being only ever 
imperfect opinion, as expounded in Theaetetus (ISle). For Lucretius, true 
knowledge is of the atoms - which are themselves as immutable and eternal 
as Plato's Forms - and such knowledge comes through the senses. Where 
the obvious unreliability of the senses leads Plato to posit that they are the 
imperfect transmitters of perfect truth and must be replaced by reason as 
the discoverer of reality, Lucretius undaunted presses the anti-Sceptical 
case to the point where he claims that we can perceive the faults in our 
own perception and that his explanatory theories (based on perception) can 
account for the flaws in perception itse1f1. 
What we call goodness is in fact a state of personal happiness 
guided and secured by the perception of the limits and nature of 
pleasure, katastematic rather than kinetic. Above all, it is the task of 
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the ethical philosopher to give the sort of scientific knowledge which 
will produce the truth about the world~ this will promote right thinking 
and reduce ignorance and will consequently maximise happiness and 
banish empty fears. People all seek the same thing - pleasure - but the 
wicked and the foolish are misguided in their interpretation of what is 
good for them, victims of an inability to see the world aright. 
Goodness and happiness can only be gained by living the good life 
according to our atomic bodily nature, and it is therefore the task of the 
atomist ethical philosopher to expound the nature of things and let the 
ethics be derived from that, as we argued earlier. This is already 
leading us towards the idea that ethics can be aesthetic - if all ethical 
judgements rest on the perception (aisthesis) of the world, then the 
judgements will be to that extent at least aesthetic ones as well as moral 
assertions. We must first examine the major sections of the poem 
where Lucretius explicitly makes judgements of a moral, social and 
political nature and see how this primacy of right perception is at all 
times the dominant ethical imperative. 
THE FEAR OF DEATH 
The analysis of the fear of death as a cause of misery and vice 
in book 3 is a most revealing passage to illustrate the poet's ethical 
stance: 
8 see 4. 469-S21 and Godwin (1986) 120-124 
29 
et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus 
funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, 
omnia suffimdens mortis nigrore, neque ullam 
esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit. 
nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos 
infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti 
et se seire animi naturam sanguinis esse 
aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas, 
nee prorsum quiequam nostrae ration is egere, 
hine licet advertas animum magis onmia laudis 
iactari eausa quam quod res ipsa probetur: 
extorres idem patria Iongeque fugati 
conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 
onmibus aerumnis adfecti denique viwnt, 
et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant 
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu' divis 
inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 
acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 
quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 
convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit~ 
nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo 
elieiuntur et eripitur persona, manet res. 
denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido, 
quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 
iuris et interdum socios scelerum atque ministros 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 
non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 
turpis enim ferme contemptus et aeris egestas 
semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 
et quasi iam leti portas cuncta~er ante; 
unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 
effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 
sanguine civili rem conf1ant divitiasque 
conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accwnulantes, 
crudeles gaudent in tristi funere ftatris 
et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 
consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore 
macerat invidia ante oculos ilium esse potentem 
ilium aspectsri, claro qui incedit honore, 
ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 
intereunt partim statuarum et nominis ergo. 
et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae 
percipit humanos odium lueisque videadae 
ut sibi conseiscant maerenti pectore letum 
obliti fontem curarum hune esse timorem: 
hunc vexare pudorem, hune vincula amicitiai 
rumpere et in summa pietatem evertere suadet; 
nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis 
prodiderunt, vitare Acherusia templa petentes. 
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The passage has puzzled editors and has therefore not generally been 
given the treatment it deserves: 'unter allen die philosophische Ethik 
betreffenden Aussagen des Lukrez gibt es kaum eine, die in den 
Kommentaren so wenig eine sichere, wirklich voU befriedigende 
Beurteilung gefunden hat wie die Herleitung der als typisch fur sein 
Zeitalter angesehenen Exzesse von Gewinnsucht und Machtstreben aus 
der Todesfurcht' declares Schmid9. Bailey comments on the 
'vehemence and strangeness'10 of the poet's treatment of the fear of 
death and its moral consequences, but the passage has· many features 
which are fully in accordance with the poet's style. There is firstly the 
satirical removing of the mask from the boastful men who claim not to 
fear death; the man who claims he understands death and would sooner 
die than suffer disease or disgrace is still to be found dragging out his 
life in shame elsewhere and carrying out superstitious rituals which 
show his ignorance of the truth. This is mockery of human pretensions 
and encouragement to the reader to disown such behaviour as being 
dishonest to the truth and to others. 
There is then far more serious criticism and some original 
insight on the part of the poet: the fear of death is in no small measure 
responsible for the immoral behaviour of many people. This notion is 
not to be found in Epicurus himself: Bailey and Kenney point towards 
K.~. 6 and 7 where Epicurus speaks of the 'secure life' (a~la-
9 Schmid (1978) 137 
10 Bailey (1947) ii 993 
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stabilis vita 66) but the Greek will not extend as far as Lucretius' 
conclusions and it appears to be the poet's own idea which inspires this 
passage. It is important to unpack exactly what the poet is saying here: 
he is not producing the stock picture of black cura stalking the rich and 
famous and cutting them down to mortal size, such as we find in (say) 
Horace Odes 3.1.40; nor is he examining the contrast between the rich 
man ruthlessly pursuing wealth at home in the face of certain death with 
its inescapable eternal abode as we find in Horace Odes 2.18. He is 
claiming that the rich and ambitious pursue their desires not in despite 
of the fear of death but because of it and that therefore they are 
apparently seeking life (as in the 'good things of life') but actually 
looking towards death, if only they knew it. 
almost syllogistically: 
The poet explains this 
men see poverty and disgrace as being next door to death, 
they wish to flee death 
therefore they flee disgrace and poverty. 
They do this by seeking wealth by unscrupulous means where they can 
and begrudging such status in others in bitter envy where they cannot, 
ambition and envy being for them two sides of the same coin. The 
logic is poor: the shoring up of 'security' through money and fame is 
more probably an attempt to enjoy what life we have left rather than a 
terror of its ending, and the most that could be said for the poet's 
theory in this form is that such pleasures may function as a distraction 
from the awful truth of our eventual demise. It would have been 
better perhaps for the poet to have urged that, since pleasure cannot be 
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increased once the pain of want has been satisfied, there is no point in 
trying to squeeze more pleasures into a limited lifespan, linking the 
passage with the concept of limited desires and CL1tA.170na 11. This sort 
of critique of the greedy lifestyle can be found elsewherel2 and occurs 
again later in book 313, and is echoed in a passage of Porphyry where 
Epicurus is said to have linked the insatiable desire for life, wealth and 
property with 'fearing the terror associated with death as limitless' (ro 
Kara roy Oavarov oelvov cOs ciNtbpavrovFN4~ it would have been 
easy and philosophically advantageous for the poet to adduce such 
criticisms here, especially as he puts similar arguments into the mouth 
of Nature against the old man reluctant to leave life's banquet even 
though his time is up: 
'aufer abhinc lacrimas, baratre, et compesce querellas! 
omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces; 
sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis, 
inperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita, 
et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante 
quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum'IS 
Time and again the reader is reminded of the limitations of nature and 
human nature, and it is only the fool who does not realise that pleasure 
and happiness are no less attainable now just because life is finite; and 
death cannot be unpleasant because there will be no sensation at all. 
Instead of this reasoning here, however, we have a passage of social 
11 cf. Schmid (1978), Segal (1990) IS 
12 2. 14-61 
13 the Danaids at 3. 1003-1010, recalling Plato Gorgias 493dS-49Sb9 
14 Porphyry Frag. 4S8 Usener, cited by Segal (1990) 16 
IS 3. 9S4-960 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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and political comment whose direction is oblique and In need of 
explanation and whose logical structure is faulty. 
The two worlds of the successful and the unsuccessful, the 
ones in the bright light16 of fame (claro), the others in the darkness 
(tenebris). are as sharply contrasted as the living and the dead: 
illum esse potentem, 
ilium aspectari, claro qui inc edit honore, 
ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur. 17 
The fear of death shatters pudor, amicitia, pietas; loyalty to the 
fatherland (patriam) and parents is a lamented casualty of the fear of 
death, as is the bond of amicitia. In extreme cases, the enjoyment of 
life is so sickened by the moral and psychological malaise of the fear of 
death that suicide is committed - a neat ironic touch of the poet'sl8 
whereby the fear of death actually produces its own disaster and thus 
'proves' itself in a manner close to Cicero's account: 
ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur. et ut 
succumbere doloribus eosque hwnili animo inbeciUoque fene miserum est, ob 
eamque debilitatem animi multi pareotes. multi amicos. non nulli patriam, 
plerique antern se ipsos penitus perdiderunt ... 19 
This is not merely satire, of course; the moral terms are 
loaded with value-judgements. No discussion of Lucretius as an 
ethical writer should fail to notice the implicit values in such tenns as 
pudor, pietas, amicitia. These last two in particular had a special 
meaning for the Roman of the late Republic, meaning far more than 
visual imagery once again 
3. T~JT 
not origiDal to him: cf. Democritus B203 OK 
de jinibus 1.1S.49 
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'duty' and 'friendship' and extending into the world of political alliance20 
as in Lyne's useful analysis of the use of such terms in Catullus: 
The Roman social code was deeply feh and, as a rule, elaborately 
practised. Virtually every page of the correspondence of Cicero ... attests both 
code and tenninology ... Fides ('fidelity', 'integrity') was, or should be, the 
foundation of all actions and relationships; one conducted oneself in 
accordance with pietas ('sense of loyahy', 'conscientiousness'). One had a 
profound sense of offiCium ('service', 'dutifulness'); one was pleased, indeed 
compelled, to find and to display gratia ('favour'). Embracing and applying all 
these and other ideas was the extensive, sometimes very formal relationship 
connoted by amicitia: a complex and profound 'friendship' implying at best 
mutual obligation, mutual affection and mutual pleasure. Amicitia was, 
among the Roman aristocracy, the essence of any proper relationship, private 
or public, business or pleasure .... this language, the highly charged language 
of Roman aristocratic fellowship ... '21 
The implications for Lucretius' text are considerable. The 
poet not only uses the terms of political activity. he actually appears 
committed to the morals behind the political machine even though the 
Epicurean is opposed to the engaging of the citizen in politics. Why 
would he decry the breaking of the bonds of amici/ia, if he did not feel 
that such amicitia was a good thing? Is pudor any more than mere 
20 see e.g. Brunt (1965) and see the important discussion of the theory of L's seeking of 
Menunius' patronage in Clay (1983) 215, a theory which Clay rightly dismisses as 'literary 
fiction'. 
21 Lyne (1980) 24-5 
22 
23 
24 
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maintenance of status and as such is it worth lamenting when it is lost? 
Pietas also might be seen as merely duty towards others with little gain 
for oneself Is the poet therefore consistently opposed to political 
activity, or just to the seeking of glory and power? Are these 
distinguishable goals? Fowler, in an important article22, has discussed 
the present passage and drawn attention to the parallels which obtain 
between it and the near-contemporary Sallust, as well as adducing other 
parallels such as Hesiod Works and Days 176-20J23 - but he has not 
gone far enough in his analysis of the incoherences of the text as an 
anti-political tract. 
The language used is that of political invective and hyperbole24 
and the target is, to begin with, the politically ambitious: who else 
would find themselves exiled (exto"es patria..Joedati crimine turpi 49-
50)? The poet's quarry then becomes less obviously political - after all, 
the struggle to climb ad summas opes could describe the quest for 
wealthl5 just as surely as political power, the greed of an eques as 
surely as the ambition of a senator - especially when the poet shortly 
afterwards talks of the motive force being fear of acris egestas which 
can only mean poverty. The phrase avarities et honorum caeca cupido 
(59) joins the twin goals of wealth and power neady together, to be 
glossed later as haec vulnera vitae (63), that is, aspects of life which 
effectively disable the human being from enjoying it to the full although 
Fowler (1989b) 
Fowler (l989b) 137 n. 71 
examples quoted in Fowler (l989b) 137-9 + on. 
see OLD S.v. lops' 4a 
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they think that they are climbing to the pinnacle of power. The seeking 
after wealth and power forces men to cross the boundaries of the law 
and to struggle night and day towards opes. The results of such 
behaviour are delight in death - even that of a brother - and the mistrust 
of hospitality; thus the fear of one's own death brings about callous 
disregard for the deaths of others and mistrust of even dinner-party 
hosts26• 
What is essential to this thesis is to see Lucretius' use of the 
language of sight and delusion to describe his targets. These men are 
seeking what they believe will make them happy and successful; none 
of which the poet can disapprove of in itself. Their mistake, however, 
is to misinterpret the evidence available by thinking that the res they 
want require murder for their acquisition. Notice how the poet 
criticises their blindness (caeca cupido 59) and how their disgrace and 
poverty is a matter of seeming so (videtur) to others and is made into a 
cartoon-like simile whose obvious unreality is a form of mockery (quasi 
iam leti ante .. port as 67). Men are driven by falso te"ore (68), their 
empty wistful dreams being well emphasised in the repeated lange 
longeque (69). Their actions are then an inflation of their ideas into a 
multiplicity of action, the proliferation well brought out by the verbs 
conflant... condup/icant and the verbal repetition caedem caede to 
show verbally the repeated murders. The verbs are interesting here: 
conflo has the meanings of 'running up a debt'27 as well as 'hatching a 
26 cf. 5. 1010 
27 Sallust Cat 14.2, 24.3,OLD s.v. 'contlo' 7b 
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consipracy'28, and also has the sense of 'inventing a lie'29; thus the poet 
can in a single word suggest impecunious political chicanery which is 
based on a lie. The notion of 'reduplication' in the word conduplicant 
also carries with it the sense of illusion as at 4. 447-452. The moral 
confusion is well brought out by the oxymoronic words gaudent in tristi 
(72) just as there is something bizarre in 'hating and fearing' the tables 
of people who are consanguineum - the word neatly picking up the twin 
associations of joined by blood and kin but also sanguine civili from 70. 
The primary emotion in the next paragraph is invidia - another false 
form of videre - and just in case we have not noticed the visual nature 
of the feelings being mocked the poet adds ante ocu/os. The ambitious 
man is looking with mistaken envy at a man who is himself being looked 
upon (aspectari) with public honour (claro ... honore), a passage well 
suggesting the hall-of-mirrors which is Roman politics in which each 
man is nervously eying the opposition. The complaint of the failed 
politician is again obviously false, couched in a revealing metaphor: 
ipsi se in tenebr;s vo/vi caenoque queruntur (77) where the prevailing 
theme of light and darkness (truth and falsehood) is joined to a familiar 
political cliche caen03° in (again) a piece of obvious unreality and ( 
hyperbolic self-pity - note the inflated conceit of vo/v; put into the 
mouth of a whining fool. The following line neatly sums up their 
'sacrifice' as all being for the sake of statuarum et nominis (78), 'an 
28 Cicero de Orat. 2.124, OLD S.v. 'codo' 3b 
29 Cicero Q. Rose. 48, OLD S.v. 'codo' 4 
30 e.g. Cicero In Vatinium 23 fuerisque non tribunus plebis. sed intolerandus ex caeno 
nescio qui atque ex tenebris tyrannus; cfibid. 17, Otto (1890) 63 
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almost luvenalian phrase'31 which also neatly encapsulates the argument 
under discussion: a nomen is of course merely a word, a sound with 
no substance, and hardly worth dying for; whereas a statua, while 
having a great deal more permamence and suggesting the sort of 
imagines patrum on which the Roman nobility prided themselves32, is 
also a translation of the Greek eiOOJAoV which also means for Lucretius 
simulacrum, the insubstantial images being emitted from things all the 
time. This kind of etymological joke is very much in the poet's 
manner33 and adds greatly to the effect here. The final irony is that the 
fear of death brings it about, anxiety breeding hatred of life and then 
suicide; once again the poet imports an unnecessary element of 'seeing' 
here in his gloss of vitae as lucisque videndae with the ironic point that 
seeing incorrectly sours the enjoyment of seeing (i.e. living) at all, but 
that their suicide is a mistake caused by their 'forgetting' (obliti) the 
truth. Knowledge is secured by perception when correctly interpreted, 
and happiness must be secured by knowledge rather than ignorance. 
The fool is not wicked but simply deluded, seeing is adequate to 
correct his folly and illusion is the root of all evil. 
These illusions then cause the moral chaos we saw earlier. 
Again notice the language used: 
hunc vexare pudorem, hunc vincula amicitiai 
rumpere et in summa pietatem evert ere suadet; 
nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentes 
prodiderunt, vitare Acherusia templa petentes.34 
31 Kenney (1971) 86 
32 cf. e.g. the words of Marius in Sallust B.J. 85 
33 cf. e.g. the Phrygeslfrugesjoke at 2.610-13, with West (1969) 105-6 
34 3. 83-6 
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where the verbs in particular are all violent and aggressive: vexare is to 
'damage, attack, treat roughly, ravage, afflict', only here used of 
pudor3S .. vincula rumpere suggests the breaking of bonds and thus 
liberation as at Cicero Verrines 5.79 
si aufugisset, si vincula rupisset 
or in Catilinam 4.8 
adiungit gravem poenam municipiis, si quis eorum vincula 
ruperit... 
although the element of 'liberation' is being subverted here into the 
atomic notion of shattering the cohesive bonds of amicitia, the word 
vinculum having a precise atomic meaning as 'the force which binds the 
atoms into their concilia' as at 6. 355-6: 
quae facile insinuantur et insinuata repente 
dissolvunt nodos omnis et vincla relaxant. 
The violent shattering of the bonds Qf trust - to liberate the amoral man 
perhaps from anything which might hamper his progress - thus becomes 
a simple atomic rupture~ we see amicitia almost as a concilium whose 
inner atomic coherence has been shattered by folly which derives from 
inability to see the correct atomic view of the world. The metaphor 
implicit in pielatem evertere is that of 'overturning a statue' or even 
'overthrowing a city', strengthened by the qualifying phrase in summa 
whose surface meaning ('in a word') is accompanied by the sense of 
3' OLD S.v. 'vexo' 6 shows how infrequently the word is used metaphorically; for the 
metaphorical use here compare Propertius 3.19.3: ubi c:ontempti rupistis frena pudorls 
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summus as 'topmost', suggesting that pietas is being overthrown from 
top to bottom as at 5. 163 
nec verbis vexare et ab imo evertere summa 
The crime betrays both fatherland and fathers (patriam .. parentis) with 
the telling emotive epithet caros36 used of the parents; all this to avoid 
the mockingly named Acherusia temp/a, whose very title suggests their 
unreality and fatuity. There is furthermore a nice double paradox here: 
the fools are hoping to avoid Acheron but are 'seeking' to do so, 
recalling the poet's ironic remarks that the fear of death is a looking 
towards the very thing we wish to avoid, a paradox well' evoked in the 
oxymoronic verbs vi/are ... petentes. Furthermore, the 'avoiding' of 
Acheron can only be for them a temporary measure as they will one day 
have to die and then face the terrible superstitious nightmare, whereas 
the Epicurean can avoid Acheron for ever by discovering that it simply 
does not exist - he can thus avoid Acheron without having to murder his 
family to do so. 
The poet concludes the passage with a repetition of the telling 
theme of children contrasted with adults tied to darkness contrasted 
with light, a Leitmotif of the poem)7, thus neatly leaving us with the 
strong sense that perception of the truth is the prerequisite of wisdom 
and happiness, that the moral evils he adduces are misguided delusion 
rather than wilful wickedness. 
36 surprising perhaps in the text of an Epicurean, in the light of Epicurus' stress on 
avoiding attachments (aurrl,oK81a) 
37 3. 87-93 = 2. SS-61 = 6. 3S-41; 3.91-3 = 1. 146-148 
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This is where the poet parts company seriously with the other 
'moralist' accounts of late Republican vice which are usually compared 
with him. Sallust for instance lists the sort of vices which we find in 
Lucretius, but with no hint of there being anything other than sheer 
wickedness at work in the followers of Catiline: 
nam quicumque impudicus adulter ganeo manu ventre pene 
bona patria laceraverat, quique alienum aes grande conflaverat, quo 
flagitium aut facinus redimeret, praeterea omnes undique parricidae 
sacrilegi convicti iudiciis aut pro factis iudicium timentes, ad hoc quos 
manus atque lingua periurio aut sanguine civili alebat, postremo omnes 
quos flagitium egestas conscius animus exagitabat, ii Catilinae proximi 
familiaresque erant.38 
There are verbal similarities between the two: aes alienum conflaverat 
reminds us of rem conflant divitiasque conduplicant (70), parricidae 
is not a long way from gaudent in tristi funere fratres (72), sanguis 
civilis occurs in both (70), the judicial disgrace of convicti iudiciis is 
recalled in the poet's description ofthejoedati crimine turpi; but these 
similarities only underline the difference in explanation between the 
moralising Sallust and the psychologically more subtle Lucretius. 
Similar differences obtain between Lucretius and another contemporary 
Catullus, who closes poem 64 with a similar catalogue of vices to 
explain why the gods no longer visit the human race: 
sed postquam tellus scelere est imbuta nefando, 
iustitiamque onme5 cupida de mente fuganmt, 
perfudere manus fTatemo sanguine ftatres, 
destitit extinctos natus lugere panmes, 
optavit genitor primaevi funera nati, 
38 Sallust Cat. 14. 1-3 
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tiber uti nuptae poteretur flore novellae, 
ignaro mater substemens se impia nato 
unpia non verita est divos scelerare penates, 
omnia fanda nefanda malo permixta furore 
iustifieam nobis mentem avertere deorum. 
quare nee talis dignantur visere eoetus, 
nee se contingi patiuntur lumine elaro.39 
Again there is the stress on judicial corruption (iustitiam jugarunt), on 
fratricide ifraterno sanguine fratres), on the betrayal of parents 
(destitit .. lugere parentes)~ but again there is no suggestion that such 
behaviour is foolish but simply a blanket moral condemnation of 
unredeemed wickedness. 
These judgements of human folly in Lucretius are continued in 
the lengthy and impressive piece of allegoresis which seeks to re-
interpret the myths of the underworld towards the end of the third book 
as all being 'types' of human folly. The fear of death is no longer at the 
centre of the poet's attention, except insofar as he is discrediting the 
myths of punishment after death to reduce the fear of such torments. 
Again, however, he fails to do what we expect; we would most 
naturally expect him to argue rationalistically that as sensation ends with 
death there can be no pain after death, and that such stories are 
therefore totally to be rejected. Instead he uses the stories themselves 
as allegories with which to attack other forms of (to him) immoral 
behaviour, thus killing the two birds of superstition and misbehaviour 
with the same stone. In all cases the fault is one of not seeing the truth 
rather than having the wrong desires; thus bearing out in all cases the 
thesis argued here of the primacy of perception in ethical decisions. 
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The 'real' Tantalus, for instance, is to be found in life as 
follows: 
sed magis in vita divom metus urget inanis 
mortalis, easumque timent quem euique ferat fors4O 
where the fatuity of the fear of gods is well brought out by the epithet 
inanis. Tit yon is not a giant in Tartarus, but rather: 
sed Tityos nobis hie est, in amore iacentem 
quem volueres lacerant atque exest anxius angor 
aut alia quavis seindunt cuppedine curae.41 
tom by the 'birds' of love as he tosses on a bed of anxiety42 which is all 
in the mind43 and the result of the sort of folly he analyses in book 4. 
As Kenney has pointed out, even the language of this passage is 
sarcastic and ironic, debunking the lover with his own pretensions 
drawn from the fashionable Greek love poetry of the time44. 
More to the point of our present discussion, Sisyphus 
becomes a frustrated politician: 
Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est, 
qui petere a populo fasces saevasque secures 
imbibit et semper victus tristisque recedit. 
nam petere imperium quod inanest nee datur umquam 
atque in eo semper durum suffere laborem, 
hoc est adverso nixantem trudere monte 
saxum quod tamen e summo iam vertice rursum 
64. 397-408; for further discussion sec Godwin (1995) 171-175 
3. 982-3 
3. 992-4 
see on this passage Kenney (1971) 224-S andKcnney (1970) 44-47 
see OLD s. v. 'angor' 2 and its cognate lKljective anxillS 
Kenney (1970) 44-7 
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volvitur et plani raptim petit aequora campi.4S 
He, like Tantalus, seeks what is inane and therefore insubstantial or 
even threatening (saevas .. secures); he is prepared to endure durum 
laborem to achieve this just as the fool at the beginning of the book was 
prepared to niti praestante labore46 . The poet mocks the politician 
with his own vocabulary: petere and recedit4' are both technical terms 
of the political scene, petit being sarcastically repeated at 1002 of the 
rock: and the verb imbibit is striking here in its sense of gullible open-
mouthed drinking in of foolish purposes and thirsting for power as at 
6.72 where the notion is mocked of the gods ut ex ira poenas petere 
imbibat acres. The sketch of the politician is obviously hyperbolic: few 
politicians would enjoy absolutely no success, as is stated in the poet's 
semper victus ... nec datur umquam - although obviously the mythical 
context (of endless torment after death) requires an element of 
interminability - and as with the men who die statuarum et nominis 
ergo48 these men are seeking the idle show of fasces saevasque secures, 
the outward appearance of power and its empty show. As with the 
earlier passage, the modem-day Sisyphus is also taken in by 
appearances and is ignorant of the reality. 
The Danaids represent the type of person who is never 
satisfied although the means for his satisfaction are freely to hand: 
deinde animi ingratam naturam pascere semper 
.. , 3. 995-1002 
46 3. 62 
47 cf. Kenney ad loc, West (1969) 100-102 
48 3. 78 
atque explere bonis rebus satiareque numquam -
quod faciunt nobis annorum tempora, circum 
cum redeunt fetusque ferunt variosque lepores, 
nee tamen explemur vitai fiuctibus umquam -
hoc, ut opinor, id est, aevo flo rente pueUas 
quod memorant laticem pertusum congerere in vas, 
quod tamen expleri nulla ratione potestur.49 
This theme of arrA.l1cnla continues the ethical doctrine by contrasting 
the insatiability of the human and the abundance of the goods available; 
the poet dwells lovingly on the goodness and beauty of the fruits of the 
seasons, stressing both the eternal recurrence (redeunt) and their 
fecundity (jetusque leront) and their beauty (variosque /epores) in a 
neat tricolon crescendo which underlines the ingratitude' of the human 
being just as Nature upbraids the old man loth to die at 3. 931-963. 
Once again, however, the slant is perceptual and aesthetic rather than 
simply moralistic. It is not that human beings are inherently greedy 
and selfish, but simply that they do not see what is needed for their 
happiness, the familiar parvum quod salis est as earlier in the poem: 
o miseras hominum mentes I 0 pectora caeca! 
qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis 
degitur hoc aevi quodcumque est! nonne videre 
nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui 
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mensque fiuatur 
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque? 
ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus 
esse opus omnino, quae demant cumque dolorem, 
delicias quoque uti multas substernere possint'o; 
Here again the poet is stressing the need simply to look at the world 
and see the plenitude and the beauty of what is freely available to us, 
49 3. 1003-1010 
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the error is one of perception rather than intent, and the inherent 
contradiction in human behaviour well evoked by the paradox that we 
can explere but not satiare. The insertion of value-judgements such 
as varios Ie pores indicates that Epicureanism is not going to rob the 
world of all its colour, but on the contrary will put the wise man in 
touch with beauty which is there but often unnoticed. Once again, 
the fault is misinterpretation of evidence rather than wickedness, and 
the aesthetic perception of the truth is the poet's remedy for it. 
The poet ends this section by looking at the pangs of 
conscience allegorised into the pains of Hades: 
Cerberus et Furiae iam vero et Iuds egestas 
T artarus horriferos eructans faucibus aestus -
qui neque sunt usquam nec possunt esse profecto. 
sed metus in vita poenarum pro male factis 
est insignibus insignis, scelerisque luella -
carcer et horribilis de saxo iactu' deorsum, 
verbera carnifices robur pix lammina taedae; 
quae tamen etsi absunt, at mens sibi conscia factis 
praemetuens adhibet stimulos torretque flagellis, 
nee videt interea qui terminus esse malorum 
possit nec quae sit poenarum denique finis, 
atque eadem metuit magis haec ne in morte gravescant. 
hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita.' 1 
Here again the perception is all: the guilty man can see the shocking 
array of punishments applied to the criminal in this life - 'the gruesome 
inventory of Roman inhumanity' as Kenney calls it'2 - but (as if this 
were not bad enough) he goes on to invent similar punishments after 
'0 2. 14-22 
'1 3. 1011-1023 
'2 Kenney (1971) 230 ad 1014-1017 
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death which will be even worse (graveseant) because they cannot end, 
thus neatly inverting the usual fear of death as an eternal lack of 
pleasure into an eternal agony of sufferingB. Once again, perception 
is all: significantly the poet lists lucis egestas among the pains of 
Hades, and the reason for the mental anguish is simply one of inability 
to see: nee videt ... This causes the self-inflicted suffering of the 
frightened man (mens ... adhibet stimulos to"etque f1agellis) who has 
avoided the real punishment but torments his mind with anticipatory 
fear (praemetuens) of what may never happen, not even allowing 
himself the consolation that he can always release himself from any 
possibility of punishment by death. In the case of death, then, we see 
that the poet has taken the Epicurean arguments against the fear of 
death based on loss of sensation and has developed them at length: he 
has also used the fear of death to explain features of social and political 
life of which he disapproves such as greed and ambition; and he has 
demythologised the tales of Tartarus into allegories of human folly here 
and now. In all three cases the primacy of aesthetic sense-perception 
is obvious~ such sensation defines living as opposed to dyings4, such 
sensation informs our minds of the truth of the world and allows us to 
make correct moral judgements in conducting our lives, and the types 
of human folly are all marked out by the inability to see the truth and 
dismiss the idle fears of death and suffering. The perception of the 
limits of our pleasure and pain will liberate us from the pain of anxiety 
Sl cf. e.g. Plutarch Non posse suavite,. v;v; secundum Epicurum 1107 A 
S4 urBprJOtS 06 scmv aio97jasws (, 8civa-ros D.L. 10. 124; DRN 3. 830-42 
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and thus this perception itself becomes a source of pleasure - as 
pleasure is the removal of pain - and therefore a source of ethical and 
moral good. At this point the term 'aesthetic' becomes justified in 
describing the perception of truth which is the reception and recreation 
of goodness. The negating of the fear of death is thus transformed into 
a positive force for happiness and moral goodness. 
ROMANTIC LOVE 
When we come to the diatribe against romantic love, we see 
the same insistence on the aesthetics of truth over illusion. Lucretius 
seems to be pessimistic in the extreme about certain forms of romantic 
love, but the chief attitude which emerges from his attack is again one 
of folly rather than VIce, of illusion and delusion rather than 
wickedness. 
Epicurus was famously ambivalent towards the subject. In 
one place" he says: 
auvovalav oe t/Jamv ov1jaat p£v OVOEtrO'rE, ara7r1]'rOv oe Ei pry 
, "a'l-Kal EYMA.'I'E. 
whereas elsewhere56 he counts sexual pleasure among the good things 
of life. The Epicurean ideal was ataraxia, and so sexual activity will 
be good if it promotes this by removing the pain of fiustration, but bad 
if it impairs the overall serenity of the wise man's disposition. The 
wise man therefore is not to fall in love (epaoOTpEa6al) but neither is 
55 D.L. 10. 118 
S6 D.L. 10.6 
he necessarily to remain celibate, although Epicurus is said to have 
denied marriage and child-rearing to the wise man'7. The sane lover 
is one who takes sexual pleasure when he needs to do so, when its 
abstention would cause the pain of frustration; the Epicurean lover is 
likely to be promiscuous: 
si non prima novis conturbes vulnera plagis 
volgivagaque vagus Venere ante recentia cures'8 
and the romantic lover who insists on the one and only (unattainable) 
sexual partner is depriving himself of pleasure and condemning himself 
to pain. What distinguishes the sane and the insane in love is again 
perception of the truth - the truth both about our real bodily needs and 
also the truth about the objects of our desires: Lucretius well brings 
out this dichotomy of the sani and the miseri, the healthy people who 
use food and sex but are literally under no illusions about either, and 
the diseased wretched people who do not. The pathetic delusions of 
the infatuated lover are described as a sore (ulcus) and then as madness 
(juror): 
ulcus enim vivescit et inveterascit alendo 
inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit'9 
whereas the quieter charms of the 'homely little woman' are 
enunciated with approval and the 'habit of love' sounds more like 
Epicurean friendship60. Sexual pleasure fell into the class of pleasures 
S7 D.L. 10. 119 J.l'70S "ai rCXJ.l~C16lV "ai 't"6KV01rO'~V tOv aot;Ov 
S8 4. 1070-1071, cf. Horace Satires l.2.116-119 
S9 4.1068-9 
60 4.1278-1287: cfCiceroDeFinibus1.21.69 
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which are natural but not necessary and hence are to be satisfied where 
necessary but not indulged in beyond the body's natural need61. Once 
again it is axiomatic that pleasure, once the immediate desire has been 
satisfied, can only be varied and not increased62, especially if we are 
considering this sort of kinetic pleasure which only arises from 
mechanical causes and thus is simply a response to an involuntary 
stimulus. The sexual urge is inborn in us, to be awakened when we 
enter the choppy tides of adolescence63: perception is the result of 
eftluences beyond our control, and hunger, sleep and dreams are all 
explicable in similarly mechanistic atomic terms64. The creation and 
emission of sperm is thus natural; what is unnatural and unecessary is 
the retention of sperm as practised by the romantic lover for whom no 
other woman will do, whose sheer frustration causes him to idealise the 
beloved and project his fantasies onto her: the locked-out serenader 
would flee if he were actually admitted and his illusions about the girl 
were rudely shattered6~ Marriage is assumed66 and even 
recommended with a wife who is: 
morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto67 
whereas the romantic lover is doomed to frustration as his obsessive 
attachment to one girl will limit his chances of obtaining sexual 
61 D.L. 10. 127: Cicero de Finibus 1. 45 
62 Lefter to Menoeceus 130-131, Kuriai Doxai 3, 18, Gosling and Taylor 348 
oj 4. 1030 
64 Aristotle (de motu animalium 103b5f1) discusses the movement of the penis along with 
sleeping and waking and breathing as movements over which we have no control: see 
Furley (1967) 221-2 
6~ 4. 1177-84 
66 4. 1277 
67 4. 1281 
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pleasure compared to the chances enjoyed by the promiscuous, where 
the girl may not be beautiful but she is certainly better than nothing (a 
nice example of the parvum quod satis est argument68): 
et iacere umorem conlectum in corpora quaeque 
nec retinere, semel conversum unius amore 
et servare sibi curam certumque doiorem6Y 
Lucretius' attitude to love (like his attitude towards politics, greed and 
death) can thus be seen to be descriptive rather than prescriptive: the 
romantic lover does not in fact enjoy the life of love, as it does not 
answer the bodily needs which sexual pleasure serves when it is 
indulged as Epicurus suggests. The romantic lover's attitude to sex is 
blind, greedy and unsatisfied - the perfect antithesis of the Epicurean 
ideal of open-eyed moderate pleasure enjoyed even by the primitive man 
described in book five. 70 The passage in question is not simply 
romanticised nostalgia, of course: the fact that we are here at all 
proves that earlier generations could withstand the sort of privations 
which we find unbearable and still reproduce, on the syllogistic 
reasoning: 
if men then = men now, then they would not have survived to 
breed as we would not breed in those conditions (if, P, then Q) 
but they did reproduce (but not-Q) 
therefore men then * men now (therefore not-P). 
68 cf. 2. 20·36, 5. 1412·35 
69 4.106S.7 
70 S. 962.965 
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Furthermore, the description of their life as being conducted more 
jerarnm is in itself not necessarily condemnatory, especially as it comes 
qualified with vulgivago, a coinage whose only other use in the poem is 
one of approval71 . The sexual habits of early man, for instance, are 
not described with disapproval - on the contrary, the phrasing of 
Venus in silvis iungebat corpora amantum 
is all too idyllic, recalling the prelude72 and the 'natural' love-making of 
happy union in book 473 where again 'natural' animal habits are 
compared with approval over against the unnatural habits of the 
romantic lover. Of course the love-making is not always a mark of 
mutua cupido but may be caused by violent a viri vis atque impensa 
Iibido74 or by bribery7' and there is a definite note of bathos in the 
sudden lowering of poetic register from the idyllic line 962 to the more 
brutal lines 964-5, with the added touch of realism in the poet itemising 
the bribes as humble fruits (glandes at que arbita vel pira leeta). It is 
difficult however to see this passage as simply disgust at the brute 
nature of the primitive; it is, rather, historical imagination getting to 
work on the unrecoverable past and seeking to evaluate it with a mind 
unclouded by either rewlsion or nostalgia but animated solely by 
disinterested logic. 
It is these unhealthy aspects of love which Epicurus and Lucretius 
condemn, rather than the simple fulfilment of bodily need and the 
71 4. 1071 
72 cf. esp. 1. 17-20 
73 4. 1193 
74 S. 964 
i~ 
76 
77 
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consequent kinetic pleasure to be derived from it. Sexual love is 
simply a function of the animal body: it does not give our life any 
meaning in itself. This is naturally why the poet chooses to place the 
diatribe against love at the end of the book explaining the truth of 
sense-perception: the lover is deceived by the illusion that his beloved 
is beautifuF6 just as one might be deceived by the optical illusions so 
neatly described by the poet at 4. 324-468, and so his delusion is ideal 
to end a book on the primacy of correct perception. He is 'mad' in the 
sense that he is hallucinating 77 but his madness is more than merely a 
misconception; his refusal to perceive the truth leads him to fight 
against the sexual demands of his nature (in that his worship of the 
unattainable mistress entails retaining his sperm rather than releasing it 
(4.1066)) and his unrequited love could never become the type of 
reproductive union the poet endorses at the end of the book anyway - if 
he ever got close to her he would sense her foulness and flee in disgust 
(4. 1 180ft). The scenario is all fixed by the poet so that the lover 
cannot win - he is not allowed to achieve pleasurable union with his 
beloved because she will not let him do so, but it would be hopeless 
even if she did let him in view of his impossible expectations of what 
this 'goddess' is really like and his disillusion would destroy his passion. 
That is why such women keep their illusions safely in place but cannot 
fool the wise reader: 
quo magis ipsae 
although it is not obvious which sex is bribing the other 
cf. the catalogue of euphemisms at 4. llSS-ll70 
cf. 4. 1069 with Godwin (1986) IS6 
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omnia summo opere hos vitae postscaenia celant 
quos retinere volunt adstrictosque esse in amore; 
nequiquam, quoniam tu animo tamen omnia possis 
protrahere in lucem atque omnis inquirere risUS.78 
The blind restricted life of the lover (notice the metaphor of being tied 
in fetters in adstrictos) is matched by the theatricality (postscaenia) of 
the meretricious woman: the deceit and deception can only be cured by 
honest perception and correct interpretation. 
In all these cases, therefore, of love, political and social life, 
we can see that the poet's judgement of human folly rests on the 
insistence that ethics is a matter of seeing the truth and living in 
accordance with the perceived facts of nature; ethics is perception of 
the limitations of human ambition and appetite, recognition that 
pleasure is the removal of pain and so cannot be increased but only 
varied when the pain of want has been removed, and above all the 
insight that the goals of human striving (love, politics, greed) and the 
objects of human fear (death and its attendant punishments, divine 
displeasure and retribution) all rely on a misguided misinterpretation of 
the observable facts of the world and are a waste of time and a needless 
source of care. 
This all ties in neatly with the poet's stance as the observer of 
the truth and the interpreter of the world, and it gives 'moral' purpose 
to his detailed observations of nature drawing him close to the position 
78 4. 1185.1189 
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of Naturalist ethics which asserts that moral judgements are reducible to 
statements of one of the sciences (usually psychology and/or sociology). 
It also provides a way in which this poem can be read as having an 
'aesthetic' ethical theory, ascribing goodness to physical pleasure and 
that alone and seeing the enjoyment of such experiences as the source 
and definition of our notion of good, and arguing that perception of the 
truth is a prerequisite for ethical goodness - which also leaves the way 
open for the wise man to enjoy poetry and art both as pleasures in 
themselves and as the depiction and reminder of such pleasures. 
If perception is the key to both knowledge and goodness, 
then the analysis of perception in 4.26-523 will be ethically crucial. 
The refutation of Scepticism is central to the ethical argument; there 
can be no question of an 'aesthetic' ethical philosophy such as this 
being any more than a fantasy if the senses do not provide us with 
adequate information and if the mind is not capable of appraising it; 
and the Sceptics' case is a powerful one which has to be met. 
Lucretius argues for the veracity of perception in that only matter can 
affect other matter (i. e. our sense-organs) and so there must be 
something there, and he urges that our perceptions taken all together 
show up which of them are true and which of them are false. The 
man standing on the railway line sees the tracks converge at the 
horizon but also sees a train go past without being derailed; clearly 
one of these conflicting sense-impressions is false, and as we would be 
unlikely not to notice a train-derailment but have other experience of 
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the converging of objects at a distance, we decide that the lines are in 
fact parallel and only appear to converge. In this way the Epicurean 
'sees' conflicting sense-data but allows his sense-impressions to correct 
each other. Implicit in his epistemology however is the inadequacy of 
the senses to receive a complete view, as we depend on the simulacra 
to find us and our eyes can only ever (in a finite lifetime) take in a small 
number of simulacra. Perceptions, just like the 'parallel' arguments, 
become 'ways of seeing' which are all of them reflections of partial 
truth (1.422-5; 'all perceptions are true' said Epicurus) but which are 
none of them adequate as a total view of the world, just as there can be 
no total view of a three-dimensional object. Lucretius points to what 
we can see for ourselves but have not looked at before, he makes us 
look afresh at things we have long got used to seeing (sheep on the 
hillside, clothes drying in the sun, and so on). This is partly the old 
poetic charge to show 'what oft was thought yet ne'er so well 
expressed', partly an appeal to communis sensus to back up his 
'reading' of the world. But it is more than this: Eagleton defines the 
aesthetic as follows: 
Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the body. In its original 
formulation by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, the 
term refers not in the first place to art, but, as the Greek aisthesis would 
suggest, to the whole region of human perception and sensation, in 
contrast to the more rarefied domain of conceptual thought. The 
distinction which the term 'aesthetic' initially enforces in the mid-
eighteenth century is not one between 'art' and 'life', but between the 
material and the immaterial: between things and thoughts, sensations 
and ideas, that which is bound up with our creaturely life as opposed to 
that which conducts some shadowy existence in the recesses of the 
mind. It is as though philosophy suddenly wakes up to the fact that 
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there is a dense, swanning territory beyond its own mental enclave 
which threatens to fall utterly outside its sway. That territory is 
nothing less than the whole of our sensate life together - the business of 
affections and aversions, of how the world strikes the body on its 
sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze and the guts and 
all that arises from our most banal, biological insertion into the world. 
The aesthetic concerns this most gross and palpable dimension of the 
human, which post-Cartesian philosophy, in some curious lapse of 
attention, has somehow managed to overlook. It is thus the first 
stirrings of a primitive materialism - of the body's long inarticulate 
rebellion against the tyranny of the theoretical . 
... Could it be that this realm is impenetrably opaque to reason, eluding 
its categories as surely as the smell of thyme or the taste of potatoes? 
Must the life of the body be given up on, as the sheer unthinkable other 
of thought, or are its mysterious ways somehow mappable by 
intellection in what would then prove a wholly novel science, the 
science of sensibility itself?79 
This definition suits Lucretius best in his thorough-going reliance 
on the sense-experience of the body rather than the theoretical 
structures of the mind. This is (again) not to deny the place of theory 
and reason in Lucretius' philosophy: but it secures perception as the 
means of gathering the data upon which reason then goes to work, 
whereas Plato clearly regarded reason as superior to sense-perception 
which can (in his opinion) only furnish opinion rather than truth. For 
Epicurus and Lucretius, as we have seen, all perceptions are true, and 
there is nothing that can gainsay the evidence of the senses: 
invenies prirnis ab sensibus esse creatam 
notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli. 
nam maiore fide debet reperier illud 
sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa. 
quid maiore fide porro quam sensus baberi 
debet? an ab sensu falso ratio olta valebit 
dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est? 
qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit onmis. 
an poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an aures 
tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris, 
79 Eagleton 13-14 
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an confutabunt nares oculive revincent. 
non, ut opinor, ita est.80 
Lucretius takes on Plato directly: if reason is sprung from the 
senses then it cannot be superior to them because it has no source of 
knowledge other than the senses. It can work on the sense-data 
presented to it in a variety of ways, some of which are more rational 
than others, but it cannot find any data to qualify or correct these 
sense-impressions from any other source. Furthermore, the senses 
are all as valid as one another and must all be credited with veracity 
subject to qualification provided by judicious comparisons. The 
argument is not watertight by any means: by admitting that the senses 
conflict with one another he prompts the question in the reader's mind 
of how we can ever trust any of them over the others, for instance. 
Again, however, the poet does not merely state this argument baldly, 
but invests his writing with rhetorical force, the importance of 
defeating the Sceptics' case being shown by the means used to do so: 
the repetition of key words and phrases (maiore fide ... quid maiore 
fide: ab sensu orta ... ab sensibus orta), the expressive juxtaposition of 
sensu fa/so ratio which neatly suggests that sensu fa/so entails fa/sa 
ratio, as asserted in 485. There then follows an almost cartoon 
depiction of the war of the senses to ridicule the notion, linking the 
various senses in neat chiastic pairs (ocu/os aures .. aures factus .. tactum 
sapor), ending the sequence, as it began, with the eyes. There is 
variatio of vocabulary denoting the idea of 'refute' with a sequence 
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rising from censure (reprehendere), formal accusation (arguet), stun 
into silence (confutabunt), and finally win the case (revincent). The 
mouth is credited with the verbal fireworks in arguet: the sequence of 
an phrases is varied in length, the last one being a rounded whole line. 
Once again, the poet creates his own material, asserting the inviolable 
validity of the senses by a material display of proof which itself has a 
marked and perceptible effect on the reader; the poetry is no mere 
description in a cerebral sense but an embodiment of what it describes. 
The reader is asked to judge the case being fought out between the 
senses and also between the poet and the Sceptics; and if the 
argumentation is not totally cogent, that is perhaps because a full 
refutation of the Sceptic's case cannot be made, but more likely here 
because the aesthetic poet's stance is that we can see that it is wrong. 
The senses convince us of their primacy because we can sense it - a 
circular argument, to be sure, but one of aesthetic more than logical 
force. Reason is incapable of gai~saying perception, so let us simply 
see the truth and then let reason work on what we see~ this is how this 
poet uses perception to reveal the truth. 
The first way, therefore, in which the de Rerum Natura is an 
aesthetic poem is in the epistemological sense: the senses are for the 
poet the prime means of experiencing and understanding the world 
around us. Quite irrespective of value-judgements on the 'beauty' or 
otherwise of the world - a common concern of 'aesthetic' philosophy -
80 4. 478-489 
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the poem is aesthetic because it relies totally on a'{a61JCJlS to formulate 
theories about the nature of things and also our own ethical best 
interests. 
What emerges clearly from all the above is that for Lucretius ethics 
just as much as (e.g.) metallurgy is a matter of discovery rather than 
divine revelation, that perception unclouded by anxiety or superstition 
is the best means to determining happiness, and that overall our ethical 
lives ought to avoid conflict and engagement in the world of social 
climbing, love and political power. The ethical teachings of Lucretius 
are, as we saw in the first chapter, apparently inadequate to the 
monumental authority of the physical teachings, but they do have a 
coherence which makes them more than mere ramshackle observations. 
What ties them together is the stress on perception as the key to 
learning the ethical as well as the empirical truth about ourselves and 
the world. The passages so far examined are predominantly negative 
in mood; avoid politics, love and regard justice as the compromise 
arrived at by weak human beings in the process of societal 
development. The issues are decided in a positivist manner by the 
perceived facts of nature and human nature, the ethics being thus 
deduced from and as certain as the science in which they are 
embedded. In this sense, then, the ethics of the poem are 'aesthetic' 
in that they rely totally on our correct perception of the world. 
CHAPTER THREE: THE AESTHETIC PLEASURE 
OF SEEING 
The first two chapters of this thesis have seen the ethical poverty 
of the poem in quantitative tenns and an attempt to demonstrate that the 
ethical teaching which the text does contain is 'aesthetic' in the sense that 
it derives from the raw perception (aisthesis) of the world and our place 
within it~ the ethics and the science are thus inextricably entwined and 
should not be seen as rival objectives competing for our attention. The 
science has an ethical purpose in proving the way of life which Epicurus 
recommends, while the ethics needs the science to be any more than 
shifting sands of the suasoria. 
The term 'aesthetic' conveys a great deal more than that, 
however - not only the perception of the world but also the evaluative 
appreciation of its beauty or ugliness which can lead to pleasure and pain; 
and it is the topic of pleasure in general and aesthetic pleasure in 
particular which this chapter will examine. 
THE PLEASURE OF SEEING 
When Lucretius talks of how Epicurus 
exposuitque bonum summum quo tendimus oumes1 
6.26 
2 
) 
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that summum bonum is always understood to be pleasure. The topic is 
complex, but certain features of the Epicurean notion of pleasure and 
pain are agreed by everyone. Epicurus divided pleasure into kinetic 
pleasure and katastematic pleasure, the former involving change in the 
sense-organs to remove pain, the second being a state of contentment or 
freedom from pain (a1rovla) approaching the state of total serenity 
(arapa~a) which is the ethical goal: 'The ancient sources agree that 
Epicurus identified unsurpassable pleasure, the fullness of pleasure, 
which he called a stable condition of the flesh and a confident expectation 
for the future on this score with a complete absence of pain and anxiety. '2 
Pleasure - even katastematic pleasure - like everything else in the 
universe, is material and is the result of atomic movement. Pleasure and 
pain alert the human body to what it needs and what it does not need and 
is an experience of the senses~ it is thus diagnostic of how we should live 
and we ignore it at our peril. Epicurus saw pleasure and pain as at least 
in some ways two sides of the same coin in that kinetic pleasure consists 
in removing the pain of want, as for instance in the ingestion of food to 
dispel the pain of hunger, where he asserts that the pleasure of eating will 
be in proportion to the pain of the hunger that preceded it and the 
katastematic pleasure of not being hungry is superior to both. Once the 
pain of want has been quelled, the pleasure cannot be increased but only 
varied) and such 'wants' are only to be quelled where they are 'natural' in 
the Epicurean classification which divides pleasures up into three groups: 
Rist (1972) 106 
Diogenes Laertius 10. 130-131. Lucretius DRN 2. 20-21 
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a) natural and necessary (food), b) natural but not necessary (sex) and c) 
neither natural nor necessary ('luxuries'). The first must be satisfied, the 
second may be satisfied in moderation, the third not at all4. The 
definition of 'luxury' is not simple - but the term is more helpfully 
understood to denote an attitude towards pleasure rather than any 
particular form of it: when hungry, the wise man will eat whatever is to 
hand whereas the fool addicted to 1uxury' will remain hungry while he 
holds out for turbot~ this is most readily seen in Lucretius' account of 
romantic love, where the miser lover holds on to his sperm waiting for 
the unattainable mistress while the sanus will expend it on whoever is 
available: 
et iacere umorem conlectum in corpora quaeque 
nec retinere, semel conversum unius amore, 
et servare sibi curam certumque dolorem~.5 
One key concept of Epicurean pleasure is parvum quod salis est; 
put thus by Epicurus: oooev iKavov q, oAlrov TO iKavov6. This has 
usually been cited to counter the allegation that Epicurean ethical theory 
was arrant selfish hedonism with a picture of the sage as a man of 
austerity and restraint - although Epicurus counselled restraint even over 
restraint: 'frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in a 
like case with the man who errs through excess'7. 'Moderation in all 
things' seems, then, to have been the wise man's goal; we would all opt 
4 Diogenes Laertius 10. 127, K.A. 29, Cicero de jiniblls 1.38 
S 4. I06S· 7; ct. Horace Satires l.2.114-9 
6 Fragment 68 (Bailey); better in Aelian's version. oUyov oU.c Ucavov, a.ua TOtnrp 16 
OU06V Ucavov (var. Hisl. iv.13, cited Bailey (1926) 386 
7 Fragment 63 (Bailey) 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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for the privilege of not being hungry, not being thirsty, not being colds 
and the pleasure of removing the pain is less preferable than the state of 
contentment which would remove both; rather like the donkey in Animal 
Farm who asserts that God gave him a tail to swish the flies, but that he 
would prefer to have no tail and no flies. In practical terms, this means 
that the wise man will seek contentment where it may be found rather 
than setting his standards too high and incurring certain disappointment. 
The prime source of that consciousness which feels and 
evaluates pleasure and pain is perception, which is also, as we saw in 
chapter two, the arbiter of goodness: 
, \ - , (}' \ " '~ enel nav ara ov leal leaICOV ev alvv"CJel.9 
Kal Ola 'fout"o nlV 1joovryv <lpmv Kai n:los UYO/JEV sIval 
'rOu paKaplws C;ijv. t"avt"1]v yap aya90v Trpiinov Kal OVYYEV1KOV 
eYVW/JEV, Kat aTrO t"avt"1]s Kat"aplO/JE9a TrclCJ17S aipeCJEWS Kal t/Juyi7s 
Kal em 'faVTT/V Kat"aVt"W/JEV cOs KaVOVl t"qJ Trcl9El TraV aya90v 
KpIVOVt"Es. 10 
In case we are in danger of exaggerating the cerebral nature of 
Epicurean pleasure, it is worth remembering that Epicurus is said to have 
said: 
OU rap errorE EXro n nOITJCK.O fcqa(}ov, at/Jarprov pev 
fas £5la lOAmV r,oovas. at/Jarprov ~e fas £51'at/Jpo£5,mrov ICai fas 
~l'Wcpoapafrov leal fas £5ul popq,ijsll 
Lucretius shares the concept of pleasure adumbrated above, 
although he rather assumes the Epicurean conclusions than argues 
towards them. The rich man's addictions to luxury are mocked, for 
r "a/icon Sayings 33 
Diogenes Laertius 10.124 
Diogenes Laertius 10. 128·9 
Diogenes Laertius 10.6 
12 
13 
14 
l' 
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instance, as compared to the good things freely available to the wise man 
(2.20-36)~ so also mockery is directed at his neurotic boredom (3.1060-
1070); the romantic lover's addiction to an unavailable and unworthy 
mistress is contrasted unfavourably with the sensible marriage with a good 
woman, just as early man's use of what is natural contrasts with modem 
man's rejection of that in favour of luxuries and consequent warfare (5. 
1412-1435). 
More positively, Lucretius uses the words mavis and voluptas of 
a range of experiences: Venus is addressed12 as hominum divumque 
voluptas, for whom the earth sends forth mavis flowers. The poet is 
inspired by the anticipation of voluptas in the mavis amicitia of 
Memmius, mavis amicitia which madet the poet to spend the nights 
writing13, just as men are led by voluptas to reproduce14. This pleasure is 
not a blind instinctive reflex, however: the tiny clinamen gives us the 
freedom to choose pleasure or not l ', while to feel voluptas at all one 
must be a compound made up of many atoms, as that pleasure is inner 
movement of the atoms themselves16, and fear is capable of adulterating 
pleasure to the point where no pleasure will be left liquidam puramque17• 
The body is even capable of feeling pain and pleasure simultaneously in 
different parts of the body18, although the centre of such feelings is 
1.1 
1.140-142 
2. 172-4 
2. 251-262, on which see Fowler (1983a) 
and so atoms themselves do not feel pain or pleasure: 2. 963·972 
3.40 
3.106·111 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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primarily in the breast19 where (the poet tells us) the centre of intelligence 
IS. Seeking new pleasures is a futile labour of Sisyphus: 
nee nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas; 
sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 
cetera: post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus 
et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantis20 
as is the pathetic attempt either to extend one's span of life21 or to 
gorge oneself in pleasures once the want has been removed22 . 
The pleasure of eating is confined to the mouth and palate23, 
just as the pleasure of sex is the ejaculation of semen24. The whole 
passage on the passion of sexual love is instructive in its reductionist view 
of sexual pleasure - the gazing at simulacra which are by definition as 
insubstantial as anything can be2s, the ardent desire, the violent love-play 
are all unnecessary and empty, while the real pleasure is in the ejaculation 
which the poet denotes in a briefphrase26. 
Pleasure keeps us willing to live27 but is not restricted to the 
basics of food and sex and warmth: the poet describes how he feels a 
divine vo/uptas atque horror at seeing nature revealed28 just as early man 
discovered pleasure in song and dance29 and just as the Muses' song is 
called suaviloquentf30; sleep31 and even fainting are called suavis32, 
3. 138-42 
3. 1081-4 
3. 931-51 
5. 1416-35 
4. 627-629 
24 4. 1057 where the verb praesagit is revealing about the pleasure of sex not being in the 
anticipation. 
2S 4. 110-122 
26 4.1056, 1115 
27 5. 178 
28 3. 28-9 
29 5. 1379-1411 
30 1. 945 = 4.20 
31 4.453 
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where there is movement of the soul-atoms no doubt but hardly kinetic 
stimulation of the senses - indeed both involve a cessation of sensation 
which might be said to contradict Epicurus' words33 that all good is to be 
found in sensation but may be said to look towards the 'katastematic' 
pleasure which is the cessation of sensory disturbance - sleep and fainting 
do after all produce a state of (temporary and involuntary) ataraxia. 
Far more important for this thesis is the question of aesthetic 
pleasure~ and the evidence on Epicurus' views on the subject are scant. 'I 
spit upon the beautiful and those who vainly admire it, when it does not 
produce any pleasure'34 has been taken3S to indicate a blanket rejection of 
aesthetic appreciation - whereas in fact it surely indicates more of an 
'emperor's-new-clothes' attitude which rejects notions of beauty and moral 
goodness which do not in fact produce pleasurel6 . If, as he asserts, 
pleasure is the summum bonum, then clearly his attitude towards beauty 
as towards virtues and everything else must be that they are only to be 
sought if they are conducive to pleasure and discarded if not37. 
The attitude of pleasure in learning is however crucial in 
Epicurus: early on in the Letter to Herodotus he describes his total 
commitment to ~Olo).orla and thus enjoying srralTJVI'CI)v his lifel8. 
It is axiomatic that if the removal of pain is pleasure and if philosophy 
can remove the pain of anxiety for ever, then philosophy is a source of 
32 3. 172-3 
33 D.L. X. 124 quoted above 
34 Fragment 79 (Bailey) (=Usener S 12) 
3S by e.g. Bailey (1926) 400 
36 well glossed by Rist « 1972 124) as 'I spit on the beautitUl and those who pointlessly 
respect it when it produces no pleasure' 
37 Diogenes Laertius 10. 132, 138 
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pleasure~ and Epicurus takes pains to point out that the pleasure of 
philosophy is not merely the pleasurable end-product of a painful process 
but that rather: 'in all other occupations the fruit comes painfully after 
completion, but in philosophy pleasure goes hand in hand with 
knowledge~ for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but 
comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous.'39 The study of nature 
does have beneficial moral effects on the character in promoting 
avraplC£la40 but it is to be indulged for its pleasure first and foremost. 
If, after all, comprehension of the world is achieved through ai06T/OlS 
and if enjoyment and comprehension are simultaneous, then this 
aia6T/OlS will itself achieve enjoyment and thus the pleasure which is the 
ethical end of Epicureanism. Delight in learning for its own sake, even 
when the subject matter is not at first sight attractive, is nothing new: 
Aristotle explicitly says as much in his Parts of Animals: 
There are animals which are unattractive to the senses when one 
studies them~ but even in these, nature's craftsmanship provides 
innumerable pleasures for those who can discern the causes41 . 
Lucretius clearly shared this pleasure in t;vmo).oyia as is plain 
from several passages. The poet describes how he spends his time in the 
study of nature and how this study of nature gives him the pleasure which 
38 Diogenes Laertius 10. 37 
39 V.S. 27 
40 V.S.45 
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is the key to happiness~ early in the poem we read of the poet's labour of 
love in turning the 'dark discoveries' of the Greeks into Latin and how the 
problems are offset by the rewards: 
sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas 
suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem 
suadet, et inducit noctes vigilare serenas 
quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum 
clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti 
res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis42 
The pleasure here is primarily one of anticipated friendship 
(sperata voluptas suavis amicitiae) with the oxymoronic positioning of 
suavis and laborem at opposite ends of the line; but there is also a clear 
sense of the pleasure of achievement involved in rendering light what was 
dark'° and the theme oflight is stressed repeatedly (clara ... lumina). The 
passage contains more, however. The nights through which the poet 
stays awake are serenas - a clear reference to the Epicurean pleasure of 
ataraxia44 as well as a more obvious remark about the quietness of night-
time as Bailey sees it4'. The poet, in other words, enjoys the supreme 
Epicurean state of contentment even though he is engaged in the labor of 
expressing it. Furthermore, as Brown notes46, there is a figura 
etymologica in suavis ... suadet, 'bringing out the central tenet of 
Epicurean moral theory - that the prospect of something pleasant (suavis) 
is automatically a spur to action (suadet)'. The process of composition 
41 Aristotle Parts of Animals 645a8-15; d. Metaphysics 1.1.980820 ('All human beings by 
nature desire knowledge') and 982bl2 ('philosophy begins from astonishment') 
42 1. 140-145 
43 cf. the poet's claim to fame as one who writes light verses on dark themes (4.8-9 = I. 
933-4) 
44 see Epicurus Letter to Herodotus 37 (irral1]vi,tDv) 
4' 'a picturesque epithet, which suggests the calm uninterrupted nights of study.' (Bailey 
(1947) ii.624) 
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is well expressed in the sequence of prose draft (dietis) followed by verse 
(earmine)~ and the purpose of the composition is to allow the reader to 
'see' what is 'deeply hidden'. 
Later on, when he sees the truth about the gods and the 
underworld, he tells us: 
his ibi me rebus quaedam divina voluptas 
percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi 
tam manifesta patens ex omni parte retecta est47 
where the primary pleasure is clearly visual and aesthetic. Notice the 
repetition of the visual idea in manifesta patens ... reteeta48 and the 
punning use of pereipit in the line before where the primary meaning 'gets 
hold upon me' (M.F. Smith, OLD s.v. 'percipio' 8b) also has a secondary 
meaning of 'perceive through the senses, apprehend' (OLD 6) and to 'to 
grasp with the mind' (OLD 7; cf DRN 2.731, 6.536), leaving the reader 
with the faint paradox that when he perceives the world as it is, the 
pleasure of such perception seizes hold of him in a reciprocal grasp. 
The pleasure of discovering and describing the nature of things is 
repeatedly expressed. In book 2 we read: 
nunc age dicta meo dulci quaesita labore 
percipe49 
where the act of creating the text is dulcis: a notion repeated later: 
nunc age, nativos animantibus et mortalis 
esse animos animasque levis ut noscere possis, 
conquisita diu dulcique reperta labore 
46 Brown (1984) 72 
47 3. 28-30 
48 'this emphasis on revelation and illumination returns the reader to the point of departure 
in 1.' (Kenney (1971) 79), referring to how the poet uses ring~mposition in the passage~ more 
significant is the question of why the poet chose this theme in the first place, and how the theme 
of revelation underlies everything in the text. 
49 2. 730-1 
'0 
'1 
'2 
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digna tua pergam disponere carmina vitaSO 
Kenney (ad loc) asserts that this phrase is a 'literary formula ... the 
reference is to L. 's poetic shaping of his material rather than to his 
philosophical researches' but this does not do justice to the passage or to 
the text as a whole. Bailey had already seen that the poet 'emphasises 
both the labour that he has spent in thinking out (reperta) and arranging 
(disponere) this part of the poem and also the pleasure (dulci) which it 
has given him'.SI The pleasure does of course consist of literary 
pleasure peculiar to the poetic form in which the discoveries are 
communicated, and there is more to say on this topic later - but the 
discoveries here are conquisita diu with sweet labour in one line before 
their poetic form is decided in the next. In a moment of candour, the 
poet describes his enthusiasm tor philosophical poetry invading his 
dreams: 
et quo quisque fere studio devinctus adhaeret 
aut quibus in rebus multum sumus ante morati, 
atque in ea ratione fuit contenta magis mens, 
in somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire: 
causidici causas agere et componere leges, 
induperatores pugnare et proelia obire, 
nautae contractum cum ventis degere bellum, 
nos agere hoc autem et naturam quaerere rerum 
semper et inventam patriis exponere chartis. '2 
just as in a piece of real self-mockery he describes his avidity and 
pleasurable (suavis) fluency in producing material: 
quod si pigraris paulumve recesseris ab re, 
hoc tibi de plano possum promittere, Memmi: 
usque adeo largos haustus e fontibu' magnis 
3. 417-20 
Bailey (1947) ii. 1066 
4. 962-70 
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lingua meo suavis diti de pectore fundet 
ut verear ne tarda prius per membra senectus 
serpat et in nobis vitai claustra resolvat, 
quam tibi de quavis una re versibus omnis 
argumentorum sit copia missa per auris.'3 
It is at least arguable, then, that the text expresses and produces 
aesthetic pleasure in the study of nature itself even before that study has 
been conveyed in poetry - a form which, the poet assures us twice'4, 
adds honey to the medicine to entice the sick but which is not itself the 
medicine being administered. Aesthetic pleasure is to be found in the 
study of nature itself as well as in the appreciation of the verse in which 
that study is expressed, as Aristotle so well expressed in the passage 
quoted earlier". 
The pleasure, then, in writing and reading the de rerum natura 
is (so far) twofold. In the first place the text rids us of the pain of fear by 
teaching us that we have nothing to fear from the gods or from the 
afterlife. In the second place, there is pleasure in learning about the 
world in itself Both of these points are well seen at work in Book 6, 
where the ratio caeli is to be explained to prevent the reader suffering 
superstitious fearss6 but the poet immediately begs to be inspired by the 
Muse who is requies hominum divumque voluptasS7 . When one goes on 
to read the account of celestial phenomena, the poet's excitement and 
pleasure is obvious in the text, for instance: 
1. 410-417 
1. 93S-9S0 = 4. 10-2S 
Aristotle Parts of Animals 645a8-15 
6. 86·9 
6. 92-4 
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hoc etiam pacto volucri loca lumine tingunt 
nubes et tremulo tempestas impete fulgit: 
ventus ubi invasit nub em et versatus ibidem 
fecit ut ante cavam docui spissescere nub em, 
mobilitate sua fervescit~ ut omnia motu 
percalefacta vides ardescere, plumbea vero 
glans etiam longo cursu volvenda liquescit. S8 
This is no straight factual account but a burst of joy in the world 
of sensual experience. The cloud/storm is endowed with enormous 
power, such that it paints (tingunt) the sky with light and then attacks 
with an attack to make all shake (tremulo .. .impete). The text takes 
pleasure in recalling earlier teachings (ut ante docui) and in the precision 
of its account of things to which no human observer could testify (who 
could observe the inside of a cloud?) which endow the poet with godlike 
status as the revealer of what is hidden from human eye. The poet revels 
in the force and the heat of the storm, using a telling simile from the 
world of ballistics to convey both, with the piquant surprise that the 
heavy leaden bullet is like the fluffy clouds in the air~ just as earlier on he 
used the appropriate 'bird' metaphor of volucr; for the speed of light in the 
sky. More pertinently, the object is heated 'right through' (percale/acta) 
rather than just on the surface - again showing the superior 'inside' 
knowledge of the poet being revealed to the reader, whose own sensual 
experience is constantly referred to personally (v;des). 
The final book of the poem is often seen as something of a rag-
bag of afterthoughts - celestial and meteorological phenomena with little 
in common except their strangeness, culminating in the unusually 
miserable spectacle of the plague with which the poem ends. Those who 
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see the poem as simply a celebration of the joys of Epicureanism would 
find fault with the poet for organising things thus, or postulate that the 
thing was clearly incomplete and needed a rousing peroration which the 
poet did not live to provide. The fact that the poem ends the way it does 
calls for us to look again at our interpretation of the text and see if we can 
find a better frame of reference with which to account for the apparent 
eccentricities of the final book. If the first two books explained the 
atomic nature of matter and the following three books explained the 
nature of man - his mortality, his knowledge of the world and the nature 
of human society - then what is the last book there for? To mop up a few 
loose ends? 
This thesis would argue that one purpose of the final book is to 
demonstrate the aesthetic pleasure which the text recommends and 
embodies and which this chapter has been arguing for. The subject matter 
of this last book is thunder and lightning and meteorological wonders, 
followed by the wonders of the earth - earthquakes, volcanoes, the Nile, 
Avemian lakes and springs, the magnet, ending up with the 'miracle' of 
the pestilence which can turn the world upside down in a matter of hours. 
There are many topics under the universal heading of de rerum natura 
which the poet does not deal with - his choice here is of areas of wonder, 
to invite the reader to contemplate with pleasure those things which both 
delight the senses and puzzle the mind, giving the intellectual pleasure of 
understanding and the aesthetic pleasure of sensual enjoyment of the view. 
S8 6. 173-9 
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It is after all a central tenet of this thesis that if pleasure is the good and if 
contemplating the world can give us aesthetic pleasure, then such study 
of nature as the poet shows us here will be a form of goodness in itself 
and such study will be an ethical recommendation for those wishing to 
lead the good life. 
The poet's purpose in this book is of course partly (and 
explicitly) theological as well as logical: thunder is given the greatest 
prominence because it played the largest part in Roman religion, 
earthquakes were seen as the work of the 'earth-shaker' Poseidon in 
Homeric epic and elsewhere, volcanoes were explained as giants buried 
under the earth belching fire59, plagues were sent by Apollo, and so on. 
The book is thus there to prove to the reader that even these 'miracles' do 
not support the theological view of the world which the poem seeks to 
destroy - and the poet mocks the view of the divine source of 
thunderbolts with a lengthy piece of comic satire60 - just as the fourth 
book explains that the apparent visions of ghosts do not prove that human 
beings survive death. The use of the senses will stop the needless 
superstitious 'wonder' which invokes the gods: 
quod bene propositum si plane contueare 
ac videas plane, mirari multa relinquas.61 
The emphasis throughout is accordingly on the experience of the 
senses. Thunder and lightning are marvellous in themselves - but note 
how the poet takes pains to explain the way our senses perceive them at 
S9 e.g. Typhoeus in Homer Iliad 2. 781-4; cf. also Callimachus Hymn 10 Delos 141ft' 
60 6. 379-422 
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different times (6. 164-172), just as he points out the manifest fact that 
thunderbolts do not occur in a clear sky (246-9). Later on volcanoes are 
explained with a simile from erisypelas fever in the body (655-672) which 
looks forward to the closing passage on the plague~ and the explanation 
of the magnet has the familiar references to the taste of salt when walking 
by the sea62~ the poet refers to his own sense-experience: 
exultare etiam Samothracia ferrea vidi63 
and to ours too in encouraging us to find examples for ourselves: 
nec tamen haec ita sunt ali arum rerum aliena 
ut mihi multa parum genere ex hoc suppeditentur 
quae memorare queam inter se singlariter apta. 
saxa vides primum ... 64 
As we approach the end of the poem the poet is leaving us with 
the techniques of further study for ourselves: 
cetera iam quam multa licet reperire!65 
as long as the superstitious mirari of the uneducated has been retrained 
by correct use of the senses. Formerly such things as thunder and 
plagues aroused wonder and fear: the Epicurean regards them with 
wonder and confident understanding. 
6. 6S3-4 
6. 928-9; cf. 4.222-3 
6. 1044 
6. 106S-8 
6. 1080 
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THE PLEASURE OF POETRY 
All the above could have been done in prose - is there any 
further aesthetic pleasure in the peculiarly poetic fonn of the text? The 
quotation from Aristotle66 used earlier to show the pleasure in 
q,VCJlo).orf,a is again pertinent when quoted in full: 
'There are animals which are unattractive to the senses when one 
studies them; but even in these, Nature's craftsmanship provides 
innumerable pleasures for those who can discern the causes. It would be 
unreasonable - in fact, absurd - if we got pleasure from studying pictures 
of these things, because then we are at the same time studying the art 
which crafted them, but did not get even more pleasure from studying the 
actual products of nature - at least when we can make out their causes. '67 
In other words, the appreciation of art is one thing, the study of 
nature is another, and the artistic depiction of nature renders the pleasure 
indirect and oblique. Once we start to look more closely at the 
relationship of poetry and pleasure we run into questions of the 
relationship between the so-called kinetic and the katastematic pl~ 
a question which is revealing about the status of the poetry within the 
philosophy. We saw earlier how Epicurus regarded the state of neither 
pleasure nor pain as being one of contentment, a state obviously 
Aristotle Parts of Animals 64'18-1' 
Aristotle Pam of Animals 64'.8-15 
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preferable to the pain of lack but also preferable to the alteration in the 
sense-organs of kinetic pleasure. The disturbance of kinetic pleasure is 
obviously preferable to the pain of (say) hunger but inferior to the state of 
katastematic pleasure which feels neither the pain of hunger nor needs the 
pleasure of eating. If poetry could be interpreted in the same way, it 
ought to qualify as a kinetic pleasure (in that it disturbs the senses), but 
the result of the poetry - certainly the result of this philosophical poetry -
will be the katastematic contentment which does not need the stimulus of 
poetry any more~ yet the poet describes the nights he spends composing 
verses as serenae68, and the imagery of pastoral happiness which he 
creates as a metaphor for his poetry is that of peace and quiet 
contentment: 
avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante 
trita solo. iuvat integros accedere fontes 
atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores ... 69 
Lucretius describes the contemplation of the universe as being itself 
a state of voluptas70, and the opening of book 2 is eloquent on the 
pleasure of looking at the world from a safe vantage-point of wisdom. 
Both situations are, however, hard to see purely in katastematic terms -
writing poetry involves movement of ideas and atoms within the brain, 
the sight of 'disturbing' phenomena will itself disturb the wise man's 
tranquillity, however pleasant it may be, and laughter (for instance) is a 
disturbance of one's equilibrium, however welcome. Nowhere, 
furthermore, is there any sense that Lucretius is 'making do' with poetry 
68 1.142. Bailey describes the adjective as 'picturesque'. 
69 4.1-3: cfthe rustic setting of early man's first artistic efforts at S. 1379-1411 
79 
as preparation for 'real' wisdom - in one passage he is rejoicing in the 
poetry and the hope of Memmius' friendship 71, in the second he is 
expressing a contentment which poetry conveys and in some senses 
maintains in permanent form 72. The poem does assert strongly the folly 
of pursuing certain forms of pleasure (love etc) and in place of these it 
encourages the reader to enjoy the aesthetic pleasures of seeing the world 
through the clear eyes of poetry; but at no point does Lucretius explicitly 
guide us through the distinction between the kinetic and the katastematic 
forms of pleasure, and the poetry which purports to convert the reader's 
priorities must surely 'move' and 'disturb' him with kinetic emotion73, only 
to be succeeded by a state of static wisdom or katastematic pleasure. 
The study of nature is an Epicurean pleasure in itself14 as we 
saw; and yet it is obvious that the poet of the de rerum natura was not 
content to produce a prose treatise which could have done the job of 
conveying the causes ofthings7~ as well as this didactic epic poem. Poetic 
inspiration is sought from Calliope, the Muse of epic poetry, and the 
glory looked for is the crown of poetic originality : 
70 3.28-30 
insignemque mea capiti petere inde coronam 
unde prius nulli velarint tempore Musae76 
71 1. 140-145 
72 4. 1-25: poets immortalise their subjects: Lucretius is immortalising both Epicurus and 
also the (already immortal) atoms themselves. 
73 who could not be distwbed on reading of the death ofIphigencia (1. 84-101)? Unless it is 
urged that in the long run such poetry stills the unruly passions of the breast and so inculcates 
serenity? 
74 V.S. 27 
7~ the achievement with which Vergil credits him in Georglcs 2. 490-2 rather than any 
poetic glory. 
76 4. 4-5 
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which all suggests that the text is using poetry as more than a mere 
package, despite the poet's immediate protests that the poetry is merely 
the honey on the medicine cup. The logic of 4.1-25 forces the 
reader to regard the poem as simply therefore a means to an end 
(enlightenment), a tool to be discarded once the job has been done, a 
bottle of medicine and honey which the sick child needs but not the 
mature philosopher who will need neither the medicine nor the honey. 
The poet implies that his message is too important not to convey but that 
it would seem unattractive (lristior) unless dressed up, and so he has had 
no choice but to smear everything with the sweet honey 
si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere 
versibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem 
naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem.77 
This all raises questions about the genre of didactic: what is didactic 
and how is it distinguished as a genre? In many ways all literature is 
'didactic' in that it purports to inform the reader of what he does not 
know. In modem literature it is possible to argue that non-fiction is 
didactic while fiction is not, as the element of fantasy and imagination 
(proper to fiction) is out of place in a treatise on the Domesday Book -
but even here there are overlaps which are difficult to schematise 
(historical novels, for instance). In ancient literature the stories told in 
(e.g.) Homer are not seen as fiction but history, and when the ancients 
came to write fiction they did so in prose. How then to distinguish the 
77 4. 23-S 
78 
79 
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'didactic' from the rest? Hesiod is a case in point: the Works and 
Days is 'obviously' didactic in that it teaches Perses precepts and 
information which Perses will need in his life. It contains a good deal 
of mythological information but its purpose is directed towards the 
ethical state of Perses. The Theogony on the other hand is also 
generally classified as 'didactic' even though it is not addressed to a 
named dedicatee (as are the Works and Days and most later didactic 
poems) nor seems to be aiming to improve the ethical state of the reader 
but simply to teach him the tales of the gods~ in what sense, if any, is 
this distinct from Homer 'teaching' us the tales of Troy? The vital 
didactic element in the Theogony is the manner in which the reader is 
told the 'facts' about the origin of the world in a descriptive way in 
which later on Empedocles, Lucretius etc would also compose. The 
Theogony is heroic epic cosmogony: it is told because it purports to be 
a true account of the world. It is didactic because the purpose of 
instruction is more explicitly carried out than in other poetry. 
It is also told because it is entertaining. The two elements of 
utility and pleasure78 have often been seen as mutually exclusive, 
particularly in didactic literature79 where the parade of useless 
information might be anything but entertaining. The same, however, 
might be said of the Catalogue of Ships which concludes Homer Iliad 2, 
a passage of repetitious ecphrasis which holds up the narrative for 
as in HoraceA,.s Poelica 333 
sec c.g. Mc (1977) 9-22 
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several hundred lines. Contrast with that the wonderful extempore 
didacticism of Silenus in Vergil Eclogue 6.31-83 compelled out of the 
old man solely for the pleasure of hearing it. There is enough didactic 
literature surviving (and enough infonnation on the texts which do not) 
to conclude that the transmission of infonnation was seen as a proper 
and an enjoyable method for the poet to adopt. Had the didactic epic 
been as unpopular with the ancients as it has been with some scholars, it 
is hard to believe that the poets would have continued to produce these 
thankless efforts80. 
Didactic was generally seen as a branch of epic rather than a 
separate genre in itselPl; it is arguable that didactic becomes something 
of a Mischgattung in which high and low, drama, epic, satire, diatribe 
etc all interact and collide. The traditional picture sees heroic epic as 
tending to tell dynamic stories of heroes in action, while didactic tends 
towards the more static fonn of description which expounds, depicts 
and also explains the world - its origins, its nature, its future - to the 
reader; Heroic epic however contains ecpbrasis82, didactic epic tells 
stories (such as those in Hesiod, or Lucretius 1.84-101). There is a 
great deal of sense in seeing the ancient concept of genera as being one 
of metrical differences rather than our concept of 'genres'8J: certainly 
the attempt to schematise Lucretius in this way will not work. 
on the Roman didactic poets see esp. POhlmann (1973) and Cox (1969) 
see Gale (1994) 99-106 
on which see now D.P. Fowler (1991) 
Gale (1994) 100 + n.4 
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Didactic is not mentioned a great deal in ancient theorists of 
Literature84~ but we do have the occasional programmatic text such as 
Propertius 3.5.23-48. 
Propertius sees the subject matter of didactic as an old man's 
game~ when too old for love he will learn the ways of Nature. The 
interesting point here is that he sets his didactic mode after an Epicurean 
attack on the pursuit of military might and political power, whereby 
Marius and Jugurtha are both equal in death85 . True pleasure is to be 
found in peace (pacis amor deus est), study of nature and in rejection of 
luxury and ambition: He ends with a sardonic challenge to politicians to 
bring back Crassus' standards. This is equating the apolitical stance of 
the love-poet with the apolitical remoteness of the intellectual, putting 
the didactic poet and the love-poet side-by-side. Most interesting for 
our purposes is the extremely Epicurean stance adopted by the poet, 
almost as if'didactic' by then meant 'Lucretian'. 
Some interesting tentative conclusions about the didactic genre 
may be drawn so far. Firstly, all didactic poets are writers of 
exactitude and detail whose purpose is to produce work that is accurate 
and strictly 'didactic', and whose interest in their subject matter is 
adequate to sustain years of work on a single poem: but their style is 
not hexameter epic by accident, however - the form of epic verse 
imparts a degree of grandeur and affords access to the traditional divine 
machinery and sublimity of style of epic. More importantly, however, 
on this see Gale (1994) 99-106 
for death levelling high and low ct. LUCI'. 3. 102'-10'2 
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the choice of epic allows them to parade authority as poets. They, like 
the epic poet, claim to be informed and to speak with authority on their 
subject matter - and for that purpose the more recondite the subject, the 
better. It is no great gift to speak with authority on matters of common 
knowledge; so they show evidence of rare and unobtainable knowledge 
to back up their claim to be inspired by the Muses, just as the epic poet 
is inspired with knowledge of the unknowable past (or future), the gods 
or the world of mythology. Nobody can 'see' the dead heroes of Troy 
in Homer, the legends behind the astronomical phenomena in Aratus or 
the births of the gods in Hesiod: here the poet's claim to be inspired is 
his guarantee of veracity, as has been often pointed out86, and shows the 
link between poetry and prophecy so often mentioned in the ancient 
world: the adoption of the epic high style by didactic poets arrogates 
this authority of the inspired poet to a range of subject matter some of 
which is the result not of special insight afforded by the Muses but by 
the metaphrastic expounding of scientific data collected by simple 
sense-experience (Nicander's snakes, most obviously). In this way 
Lucretius has the best of both worlds: he uses the language of divine 
inspiration and a vision afforded by divinity (e.g. 6. 92-5) in his high 
epic style, but at the same time persuades the reader by frequent appeals 
to common sense not to trust the gods for guidance or fear their wrath: 
his paradoxical claim is that this recondite world of invisible atoms and 
telescopic phenomena is available to the naked eye (nonne vides?), just 
as his recondite 'divine' world of epic poetry conveys a vision of the 
e.g. West on Hesiod Theogony 32 
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world where the divine and the human do not interact at all. This 
marks him out as different from the tradition and as engaging in its 
development~ the poet is engaging in a dialogue or dialectic with 
himself, whereby the clash of epic 'divine' form and mundane content is 
itself expressive of the effort needed to enlighten the reader - the reader 
needs the enticement of poetry while he is still unenlightened, but will 
continue to enjoy the pleasure of this mode of expression even when it 
has served its purpose by persuading him of the content. As 
demonstration of this, see e.g. the argumentation of 2. 552-568 (where 
an atomic proposition about the infinite numbers of anyone variety of 
atomic shape is demonstrated by a simile of a shipwreck which blends 
into a warning not to seek wealth by travelling on the sea~ physics is 
brought to life by epic style and given an appropriately foca1ised 'ethical' 
tum): or look at 3.978-1052, where the epic tales of punishment in the 
Underworld are told in epic style with heavy irony: their idiocy is 
brought home as much by the style as by the sense of the words, and yet 
the poet will not jettison the authority which epic poets have and 
transforms the inadequate epic myths into sermons on ethical themes for 
his readers, whereby the sinners in Hades become, as we saw in chapter 
one, types of foolish behaviour here on earth. 
Secondly, didactic poets are also aesthetic poets whose poetry 
is there to make the reader feel the tangible sensations being described -
the priority of enargeia is important here as the experience is being 
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mediated indirectly through the art form but the feeling is as if one were 
there (cf Homer Odyssey 8. 499-530, where the singing of the tale of 
Troy produces real tears in Odysseus who is then compared to a woman 
victim of war in a simile). In one obvious manner, Lucretius goes 
further than the others in the metapoetic manner in which he uses 
language as both a medium of didactic instruction, a simile for the 
atoms themselves (1.196-7,823-7,912-14,2.688-94,1013-8) and even 
a subject of its own discourse (5.1028-1090 on the origin oflanguage). 
Thirdly, ethics is clearly a priority. Hesiod, Lucretius and 
Vergil all aim in some ways to change the way we live rather than 
simply expanding the sum of our knowledge. Is this proof of the 
power of poetry - the poet is inspired with sure knowledge of the 
unknowable and so we should listen to him in all things? The belief in 
the moral power of the poet is as old as Homer - remember how 
Agamemnon left a poet with his wife to keep her chaste while he went 
to Troy (Odyssey 3. 267-9). Again, Lucretius goes further; not just 
advice on fanning and the appeal of the country life (and note how 
some scholars87 now see the Georgics as synecdochic to make up for 
this apparent limitation) but rather a whole world-view involving the life 
and death of all living things and the universe itself Lucretius makes 
pretty massive claims when compared to other didactic poets. The fact 
that the ethical emotions in Lucretius (unlike in Hesiod, Aratus) are 
usually negative (against love, politics, religion) whereas the 
metaphysical and epistemological conclusions are as positive and 
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immutable as the atoms themselves has the effect of leaving the residual 
charge of the poem as aesthetic in the sense of elevating sensory values 
of pleasure in the world and the poem over any other means to secure 
happiness; which is one sense in which aesthetics become ethics in the 
text of this poem. 
To return to the programmatic passage which opens book 
488: the last word is clearly significant: utilis is a key word in the 
justification of didactic poetry, the ideal being the blend of utile and 
dulce in one text89, just as the reader of the de rerum natura will 
experience the utilitatem in a text composed suaviloquenti ... carmine. 
This lets us reach the unexciting conclusion that the text is firmly in the 
tradition of didactic poetry as described above which conveys 'useful' 
information in a poetic90 form but which may - or may not - place 
poetry higher on the agenda of importance than the science as is 
commonly alleged of the so-called 'metaphrasts'; a topic examined on 
pages 13-15 above. This thesis wishes to urge rather more than this, 
however. Lucretius applies all the above elements of the didactic 
tradition but also extends it in many ways. He is, for example, not 
without a sense of irony. He is a poet who refers more than anyone 
c.g. Lync (1993) 203 
4.1·2S 
Horace A,.s Poetica 343 
88 
else to himself as writing a poem~ he is his own protagonist. It was 
quite normal to end a book (say) with a sphragis signing off, or a 
personal closure91 - but Lucretius puts himself as the hero of his own 
experiments (e.g. 6. 1044: he does this so often that Wiseman92 
inferred the poet's whole life and hobbies from the poem) as well as 
claiming the crown of glory (4.1-25) and chiding the reader, of whom 
we see more than we do of Perses or Maecenas (albeit he fades as the 
poem proceeds93); rather than a bland treatise, we have here almost a 
record of a drama acted out. Hesiod and Vergil do not address the 
reader in propria persona so much. The central 'hero' of the poem is 
Epicurus: but the poet keeps putting himself between the audience and 
the stage and reminding us of his genius. The poet is more than Vergil 
to our Dante - he is teacher and example to the reader, proof of the 
ethical conclusions towards which the text is driving - namely that the 
true Epicurean can both see the world in its real colours without 
flinching from the pain there but can also see the world in its beauty 
and thus derive aesthetic pleasure which alone is worth deriving. The 
poem is thus both argument and conclusion, embodying its own 
answers in the fact of the text itself. The way of life of the Epicurean 
poet is being elevated to the status of the highest ethical value; and the 
pleasure of poetry and the pleasure of learning the truth about the 
world combine to secure the poet the glory he seeks. 
I}() or at least verse: cf. Aristotle's strictures on the poetry of Empedocles in Poetics 
1447b17·20 
91 e.g. the endings ofVergil's Georgics, Horace Odes 3.30 
92 Wiseman (1974) 
93 G.B. Townend (1978) 267·83 
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The ironic and self-referential posture of the poet is well seen in 
the medical analogy which opens book 4 The analogy with the medicine 
given to the sick child is however seriously misunderstood if we do not 
recognise that this poetry (unlike the medicine) is - to continue the 
metaphor - in a bottle clearly marked poetry. The child would not drink 
the medicine if it knew that it was drinking medicine - and similarly 
Lucretius ought not to tell us what he is doing if his purpose is really to 
'trick' us, as the child is fooled by the yellow honey. The poetry does 
show the true pleasure of the world: but the poet's comparison with the 
doctor is ironic and distancing. Insofar as mankind needs the 
enlightenment of Epicurus, the poet is the doctor administering to us 
what we need - and the unenlightened are frequently compared with 
children afraid of the dark94. Poetry is a way of writing which will render 
ratio more entertaining, and so (we are told) is employed for that reason. 
The poetry is, however, clearly more than just the honey to achieve this: 
it does not point away from itself. towards a greater good but rather it 
embodies and preserves the good in the aesthetic pleasure which is the 
chief route to happiness for the wise man. The child needed to be tricked 
with a deceptive appearance: the whole thrust of this poem is that such 
deceptive appearances are to be seen through and discarded in favour of 
the reality which is staring us in the face. If the poetry is itself part of the 
deception, it too will have to be discarded - but this poetry presents us 
with truth rather than deceit and thus breaks free of the medical analogy 
so artfully set up by the poet. The layers of irony become ever more 
94 2.55-8=3.87-90 
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baffling - but once again the poet creates his own material in that the 
reader reads the medical analogy with its talk of tricking the child and sees 
through it - unlike the child - to a state of health which is conveyed and 
embodied in the aesthetic pleasure of contemplating the superiority of 
himself over others: in this case that of the adult over the child, 
elsewhere9s of the wise man on land over others on the sea. The act of 
seeing this - through the poetry - is itself the goal towards which the poem 
is directed, the poem being thus its own end as well as both a receptacle 
for the aesthetic pleasure and the means towards it. One might have 
expected the poetry to be simply the cosmetic packaging to contain what 
the reader 'really' wants (i.e. truth): in fact, the situation is a great deal 
more complex as the text is itself a way of seeing, an aesthetic experience 
of the kind which the poet enjoins as our ethical ideal. Far from being 
discarded as redundant once the wisdom has been absorbed, this poem 
reveals itself increasingly as more than ~ust' the honey on the medicine to 
sell philosophy to the immature~ it is also the state of health being looked 
for. 
9S 2. 1.19 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ETHICS OF DISENGAGEMENT 
So far this thesis has examined the ethical teachings in the text 
and found them small in contrast to the weight of the science; I have 
argued that the ethical teaching is dependent on a positivist view of morals 
such that normative ethical statements may be proven by reference to the 
empirical facts of nature and human nature; and that the Epicurean 
concept of pleasure allows for a definition of aesthetic pleasure which 
would 'justify' the poem both in the quantity of pleasant knowledge being 
conveyed and also in the pleasure of the poetic style adopted to express it. 
One key passage on ethics in the poem remains to be examined - a 
passage which in many ways is the most explicitly ethical in the whole 
poem. 
The classic statement of Epicurean ethical 'wisdom' in Lucretius is the 
beginning of book 2, where the poet urges that it is pleasant and wise 
to watch the spectacle of other men suffering in battle or on the sea, 
when one has no personal part in the struggle. The poet's ethical stance 
is thus one of aesthetic distance from life, a detached disengagement 
which renders life like a theatre show. 
suave, marl magno turbantibus aequora ventis, 
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 
sed quibus ipsa malis careas quia cernere suave est. 
suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri 5 
per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli. 
sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere 
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edita doctrina sapientum tempia serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 
errare atque viam paiantis quaerere vitae, 10 
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 
o miseras hominum mentes! 0 pectora caeca! 
qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis 15 
degitur hoc aevi quodcumque est! nonne videre 
nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui 
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mensque fruatur 
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque? 
ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus 20 
esse opus omnino, quae demant cumque dolorem, 
delicias quoque uti multas substemere possint~ 
gratius interdum neque natura ipsa requirit, 
si non aurea sunt iuvenum simulacra per aedes 
lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris, 25 
lumina noctumis epulis ut suppeditentur, 
nec domus argento fidget auroque renidet 
nec citharae reboant laqueata aurataque templa, 
cum tamen inter se pro strati in gramine molli 
propter aquae riwm sub ramis arboris altae 30 
non magnis opibus iucunde corpora curant, 
praesertim cum tempestas adridet et anni 
tempora conspergunt viridantis floribus herbas. 
nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres, 
textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti 35 
iacteris, quam si in plebeia veste cubandum est. 
quapropter quoniam nil nostro in corpore gazae 
proficiunt neque nobilitas nee gloria regni, 
quod superest, animo quoque nil prodesse putandum: 
si non forte, tuas legiones per loea campi 40 
fervere cum videas belli simulacra cientis, 
subsidiis magnis et equum vi constabilitas, 
omatas armis pariter pariterque animatas, 
his tibi tum rebus timefactae religiones 
etfugiunt animo pavidae, mortisque timores 45 
tum vacuum pectus linquunt curaque solutum. 
quod si ridicula haec ludibriaque esse videmus 
re veraque metus hominum euraeque sequaces 
nee metuunt sonitus armorum nee fera tela 
audacterque inter reges rerumque potentis 50 
versantur neque fulgorem reverentur ab auro 
nee clarum vestis splendorem purpureai, 
quid dubitas quin omni' sit haec rationi' potestas, 
omnis cum in tenebris praesertim vita laboret? 
nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia eaeeis 55 
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in tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus 
interdum nilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam 
quae pueri in tenebris pavitant finguntque futura. 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 60 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque1 
Lucretius is here giving the highest approval to those activities to 
which the labels suave and voluptas can be attached. The pleasure 
here is analysed as follows: 
1) 1-19 Personal pleasure is found in watching the sufferings and 
toils of others from a safe contemplative distance and seeing that such 
striving is quite unnnecessary. 
2) 20-36 Luxury is no benefit to the body; and nature provides 
what we need free of all effort 
3) 37-61 The mind also does not need luxuries, and the show of 
military power does not succeed in ridding us of unhealthy fears which 
themselves fear no show of might; only philosophy can rid us of these. 
The priamel structure of the opening lines (suave ... suave ... sed nil 
dulcius) suggests that the third option is the most favoured of three 
different options, when it is in fact simply an extension and an 
expression of the previous two. The specific 'epic' troubles of sea-
storml and battlefield3 are focalised into a sharper picture of 
philosophical and ethical storm and battlefield to be avoided. Nor is 
the poet being simply metaphorical; on the contrary, specific images 
2. 1-61 
1 a familiar theme of epic poetry: see Gale (1994) 119-121, Hardie (1986) 201 
J 
4 
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of isolated incidents are widened to refer to a whole way of life 
(viam .. vitae). In all three cases, the verbs are ones of looking 
(spectare ... cernere ... tueri... despicere ... videre) and the pleasure is 
therefore primarily aesthetic and contemplative. 'spectare is to watch a 
spectaculum'4 The spectacle is literary and theatrical in form and also 
in content, in that the battles and the storms are the stuff of heroic epic 
action which poets use to provide pleasure for their audience. Notice 
here the use of epic language to recreate the epic struggles of weather 
(mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis) and of battle (belli 
certamina), both phrases slightly parodistic in view of the dismissal of 
these struggles as being beneath the wise man, whose life is shored up 
in the safe haven of learning (doctrina) and peace (serena). From 
here he can look down (despicere) and see (videre) other people 
everywhere (passim) straying and wandering (notice how the futility is 
brought out in the reduplicated errare ... palantis) in search of a way of 
life, in implicit contrast to his own safely discovered and fixed abode. 
Their foolish wandering is sharpened to a political sketch 
(nobilitate ... ad summas emergere opes rerumque poliri) of endeavour 
which is earnest but inane (note again the reduplicated verbs certare ... 
contendere ... niti), all in order to gain opes and rerum. This last 
word is of course highly ironic and satirical: the poem is on the nature 
of rerum and it teaches us that real res are all around us and can be 
manipulated and understood by anybody, however ignoble or poor, 
an obvious epic theme from the Iliad onwards 
Fowler (1983) 29 citing NH ad Horace Odes 1.28.17 
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once their naturaS (and especially human nature6) are grasped. The 
poet then (continuing the theme of the need for correct perception) 
apostrophises wretched mortals for their blindness (caeca ... tenebris ... 
nonne videre) and presents the Epicurean recipe for happiness -
freedom from physical pain and pleasant sensation (iucundo sensu) 
recalling the first word of the passage (suave) with neat ring-
composition. The austerity of the Epicurean is then explained in 
greater detail (20-36) with further satire of the striving after riches, the 
argument being simply that such luxury cannot add to the pleasure 
sought, because once the pain of want has been stilled pleasure cannot 
be increased but only varied7, and any means will suffice to still the 
need in the first place, the quicker and easier the better - parvum quod 
salis est - a philosophy applied to early man's enjoyment of food in the 
springtime of human history8 and to sexual pleasure als09. The 
enjoyment of physical pleasure is accepted, but the prime purpose of 
phiiosophy as a way of life is to banish fears and mental pain: the poet 
mocks the folly of relying on political and military power to rid us of 
fear (37-54): here again there is ample parody of the epic conventions 
which deceive the fool into his folly: belli certamina, the legions 
being shored up with the Ennian equum VilO, the serried ranks evoked 
by the repeated pariter, and the nice irony whereby the enemies which 
flee in panic are here the fears themselves - except that these legions do 
5 1. 75-7 
6 2.20-36 
7 Ep. Men. 30-1, K.D.3, 18, Cicero dejinibus 1.38, Gosling and Taylor (1982) 377-383 
8 5. 932-942 
9 
10 
11 
12 
t3 
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not in fact rout the terrors, whose fear is reinforced by the repetition 
timejactae ... pavidae... timores. Military power is rendered two-
dimensional and insubstantial as it succeeds only in arousing the belli 
simulacra - especially appropriate in this case as the 'fighting' is sham 
battles taking place probably in the Campus Martius11 - and the self-
deceit is also perhaps contained in the synaesthetic fervere videas as in 
the telling epithet armis ornatas (the arms are mere decoration). A 
similar figure is used later by Horace: 
dant alios Furiae torvo spectacula Marti; 
exitio est avidum mare nautis12 
'The Romans sometimes likened great military exploits, 
particularly those of the civil war, to the contests of the arena, where 
the vilest slaves were butchered for the pleasure of a sadistic 
proletariat. The point was made by the unenchanted Caelius, Cicero 
Epist. 8.14.4. (50 B.C.): "uterque et animo et copiis paratus. si sine 
tuo periculo fieri posset, magnum et iucundum tibi Fortuna 
spectaculum parabat." 13 The sham fighting does not rout the real 
enemies of fear and care and the show is a farce - ridicula .. 
ludibriaque (47). The word ludibrium is perfect: compare the 
passage in Livy where the pretend battle is contrasted with the real 
thing: 
5.962-965: cf. oJ. 1063-1072, Horace Satires 1.2.111-119 
Munro's emendation of the mss epicuri: cf. EnniusAnn 161,412 
as suggested by Bailey 
Horace Odes l.28.17-18 
Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 330 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
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amoto ... inani ludibrio. tum demum ad iustum 
proelium .. . concursum estl4 
and Martial's mocking reference to miserae ludibria chartaelS by which 
he means 'poems not based on real experience'16. The fears 
themselves, personified, walk tall among even the grandees of this 
world (reges rerumque potentes) and have no respect at all for the 
appearances of power and wealth which they display (52). The title 
rerum .. potentes is of course bitterly ironic in the context of the empty 
show of power over res when (again) real res are all around us for the 
taking. The poet thus uses poetry to undermine the very tone he is 
setting up, using epic language to debunk the epic way of life in a self-
exploding passage of deep irony. 
The moral tone in this passage is apparently one simply of 
enlightened self-interest and disillusion with the conventional icons of 
success and happiness, such as the proverbiallZoucos roOaIpOJv tyrant 
figure found in (e.g.) Plato Gorgias17; the rich and powerful are not 
for that reason happy, while the poor and powerless may be happy with 
the aid of reason. The world is not a perfect place, but we can all be 
happy in it. The philosopher will not take part in politics as the bear-
garden of politics is too rough and dangerous for peace of mind and he 
Livy 37.41.12 
Martial 10.4.7 
OLD s.v. 'ludibrium' 4 
470c9-471d2 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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can (and should) shelter from the storm, as suggested by Socrates in 
Plato's Repub/icI8 : 
raora 7ravra Aor1opij} Aa{3Wv, T,C1Vvav eXCtJv teal ra 
au roo 7rpclrrCtJv, olov BV XSlPOJvt teOVlOp-rOO teal r;-&;..71S U7rO 
7rVsuparos q,spOP€VOV U7rO rS1Vov a7rooras, opiiJv roos a,Uovs 
tearamp7rAap6VOVS avoplas, ara7rq. Sf trn auras tea9ap?Js 
,~ , ",,, , , 9' ~ f3' f3' , avltclas rs teal avoC1lCtJV sprCtJV roy rs sv avs lOY ICtJosral teal 
nJV a7ra,Uar1]V aurov JJera teaA17S ihrl80s lAeCtJS re teal sUJJsV1}s 
a7raAA&~sral. 
Where Lucretius goes further than Socrates is in his suggestion 
that the politically powerful are in fact weaker than the non-political 
sage~ the passage is thus in 'political' terms something of an exercise in 
turning the tables on the powerful of the world, whereby their show of 
power - notice for instance how the legions evoke only the simulacra of 
war (41), a remark justifiable in Epicureanism but here of obvious 
satirical force - is a mere show with no substance while the reality 
behind the fa~ade is one of fear and impotence in the face of nature, 
death, religion and so on, a situation later memorably described by 
Horacel9. The rich and powerful are theatrical in their elaborate 
costume and decor - notice how the poet treats us to a lavish verbal 
description of the luxurious house redolent of Homers palace on 
Scheria20 - and yet behind the costumes they are as weak as the rest of 
us, their costumes a mere f~ade of empty appearance. When a rich 
man and a poor man are sick, the expensive bedclothes of the former 
give him no advantage over the latter21, whereas the wise man is 
Plato Repub/ic496d 
Horace Odes 3.1.34-40 
Odyssey 7. 100-102 
2. 34-36 
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always superior to the fool in being free from the mental pains of fear 
and superstition. Once again there is theatrical irony here: the wise 
man is the audience who sees the spectacle enacted by the fools and 
derives safe aesthetic pleasure from the displayed actions, while being 
aware that the spectacle is in fact no more than an empty show of inane 
fatuity. The fool, on the other hand, is in fact on the stage acting out 
a futile role but believes that he is 'really' pursuing pleasure and 
happiness in his quest for power and wealth: he is an actor unaware of 
his role. The wise man does not enjoy the suffering of the fool 
because he likes people to be hurt - why, in that case, would the poem 
affect to convert the fools to a happier state of mind if by doing so it 
would reduce the amount of folly available for our entertainment? 
Rather the poem presents the inescapable fact of the contrast between 
wisdom and folly, between action and contemplation, between sure 
aesthetic pleasure and futile seeking after pleasure through power and 
greed. 
The passage has often been seen as ethically and morally 
somewhat distasteful. Bailey concedes that the lines 'have an 
unpleasant taste of egoism and even of cruelty. The Epicurean 
philosopher, secure in his own independence, gazing on the troubles 
and struggles of his fellow-men is an almost cynical picture; Bacon 
referred to it ironically as ttLucretian pleasure". 'l2 The prevailing 
attitude appears egotistical and it is hard to defend Lucretius against 
this charge by any other means. Nor can we excuse the poet on the 
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grounds that these are post-Christian sensitivities not shared by the 
ancients: Aristotle regards t1ttX<X.tPElC<X.lCt<X. as an unmitigated evil 
which does not allow of a 'golden mean'23 and links it with adultery, 
theft and murder. 
This is, it might be urged, to misunderstand the literary 
tradition in which this passage is composed. In the first place it is one 
of respectable atomist ancestry: the atomist philosopher Democritus 
expresses a very similar view when he says: 24 
em rors ouvarors ouv oei exe1v n}v yvcOJ.l1Jv leal rois Trapeov(]Lv 
apteee06al, rcOv J.l£V S 1]AoUJ.l£V(i)V teal (}auJ.las 0J.l£V(i)V oAi r1JV 
J.lV~J.l1JY exovra teal rfi olavolq J.lT, TrpooeopeVovra, 't'(OV o£ 
raA.a11l'(i)peovr(i)v rouS' f3{0US' (}e(i)p£elV evvoouJ.levov a Tr£IOXOU(]L 
leapra, Dte(i)S' elV reX TrapeOvra 001 leal ooaplovra J.lerala leal 
s1]AmreX q,a{v1Jral , teal J.l1]te£n TrA.elOV(i)V EmOuJ.l£OVn ouJ.lf3alvn 
teateOTra(}erv rfj 'l'Vxn. 0 rap 9auJ.lat;(i)v rolls £lovraS' leal 
J.lateapl'OJ.lSVOuS' VTrO rwv &.ucov aV(}pWTr(i)V teal rfi J.lV~J.ln miaav 
wpav Trpooeopeu(i)v ad ETrlICalVOUpreiv aVaYICa'eral leal 
, a~ '1 '1 ~-ll ~ " ll... I - I " .,. I emf"A'I\.II.GU{1al ul em{1UJ.ll1]V rou n Trp1]CKJelV aV1]leeO't'ov (i)V VOJ.lOl 
te(i),u)OU(]Lv. OlOTrep reX J.l£V J.lT, olt;e06al lPeQ)V, Em o£ rois 
, ll. • I -ll I ~ '1 '1 - ,. - pi " eU{1UJ.leeU{1al lPe(i)V, napaf"A'lVIA.Jvra rov eaurou LOY Trpot; TOV 
TWV q,aUAOTepov np1]OOOVT(i)V, leal J.lateapi,elV £(i)UTOV 
Ev9uJ.leVJ.levov a TraOlOU(]LV, OteooqJ aors(i)v f3s).nov Tr~CKJ&1 re 
leal 01are1' rav't'1]S' yelp EI0J.levOS' rijS' yvmpTfS' eV8uporepdv re 
ola~elS' teal oote oAiraS' tcijpaS' ~v Tep f3{qJ olooeal, tjIlJovov leal 
,ijAoV leal O:uoJ.levl1Jv. 
Democritus is perhaps not the philosopher whom many would choose 
as their model: 
'Democritus' hedonism has nothing to do with morality; it 
does not pretend to tell us what, morally speaking, we ought to do, or 
how to live the moral life. It is a recipe for happiness or contentment, 
not a prescription for goodness; the system sets up a selfish end for the 
22 Bailey (1947) vol ii p.797 
23 Nicomachean Ethicsl107alO 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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individual and counsels him on how to attain it: it does not set up a 
moral goal and advise on its achievement. '25 
This 'systematic theory of prudence'26 is of course exactly 
what one expects from a positivist atomist philosopher whose moral 
theory rests on his system of materialistic physics. and Barnes' 
dismissal of the connections between the physics and the ethics of 
Democritus as 'empty: it follows a will 0' the wisp'27 is unfair to the 
atomist thinker whose theory of (apparent) moral nihilism is no less a 
theory for all that. The urge towards Schadenfreude is perhaps not 
one which people would readily admit to: but for Epicwils there is no 
court of appeal beyond the provision of pleasure to the individual: 
'strictly speaking there is no concept of moral obligation or of moral 
evil in Epicureanism'l8 and so the primacy of pleasure justifies the 
laughter for the Epicurean without any further ado. There is inevitably 
an element of such superiority in any philosophical or religious system 
which promises to elevate the wise man or the initiated above his peers 
into the realms of blessedness. and Lucretius is simply (in this. as in 
much else) being more honest about it. 
There are then other distinguished ancients who subscribe to 
Lucretius' enjoyment of others' suffering: Fowler29 cites the Greek 
proverb £~avt11S AeOOoco 't'oVJJov lCaKOV d.Uov sloV't'a, and Cicero 
fro 191 (KRS S94): the parallel is not noted in Bailey 
Barnes (1982) S33 
ibid. 
Barnes (1982) 534 
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is explicit and interesting on the whole topic in seeking Lucceius' 
favourable report of his political career: 
multam enim casus nostri tibi varietatem in scribendo 
suppeditabunt, plenam cuiusdam voluptatis, quae vehementer animos 
horninum in legendo te scriptore tenere possit. nihil est enim aptius ad 
delectationem lectoris, quam temporum varietates fortunaeque 
vicissitudines; quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in 
legendo tamen erunt iucundae. habet enim praeteriti doloris secura 
recordatio delectationem. ceteris vero, nulla perfunctis propria 
molestia, casus aut em alienos sine ullo dolore intuentibus, etiam ipsa 
misericordia est iucunda. quem enim nostrum ille moriens apud 
Mantineam Eparninondas non cum quadam rniseratione delectat? qui 
tum denique sibi avelli iubet spiculum, posteaquam ei percontanti 
dictum est clipeum esse salvum; ut etiam in vulneris dolore aequo 
animo cum laude moreretur. cuius studium in \egendo non erectum 
Thernistocli fuga redituque tenetur? Etenim ordo ipse annalium 
mediocriter nos retinet, quasi enumeratione fastorum. at viri saepe 
excellentis ancipites variique casus habent admirationem, 
exspectationem, laetitiam, molestiam, spem, timorem; si vero exitu 
notabili concluduntur, expletur animus iucundissima lectionis 
voluptate.3o 
Later on, in the depths of disillusion with politics, he expresses similar 
sentiments again: 
iam pridem gubernare me taedebat etiam cum licebat; nunc 
vero, cum cogar exire de navi non abiectis sed ereptis gubernaculis, 
cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri, cupio, ut ait tuus amicus 
Sophocles, KQV urro C1rer?1 
1tV~ WcOUf:'V ytaKa80s eiJ80Uan 41Pf:vr.31 
The Sophoclean quotation runs in full: 
l/JEV q,EV n rovrov lapJJa JJEi,ov av MifJolS 
rov rijs em'llavoavra 1C~9' WeD OTEro 
mJlCVijS alCovoal ljIalCat50s wooVan </JpEvi;32 
28 Rist (1972) 125 
29 Fowler (1983) 17 
30 Cicero Ad Fam. 5.12.4-5 
31 Cicero AdAtticum2.7.4 
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Shackleton-Bailey]] cites some interesting Epicurean lines from 
Tibullus: 
parva seges satis est~ satis est, requiescere tecto 
si licet et solito membra levare toro. 
quam iuvat immites ventos audire cubantem 
et dominam tenero continuisse sinu 
aut, gelid as hibemus aquas cum fuderit Auster 
securum somnos imbre iuvante sequi. 34 
These last lines put the Lucretian passage into the more familiar setting 
of the Epicurean choosing the life of quiet pleasure rather than that of 
noise and fame or ruin3'. The choice is after all open to all to be either 
a risk-taking politician or a quietist - but it is a typical stance of the poet 
to choose the latter in the increasingly common 'choice of life' poems36 
which seek to justify the choice of apolitical poetry rather than pursue 
the life of the politician, the soldier or the merchant. Parallels abound 
in Roman literature: from the first poem in Horace's Odes to the 
explicitly autobiographical account by Ovid of his early life: 
frater ad eloquium viridi tendebat ab aevo 
fortia verbosi natus ad anna fori; 
at mihi iam puero caelestia sacra placebant, 
inque suum furtim Musa trahebat opus. 
saepe pater dixit 'studium quid inutile temptas? 
Maeonides nullas ipse reliquit opes.' .... 
cepimus et tenerae primos aetatis honores, 
eque viris quondam pars tribus una fui. 
curia restabat: clavi mensura coacta est; 
maius erat nostris viribus illud onus. 
nee patiens corpus, nec mens fuit apta labori, 
sollicitaeque fugax ambitionis eram, 
et petere Aoniae suadebant tuta sorores 
otia, iudicio semper amata meo.37 
32 from Sophocles Tympanistae fro 636 Pearson 
33 Shackleton Bailey (1965) 367 
34 Tibullus 1.1.42-8 3' cf. (inter multa alia) Horace Odes 1.9, Satins 1.6, Epistles 1.7, 1.l0 and the whole 
Epicurean theme of M86 !3u»aas. 
36 d. e.g. Horace Odes 1.1 with parallels cited by NH ad loe" Cairns (1979) 145-6 
37 Ovid Tristla 4.10. 17-40 
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where the familiar dichotomy of politics and poetry is expressed in 
peculiarly Roman terms. Vergil expresses the concept also in the 
Georgics, where he describes himself in the closing sphragis as: 
ilIo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat 
Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis otii, 
carmina qui lusi pastorum ... 38 
recalling his earlier wish flumina amem silvasque ingloriusl9 but adding 
the two important ideas of otium and lusus. In other words, it may 
be that, if Lucretius appears to be revelling in others' misfortune, he is 
only doing so to justify his own choice of life as a 'quietist' poet and 
philosopher: the traditional opposition between poetry and philosophy 
here gives way to a dichotomy between politics on the one hand and 
poetry/philosophy on the other, with the philosophical poet espousing a 
stance which combines the 'childlike' unpolitical nature of a Socrates 
being taunted by a Callicles with the otiosus attitude of a gentleman of 
letters. Put like this, the Schadenfreude of Lucretius becomes a sort 
of inverted JJaxapr.C1JJ6s elevating the chosen way of life by invidious 
contrast with other possibilities: this particular topos finds examples 
throughout classical literature40, particularly elevating pastoral41 
contentment against the noise of the city, but this is the only example I 
know of where the favoured 'profession' consists simply in the watching 
of the others all going wrong. 
38 Yergil Georgics 4. 563-5 
39 Yergil Georgics 2. 486 
40 e.g. Yergil Georgics 2.458-74, Claudian Carmimma Minonun Corpusc1I/um 20~ the 
genre is mocked in Horace Epode 2. More references given in Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 1 n. 
41 For Lucretius' use of pastoral see Gillis (1967) 
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There is thus more to the present passage than a mere 
jJ.aKapl(]/ .. UJS, inverted or not~ some positive pleasure is being assigned 
to the contemplation of the lack of real pleasure suffered by others, 
rather than simply using their displeasure as evidence of the poet's 
superiority. The Schadenfreude of the opening lines gives way, as we 
saw, to a disquisition on the true nature of pleasure as being the 
removal of pain and the avoidance of luxury~ and the poet ties the two 
together by asserting that pleasure is simply: 
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mensque fruatur 
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque42 
which allows for the aesthetic pleasure of watching other men suffer as 
being literally the enjoyment of a pleasant sensation freed from care and 
fear. 
The alternatives are not exhausted, however. It might still, for 
instance, be urged that the pleasure described here is simply that 
satisfaction gained by having chosen the better way of life, the mood 
found in, for instance, Catullus' sardonic lines: 
42 2. 18.19 
43 76. 1-6 
siqua recordanti benefacta priora voluptas 
est homini, cum se cogitat esse piurn, 
nec sanctam violasse fidem, nec foedere in ullo 
diwm ad fallendos numine abusum homines, 
muita parata manent in Ionga aetate, Catulle 
ex hoc ingrato gaudia amore tibi. 43 
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Here, after all, is that Epicurean word vo/uptas used of the recollection 
of good living in implicit contrast to the bad ways of others. The 
difference however is instructive: Lucretius' wise man is looking at the 
behaviour of others, whereas Catullus is examining his own past life. 
Catullus is analysing his own self-denial and righteous morality - with the 
implicit expectation that such virtue will be rewarded - only to find that he 
has lost out on all sides. His lover has not requited his love, his good acts 
are simply a waste of effort if their aim was to secure either that love or 
indeed happiness, since his state of mind is a very un-Epicurean sickness 
(pestem ... morbum) and even self-torture (te ... excrucies) - exactly the kind 
of love-sickness in fact, which Lucretius goes out of his way to castigate 
in 4. 1068-1120. Catullus has tried virtue in the spirit of self-denial, 
rejecting his instincts towards selfish pleasure at the expense of others and 
hoping for recognition, and found the process unrewarding - the 
implication behind his words is that he should have been as bad as the rest 
and sought pleasure through immorality. Lucretius' wise man, by contrast, 
finds virtue in the actual seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain: he 
knows what is going to make him happy and sees through the fatuous 
ambitions of the sailor and the soldier to the peaceful calm of wisdom. 
What makes the Lucretius passage central for this thesis is the 
further suggestion in it that pleasure resides in the act of seeing itself, in the 
unmoved contemplation of movement, in the passion-free contemplation of 
passion~ in short, in an aesthetic attitude. The alternative would be to read 
the text as heartless cruelty and wilful enjoyment of others' pain. Critics who 
take exception to the apparent cruelty of the passage themselves no doubt go 
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to the theatre and witness the frisson of pleasure gained by watching tragedy 
without feeling guilty of the same callous enjoyment as the poet here espouses 
- and the key to the understanding of the passage is, I suggest, precisely this 
'theatrical' context. In the next three chapters we shall look at the 
theatricality of the De Rerum Natura: suffice it to say here that the attitude is 
one of contemplation rather than action, of watching others act while 
remaining inactive, and (above all) of deriving aesthetic pleasure 
(suave ... iucunda voluptas ... suave) from the act of so watching. We are told 
by Epicurus M9£ /31ooas, we are told by Lucretius to avoid political 
activityw and the pursuit of love, to avoid warfare and superstition (all of 
them different forms of seeking power over others and the world, of rerum 
potiri): only here are we given the complementary message which breathes 
through every line of the poem - true happiness (and pleasure and power) is 
to be gained by the aesthetic understanding and appreciation of the world all 
around us. This is an aesthetic ethical philosophy which tells us that we ought 
to spend our lives in looking at and appreciating the world as perceived 
through the senses rather than in seeking to possess it. If the goal of 
Epicurean philosophy is freedom from pain and fear and serene contentment, 
then the person who wishes to be happy has to spend his time studying the 
truth about the world in order to replace superstitious fear with vera ratio: 
and also to cultivate those forms of pleasure which will bring happiness, most 
notably the ataraxia of mental pleasure. The search for scientific 
knowledge is obviously a prolegomena to such ethics, and the poem is both a 
44 on this topic. and cspccia1ly the Epicurean stance towards kingship. see D.P. Fowler 
(1 989b) 
4S 
46 
47 
48 
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testament to this search and also an example of it; but the other part of the 
ethic is the stilling of the body towards the contemplation of movement 
outside itself in aesthetic appreciation, appreciation even of the pain in the 
world. Knowledge may bring pleasure, and pleasure is the good: therefore 
knowledge is also productive of good and aesthetics becomes ethics. 
Seeing the truth of nature makes men like gods and thus grants them the 
sort of blissful contentment which the gods enjoy4s; one recalls how the gods 
in Homer watch the human activities on the battlefield with interest and 
pleasure but not without some degree of personal involvement and even pain, 
as Zeus weeps over Sarpedon46 and Aphrodite is wounded by Diomedes47, 
whereas the gods in the de rerum natura are safely distanced from any 
involvement48. The poet thus has it both ways - the 'real' gods are not 
available to help or punish us, but he is prepared to borrow the language of 
Homeric gods to produce a paradigm of the perfect human life as one of safe 
contemplation of the world of restless human activity. This point will be 
examined further in the last chapter. Before then, the poet's use of the 
theatre will demonstrate the way this aesthetic ethics of disengagement is put 
to literary and also philosophical use. 
such as is enjoyed by Epicurus: see the conclusion to the thesis 
Iliad 16. 459-61 
Iliad 5 .. 334-342 
3.14-24 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE THEATRE AS SIMILE, INTERTEXT AND POETIC 
MEDIUM 
Of all the literary debts which Lucretius clearly owes, none is 
more important for this thesis than his debt to the theatre, and this and 
the following two chapters will attempt to unpack the importance of the 
theatre in its different facets. 
The theatre is used as a microcosmic analogy of perception at 
work in 'real life' as we take in simulacra and interpret them as being 
'true' objects when they are only fleeting images; it is in the theatre that 
human experience is acted out and presented to the audience in a direct 
and moving manner; it is the theatre which shows how didactic issues 
can be addressed without overt didacticism in an aesthetic and 
demonstrative way, using rhetoric and action to convey a view of the 
world which is plausible, moving and therefore convincing; it is in the 
theatre above all that scene painting can be achieved by the use of 
words alone, a technique essential in a theatrical tradition with little in 
the way of scenery. If Lucretius chose to use the theatre as both 
metaphor, analogy and inspiration for his poetry, then, that is hardly 
surprising. 
There is, to begin with, a good deal of direct mention of the 
theatre as an institution, with Lucretius using his first-hand knowledge 
of the theatrical experience. He uses the theatre of Pompey as an 
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image several times, such as when he uses the rattling of theatrical 
awnings as a simile for the rattle of thunder: 
dant etiam sonitum patuli super aequora mundi, 
carbasus ut quondam magnis intenta theatris 
dat crepitum malos inter iactata trabesque, 
interdum perscissa furit petulantibus auris 
et fragilis sonitus chartarum commeditatur ... 1 
here the simile (thunder is like the awnings) becomes the tenor of 
another simile (the awnings are like paper) in its own right. Elsewhere 
he appeals to the common experience of scented water used on the 
stage and altar: 
et cum scaena croco Cilici perfusa recens est 
araque Panchaeos exhalat propter odores.2 
In the fourth book the theatrical imagery creates a metaphor 
for the whole theory of simulacra. Just as fire visibly casts off smoke 
and heat and crickets and snakes slough off their skins, so also a 
jortiori fine insubtantial films must be cast off the surface of things just 
as the colour of the awnings appears to 'dye' the people and theatre 
below them: 
et volgo faciunt id lutea russaque vela 
et ferrugina, cum magnis intenta theatris 
per malos volgata trabesque trementia flutant~ 
namque ibi consessum caveai subter et omnem 
scaenai speciem personarumque decorem 
inficiunt coguntque suo fluitare colore. 
et quanto circum mage sunt inclusa theatri 
6. 108-112 
2 2. 416-7 
111 
moenia, tam magis haec intus perfusa lepore 
omnia conrident correpta luce diei. 
ergo lintea de summo cum corpore fucum 
mittunt, effigias quoque debent mittere tenuis 
res quaeque, ex summo quoniam iaculantur utraque.1 
Notice here how the experience is first-hand from inside the theatre 
itself, and note also the pleasant association set up by the metaphor in 
conrident. The argument itself is hardly cogent but the analogy is 
developed with excess of detail: the three colours named, the detail of 
malos ... trabesque, the telling verbs trementia flutant put together to 
describe the trembling and fluttering of the awnings with maximum 
effect. The poet's eye goes from the gathered crowd (coruessum) to the 
stage set (scaenai speciem) and then to the masked actors on stage 
(personarumque decorem) in a tricolon crescendo of great plausibility 
as the spectator looks at his fellow audience and then the stage and then 
the actors when they appear. The colouring of these things is well 
brought out in the next line and charged with the word fluitare recalling 
how the awningsflutant in line 77. The language makes it clear that the 
poet sees the colouring as being more than mere light-effects but a good 
case of the atomic theory at work; the simulacra actually dye the 
theatre with atoms, the imagery being liquid, the detail being exactly 
observed: 
'fIuitare is 'a word properly used of water ... this water image is 
caught up in perfusa lepore, soaked in beauty. The end of the quotation 
3 4. 7S-86. MSS read patrum matrumqve deorum at 79: for the emendation printed see 
Godwin (1986) 97 
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shows Lucretius following up his interest in the technical details of 
architecture... If. the walls of the bowl of a Roman theatre are about 
the same height as the stage buildings, the more the walls of the theatre 
are enclosed all around, that is, the fewer chinks there are between the 
awnings and the top of the theatre walls, the more intensely will 
everything inside the theatre be saturated with colour as the direct 
daylight is diminished. 4 
Later in the book the actor's mask is used as an analogy to 
demonstrate what happens to simulacra when they hit a mirror: 
nunc ea quae nobis membrorum dextera pars est 
in speculis fit ut in laeva videatur eo quod, 
planitiem ad speculi veniens cum offendit imago, 
non convertitur incolumis, sed recta retrorsum 
sic eliditur, ut siquis, prius arida quam sit 
cretea persona, adlidat pilaeve trabive, 
atque ea continuo rectam si fronte figuram 
servet et elisam retro sese exprimat ipsa~ 
fiet ut, ante oculus fuerit qui dexter, ut idem 
nunc sit laevus, et e laevo sit mutua dexter. S 
The use of masks in the Roman theatre is well attested6 and the word 
persona is lavishly attested in the sense of actor's mask7. As, however, 
this is the only instance of the word creteus in Roman literature and 
actor's masks were said to be made of linen and covered the whole 
head,8 Bailey may be nearer the mark when he likens this cretea 
persona to the masks 'such as the Romans often took of the dead'. 
4 West (1969) 39 
S 4. 292-301 
6 see Beare (19S0) 184-6, Beacham (1991) 183-S 
7 OLD S.v. 'persona' cites this passage as meaning actor's mask (OLD S.v. I) 
8 see OCD s. v. 'masks' 
9 
10 
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The clay quality is important for the didactic context - a linen mask 
would hardly perform the stunts which the clay one does here. 
More telling 'mask' imagery is found in book 3, where there is 
a striking passage9 in which the poet uses the metaphor of the mask to 
denote the hypocritical front which men wear until forced by danger to 
reveal their true selves: 
quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis 
convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit: 
nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab ipso 
eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res. 
The importance of honesty and refusing to 'play a role' is central to 
Epicurean ethics, and the theatrical imagery here is perfect to show the 
'superficial materialist who says that he knows that death is not to be 
feared, but reveals the underlying terror which his philosophical 
pretensions have merely masked not removed, when he is in danger or 
distress. '10 
A more telling case still is the poet's coining of the word 
postscaenia to describe the backstage reality which lurks behind the 
pretty facade of the mistress. The blind un-Epicurean lover has fallen in 
love with a woman who wisely keeps her distance - if her meretricious 
theatricality were seen through this would break the illusion and send 
him running: 
at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 
3. 55-58 
Gale (1994) 90 
114 
floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 
unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit; 
quem si, iam ammissum, venientem offenderit aura 
una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 
et meditat diu cadat alte sumpta querella, 
stultitiaque ibi se darnnet, tribuisse quod illi 
plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 
nee Veneres nostras hoc fallit: quo magis ipsae 
omnia summo opere hos vitae postscaenia celant 
quos retinere volunt adstrictosque esse in amore -
nequiquarn, quoniam tu animo tamen omnia possis 
protrahere in lucem atque omnis inquirere risus, 
et, si bello animost et non odiosa, vicissim 
praetermittere et humanis concedere rebus. 11 
The Veneres are of course actresses, and know that they are: but the 
lover is not acting and would be distressed to have his illusions 
shattered. The irony at the end of the passage is the observation that 
when the lover is blindly infatuated he thinks the mistress is perfect but 
that he could in tum decide to 'tum a blind eye' to her faults once he has 
seen her in her true colours. Happiness, again, is available to those 
who see the truth and refuse to nurse illusions about the world; and 
imperfections fully understood and forgiven are more desirable than 
non-existent perfections. The analogy with the theatre works 
perfectly; the mistress is acting a part and has to create illusion in her 
audience (the lover) or else the excitement is lost, although this 
excitement is devoid of real content since it is based on mere 
appearance with no reality behind it - a glimpse at the reality behind it 
(the postscaenia) would reveal the lie. The wise man, on the other 
hand, will see that the all our perceptions are based on simulacra. He 
will see not only the show on the stage but also the back-stage realities 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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and realise what is truth and what is fiction. Happiness is available for 
him as he sees through the world of illusion in precisely the manner in 
which the locked out lover cannot. This scene will be examined again 
in chapter 7. 
Elsewhere in the poem the imagery of the theatre is apparent. 
Secondary qualities such as slavery, poverty and so on walk on and 
walk offlike actors on the stage: 
setvitium contra paupertas divitiaeque 
libertas bellum concordia, cetera quorum 
adventu manet incolumis natura abituque, 
haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare1l. 
just as early man's peaceful life is rudely disturbed by the entrance of a 
wild animal: 
eiiectique domo fugiebant saxea tecta 
spumigeri suis adventu validique leonis13 
The poet cannot 'play his part': 
nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo 
possumus aequo animo14 
and men would not 'play their lives' foolishly if they knew the truth: 
si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur 
pondus inesse animo quod se gravitate fatiget, 
e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde 
tanta mali tamquam moles in pectore constet, 
haud ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus 
quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper 
commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit. U 
4.1177-1191 
l. 455-8; cr. l. 7 and l.677 for the same imagery of cntraDC:eS and exits 
5. 984-5 
1.41-2: for the theatrical sense of ago see OLD S.v. 25 
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The old fool who is not prepared to die when his time has come is 
addressed by Nature as a balatro16 - a clown-figure as if from 
comedyl7, and the child who is taken in by the medicine ludificetur l8 -
a clear allusion to the comic theatre. The clearest and fullest 
expression of this is: 
sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis19 
where the goddess puts lovers on the comic stage20 and makes fools of 
them with simulacra. 
The fourth book takes the mechanics of perception and 
explains how the insubstantial simulacra form the source of everything 
we see: given that all events are atomic and must have equally atomic 
causes, sense-experiences can all be explained in rigorously atomic 
terms. In order to explain this he uses the language of the theatre a 
great deal; indeed Schrijvers well calls the theatre 'a small but fitting 
Leitmotiv in the book concerned with sense-perception'll In a simple 
sense this is true, in that his account of sense-perception states that 
'reality' (the world outside us) is only perceptible because of the 
simulacra which are emitted from objects and people~ this means that 
the observer is always in the position of the audience in the theatre, at 
one remove from reality and unable to reach the 'thing in itself. Just as 
IS 3. 1053-1059: The whole passage will be examined later on in chapter seven as an 
example of comedy 
16 3. 955: the correction for the unprecedented MSS reading baraue is plausible. 
17 cf. Horace Satires 1.2.2 
18 1. 939 = 4.14 
19 4. 1101 
20 OLD S.Y. 'ludo' 6b; cf. esp. 2. 631 
21 Schrijvers (1980) 142 
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all simulacra are insubstantial and fleeting images, and not the 'things 
in themselves' at all, and yet our perception is nonetheless reliable when 
once we have understood the mechanics of it and learnt how to 
interpret these images, so also the spectator in the theatre who 
imagined that he was seeing 'real life' rather than pretence would be 
foolish, and yet he may still 'believe' what he sees. In the theatre we 
suspend our disbelief and may be moved by emotion and yet are always 
intellectually aware of the artificiality and so do not feel (e.g.) fear at 
the spectacle of the Furies. The paradox of theatricality - how the 
obviously untrue can move us as if it were real - is applied by Lucretius 
to the whole process of perception itself, where very similar things 
happen and fool us all the time. The theatre here, then, becomes more 
than a decorative metaphor and takes over as a concrete demonstration 
of precisely the tension between truth and representation which the 
fourth book is examining. 
The subject perceives images (of sight, sound, smell etc) which 
he interprets as being representations of the real things from which they 
are being emitted; these images are called effigiae whose primary sense 
is 'statue' as in Catullus 64. 161 but which also means 'ghosts' and thus 
helps to justify the whole topic of perception as a way of disproving the 
'proof' of life after death afforded by the sight of ghosts. In the case of 
moving images the theory demands that the simulacra are in fact 
individual films - however many and frequent - and that (as in a Zeno 
paradox) the 'moving' reality is actually a series of static states which by 
their own motion in sequence give the appearance of motion in the 
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object from which they emanate. This is true in all cases, but it has a 
neat symmetry in the special case of mirrors: Lucretius uses the 
language of dance to show how the images in the mirror imitate our 
actions like a synchronised ballet-troupe: 
indugredi porro pariter simulacra pedemque 
ponere nobiscum credas gestumque imitari 
propterea quia, de speculi qua parte recedas, 
continuo nequeunt illinc simulacra reverti 
omnia quandoquidem cogit natura referri 
ac resilire ab rebus ad aequos reddita flexus22. 
The language of dance is used here: gestus23 has the sense of graceful 
and attractive stance and the same image is used again of the shadow 
following us at line 365. Later on the dancing show is even more 
explicit in the description of images in ~leepW 
quod superest, non est mirum simulacra moveri 
bracchiaque in numerum iactare et cetera membra; 
nam fit ut in somnis facere hoc videatur imago; 
quippe ubi prima perit alioque est altera nata 
inde statu, prior hic gestum mutasse videtur.24 
where the images stir their arms 'in rhythm' - unlike the ungainly lack of 
rhythm shown by early man who tried to dance but did so extra 
numerum, beating the mother earth hard with hard feet2s . The thought 
and the language are repeated at 4. 788-93: 
quid porro, in numerum procedere cum simulacra 
cernimus in somnis et mollia membra movere, 
mollia mobiliter cum alternis bracchia mittunt 
et repetunt oculis gestum pede convenienti? 
scilicet arte madent simulacra et docta vagantur, 
22 4. 318.323 
23 cf. Propertius 2.22.S, Ovid Amores 2.4.29, Pont. 4.2.33, Martia16.71.1 
24 4. 767.772 
2S S. 1399.1402 
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noctumo facere ut possint in tempore ludos 
where the repetition of the actions is well brought out by the repetition 
of words (mollia ... mollia) and m-sounds (mollia membra movere 
mollia mobiliter). The poet perhaps has in mind a stately dance such 
as the rope-dance described in Livy26 performed by young girls (for 
whom mollia membra is appropriate): his use of oculis involves him in 
a serious inconsistency, as dreams do not enter the mind through the 
eyes at all, but keeps the theatrical analogy uppermost in the reader's 
mind, just as pede convenienti means both 'with feet in harmony' and 
also 'in a suitable rhythm' (appropriate to verse drama). The poet sets 
up the theatre-show, only to knock it down with withering sarcasm, as 
he mocks the images as arte madent .. et docta vagantur: the phrase 
ludosfacere often means to 'fool or shame somebody'27, just as the verb 
madent often suggests intoxication (cf 3.479), all suggesting that the 
show is - like all theatre shows - an exercise in deception and illusion. 
The irony here is that the poet is arguing that the illusion of simulacra is 
in fact pointing us to the truth. 
Later on Lucretius takes the concept of the spectator at the 
ludi as a prime example of one who sees recurrent images even after the 
show is ended: here he expands the description of the theatre into its 
fullest and most relevant form to the argument of the book: 
et quicumque dies multos ex ordine ludis 
adsiduas dederunt operas plerumque videmus 
26 27.37.12-14 
27 OLD s.v. ludus 4ab 
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cum iam destiterunt ea sensibus usurpare 
relucuas tamen esse vias in mente patentis 
qua possint eadem rerum simulacra venire. 
per multos itaque illa dies eadem obversantur 
ante oculos, etiam vigilantes ut videantur 
cemere saltantis et mollia membra moventis 
et citharae liquidum carmen chordasque loquentis 
auribus accipere, et consessum cernere eundem 
scenaique simul varios splendere decores.28 
What the poet is describing is memory stirred by a striking spectacle 
and the constant reliving of both sights and sounds from the Iud; even 
when the spectator is awake and far removed from the original 
experience; the tension between repetition and variety is well evoked in 
the contrast of the 'same' crowd but the varios ornaments of the 
beauties of the stage. The precision builds up as the passage goes on: 
the images are seen dancing and moving their limbs (980), then the 
sound is added (981-2), after which the spectator sees the rest of the 
audience (consessum 982) before the situation is located beyond any 
doubt in the theatre with the word scena;. Again, the 
moving images are evoked in langlJage echoing the earlier discussion at 
768-772 and also 788-93. It is also highly instructive to read the poem 
in these theatrical terms, and to see the manner in which Lucretius 
reveals his own philosophy of art through the theatrical stance adopted. 
For just as the metaphor of the theatre helps to explain the process of 
perception, whereby sense-data which we know to be 'false' are still 
believable when correctly interpreted, so also vice versa: the subjective 
and partial process of sense perception, whereby we only ever see a 
part of the world and need ratio with which to understand that little 
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which we do see, is itself a metaphor for the work of art which takes 
'reality', refracts and compresses it into an artificial frame and compass 
of time and then presents it to the observer as if it were the whole truth. 
The poet's use of the word simulacrum is itself instructive: the word is 
clearly being used in its technical sense of Epicurus' SL&J).,oV but it also 
connotes the theatrical shows such as mock-battles as shown above at 
2.324: 
praeterea magnae legiones cum loea cursu 
camporum complent belli simulacra cientes 
and as is found in Livy29: the word also denotes the images carried in 
triumphal processionsJO and the sense of public display is thus kept 
prominently in the mind of the reader. 
The text thus has a clear theatrical dimension. It shows that 
the way we perceive the world through simulacra is itself analogous to 
the experience of going to the theatre, and thus neatly reverses Plato's 
strictures on the arts~ for Plato the theatre leads people deeper into the 
realm of appearances and away from the reality which can only be 
apprehended by reason and philosophy, whereas Lucretius urges us to 
look ever harder at the reality which our senses (and they alone) show 
us as this is the only way to apprehend the atomic reality 'out there'. 
We saw in chapter two how the ethical teachings of the poem rely 
entirely on our ability to perceive the reality of ourselves and the world, 
such that we are not to fear death or the gods and that we may realise 
28 4. 973-983 
29 26.S1.6 
30 OLD S.v. 'simulacrum' 3b 
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our deepest needs with res which are all around us; we then saw in 
chapter 4 how the ethical stance of the wise man is that of an 'aesthetic' 
spectator contemplating life as if in a theatre and refusing to engage 
directly in the world of politics, love, business etc. In this case it 
would be surprising if the poem did not also make use of direct 
theatrical material in the illustration of its teachings; and the next two 
chapters will examine the worlds of tragedy and comedy to show how 
the poet does just that. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE USES OF TRAGEDY 
In the last chapter I examined the ways in which Lucretius uses 
the theatre itself as imagery~ this chapter will look at the ways in which 
examples from the plays themselves are used for literary and especially 
ethical purposes. We shall begin with two obvious examples of the poet 
choosing to imitate a famous passage of tragic poetry. 
THE PRELUDE 
To begin at the beginning: the interpretation of the prelude of the 
poem is one of the great cruces of Lucretian scholarship. This poem 
rejecting the superstitious world-view opens with a hymn to a goddess 
asking for her help. The philosophy tells us that the gods are not 
concerned for us and yet the prelude prays explicitly to Venus for 
assistance: 
te sociam studeo scribendis versibus essel . 
Venus is addressed in conventional epic terms as: 
Aeneadum genetrixl 
and her divine presence is saluted as infusing life and creativity into 
the world in a direct sense which the rest of the poem will correct. The 
picture becomes ever more mythological, culminating in the scene of 
Venus and Mars making love and thus bringing about the peace which the 
1.24 
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poet longs for in an anthropomorphic vignette. This is followed by the 
'correct' theology3, a passage possibly interpolated by a waggish scribe or 
a puzzled reader or possibly put there by the poet eager for the theology 
to be established but the poetry left intact. In 'straight' philosophical 
terms, this prelude is contradictory to the whole ratio which it is the 
poet's ostensible purpose to instil in the reader. 
Various attempted answers have been made. Waszink4 pleads 
that the poet was heavily influenced by Empedocles, whom he admired5 -
although it was customary for Epicureans to despise him - and 
Parmenides, seeing their choice to compose in verse, and especially their 
equation of poetry with light and light with truth as inspiration for his own 
efforts. The two forces of Empedocles then spring to mind, where Love 
and Strife fight for supremacy of the universe; but this identification is 
left to be inferred by the reader, the text becoming thus almost a 
philosophical roman a clef Another obvious line of enquiry has been to 
see Venus as a symbolic figure representing the 'force of nature', which 
by its reproductive delight brings into being all the myriad life-forms we 
see around us. Lucretius several times uses a personification of Nature6 
just as elsewhere he plays on the figure of Mother Earth': it may be that 
Venus is a personified force in the same way, but there is a great deal 
more to it than that. 
2 1.1 
3 1.44-49 = 2.646-51 
4 Waszink (1954) 
5 1. 716-33 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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Bignone8 has ingeniously argued as follows: if Venus is 
pleasure, she is first of all the kinetic sexual pleasure which reproduces 
ourselves but is then transformed into the katastematic pleasure of 
serenity, peace and friendship. It is as the embodiment of the latter sort of 
pleasure that she is in a position to represent the peace and serenity that 
Lucretius needs to write the poem and that Memmius needs to read it. 
The incongruous lines 44-49 would then find a place as explaining how 
the gods practise this serenity which Venus has by now come to represent. 
The difficulty with this is that the passage in question is a prologue and 
the reader cannot be expected to unpack the finer points of Epicurean 
pleasures and their distinctions at this early stage in the poem. 
An easier form of explanation can be found if we examine the 
polarity in lines 21-43 between peace and creativity on the one hand and 
war and death on the other. Lucretius elsewhere9 speaks of the 
equilibrium between these conflicting forces: 
nec superare queunt motus .itaque exitiales 
perpetuo neque in aeternum sepelire salutem, 
nee porro rerum genitales auctificique 
motus perpetuo possunt servare creata. 
sic aequo geritur eertamine prineipiorum 
ex infinito contractum tempore bellum: 
nunc hie nunc illie superant vitalia rerum 
et superantur item. miscetur funere vagor 
quem pueri tollunt visentes luminis oras; 
nec nox ulla diem neque noctem aurora secuta est 
quae non audierit mixtos vagitibus aegris 
ploratus mortis comites et funeris atri. 
e.g. 3. 931-51; see Brown (1987) 229 
e.g. 5. 795-836 
(1945) 2. 134-342 
2.569-572 
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The imagery of war is presented here as a representation of the 
balance between the Empedoclean forces of creation and destruction: and 
the economy of the universe which maintains its existence by balancing 
these conflicting forces in harmony is well evoked by the poet. The 
passage in book 2 is an atomic unpacking of the allegory of the prelude, it 
might be urged, the science by now being refined and understandable 
after a good deal of atomic exegesis: the reader of the prelude had to 
have a pretty picture presented to display what later on can be expressed 
in more rigorously philosophical terms. 
Others have drawn attention to the obvious epic nature of the 
prelude: the epic periphrasis 
Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divumque voluptas 
used before the name is mentioned, an epic address going back to 
EnniuslO and the whole system of legends which traces the ancestry of the 
Romans back to Troy through Aeneas, son of Venus. This is stamped 
clearly in epic mould, and Roman epicll at that; no mere copy or 
translation of a Greek original but a new creation for Roman readers 
referring to topical events in phrases such as hoc patriai tempore iniquol2 
and in the allusions to named individuals such as Scipioll, Enniusl4 and 
AncuslS and to Roman institutions such as the theatrel6, hunting dogsl7 
and Etruscan scro11s18. 
10 Annales 52 
11 see Mayer (1990) 
12 1. 41 
13 3. 1034, imitating EnniusAnnales 313 
14 1.117-126 
IS 3. 102S, quoting Ennius AnnaJes 149 
16 4.7S-86 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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These considerations all have a great deal to recommend them, 
and yet they do not by any means exhaust the opening of the poem. The 
myth and legend of Venus and Troy with their epic significance, the 
allusion to the Empedoclean forces, the 'before and after' effect whereby 
Venus at this early stage is seen in glowing healthy terms whereas her 
later manifestation in book 4 is of unhealthy sexual drives - all these 
theories require the reader to know more than the poet is prepared to tell 
us yet. They none of them explain the puzzling passage of 'correct' 
theology inserted (by the poet or by an interpolator) after the prayer19. 
It may be that there is a further explanation available 
Venus is at once glossed as hominum divumque voluptas! alma 
Venus20 . It is not coincidental that the highest good for the Epicurean is 
pleasure, and that the poet is therefore nailing his moral colours to the 
mast right away by elevating pleasure to the status of divinity. The 
passage goes on to describe Venus' activities in terms of sunlight, 
wannth, spring with the goddess being the force behind all this - Venus 
physica - in a way calculated to dispel at once any suggestion that this 
Epicurean atomism is a gloomy picture of the world in which cold dark 
atoms collide in a futile random manner and that we might as well never 
have been born as our lives are purposeless and doomed to certain 
extinction. The poem will seek to demonstrate that there is no 
theological purpose to the atomic collisions, and that the source of 
4.991-7 
6. 381 
1. 44-49 
1.1-2 
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everything we know and are is atomic movement, which in tum is blindly 
caused by gravity assisted by the exiguum cLinamen~ but in this aria of 
poetry we see the poet rejoicing in the free gift that is life and joy, 
recognising that within the breasts of living things there is undeniably a 
force, an instinct towards growth and reproduction which is the source of 
our survival and our joy. F or all the atomic determinism of the science, 
the prelude is a rapturous celebration of bliss; and the figure of the 
mythological Venus is a personification of the force which moves all 
things and the delight which colours our experience of life at its best. 
This sort of allegory had already been done in Greek21 and the 
poet himself addresses Nature in personal terms as rerum .. creatrix22 and 
uses the term Venus as a synonym for sexual desire and activity2l, the 
snares of love24, the benefits of love,2' even though he elsewhere adopts 
the more straightforwardly mythological personification26. This sort of 
allegory is mentioned earlier in the poem27 as being permissible 
dum vera re tamen ipse 
religione animum turpi contingere parcat. 28 
So far, so good. When Empedocles' Love and Strife are 
personified/allegorised as Mars and Venus in a poem rejecting superstition 
and also rejecting Presocratic ideas, we know that the objectives are 
literary and aesthetic rather than coldly logical, and that the beauty of the 
21 Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite I-S, Euripides Hippolytus 447-4S0, 1272-81, Pannenides 
BIZ. 3-6 (OK), Empedocles B17, 22, 3S, 71 (OK). 
22 1. 629, 2.1117, 5. 1362 
2l 4. 1058, 1071, 1107 
24 4. 1I13 
2S 
26 
27 
4.1073 
4. 1084, 1101 
2.6SS-660 
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imagery is a part of the world being celebrated. As the opening of a 
poem whose ethical precepts will advise us to avoid engagement in the 
world but rather contemplate it as in a theatre, it would be odd if there 
were not a 'scene' being set up for the reader to admire. It would also be 
odd if that scene were not drawn from drama. 
The immediate source of the imagery here has so far, however, 
escaped notice: it is a passage of Sophocles29: 
iJJ 1Cai8es, ij rOl KU1CPlS ou K.U1CPlS povov, 
all'Barl 1COA.M>V ovoparwv B1CWVUpOS. 
60TIV p£v "Az811S, 60TI 8'at/J9r.ros Pla, 
60TIV 8£ AUooa pavlas, eOTI O"IJJepos 
aKparos, ear'oi.jJwrJJos. BV Ke{Vn ro miv 
cmo08aiov, qoulaiov, BS {3lav arov. 
BVn7Keral rap 1CAEOJJOVWV ;;aolS eVl 
'l'Uv1' TIS oup rijeroe 8eu-repos geoo; 
eiaEPleral JJ£v il9Uwv 1CA.a>-rCP rEVel, 
lepC100 8' eveanv BV re-rpaC1KeMi rovfi" 
vWJJer. 8' BV oiwvorcn rOUKelVl1S 1CTepOv, 
BV 911palv, BV /3po-roicnv, BV geois avw. 
", ~JD .,-,' "~NN_ 9 -nv OO1Call.U.lOvu es rplS ehI.I....~N ewv; 
e'l pOI geJJlS, geJJlS 8£ -ralry8ij llrelv, 
L1los rupavvei 7rA.evJJovwv avro 80pOs, 
" ~" , avro cnvl1poO" 1Cav-ra -rOl ouvreJJveral 
K.U7rplS -ra 9vl1-rmv Ka1gemv {3ovA.eUPQ-ra. 
The obvious line of comparison between the above text and 
Lucretius' prelude is in the evocation of the universal nature of the power 
of Venus even in the birds (cf DRN 1. 12-13) and the beasts (cf DRN 1. 
14-15, and note with Pearson that er,palv is not confined to wild beasts): 
also the assertion that only Venus has the power to change the hearts of 
powerful gods who are in warlike mood: 
nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare 
28 2. S~9JSM 
29 fragment 941, cited Stobaeusflor. 63.6 and also Plutarch amat.13 p.7".. It is argued 
by Nauck. that the fragment is in fad by Euripides; see Jebb ad loe. 
30 
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mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mavors 
• • 30 anrupotens regtt. .. 
echoes the dramatist's confidence that love conquers all, even Zeus, 
without arms. The image of Love as a victorious wrestler (traMEova') is 
not too far from the physical embrace of Mars and Venus in which Venus 
the weaker one defeats Mars the stronger. The paradox of Love as a 
tyrant with no body-guard (pearson) is well developed in Lucretius' 
picture of Mars succumbing to Venus. Above all, the tragic passage 
makes it clear that the world is not a simple place, that love has many 
names and takes many fonns; that mutability is going to be the prevailing 
theme of this poem just as it is a prevailing theme of many tragedies31. 
The presocratics were wrong, Lucretius will later on argue, to see one 
force (fire, e.g.) as the source of being: in the prelude, however, he is 
setting up Venus as precisely that. Again, the reader is invited in the 
prelude to contemplate the world around and admire the forces at work; 
the direct invocation of the 'goddess' is an act on the part of the poet 
which will always defy explanation - but there is a lot to be said for the 
idea that the poet is here preaching to the unconverted and that the poem 
will later on correct what the proem has done. 
1. 31-3 
see Jones (1971) 47-9 andpassim 
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MOTHER EARTH 
At line 991 of Book 2 the poet launches into a famous piece of 
rhetoric summarising the conclusions of what has gone before in a piece 
of high mythology on the theme of Mother Earth: 
denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi: 
omnibus ille idem pater est, unde alma liquentis 
umoris guttas mater cum terra reeepit, 
feta parit nitidas fruges arbustaque laeta 
et genus humanum, parit omnia saeela ferarum 
pabula cum praebet quibus omnes corpora pascunt 
et dulcem ducunt vitam prolemque propagant; 
quapropter merito matemum nomen adepta est. 
cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante, 
in terras, et quod missumst ex aetheris oris, 
id rursum caeli rellatum templa reeeptant. 
nec sic interimit mors res ut materiai 
corpora conficiat, sed coetum dissupat ollis: 
inde aliis aliud coniungit, et efficit omnes 
res ita convertant formas mutentque colores 
et capiant sensus et puncto tempore reddant12 
The obvious source for the mythical picture of Father Sky and Mother 
Earth - more fully developed at 1. 250-264 - is a fragment of Aeschylus, 
where Aphrodite speaks11: 
"t -rt" I 
't"SMtoS' son. 't"coVQ syco trapalnos. 
32 2. 991-1006 
13 fro 44 Nauck. cited Atbenaeus 13.73 p.600B 
34 
3S 
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The parallel is close, but one with Euripides even closer: 'There can be 
little doubt that Lucr. is here closely following and almost translating a 
passage in the Chrysippus of Euripides (fr. 839) which is always said to 
be founded on the teaching of Anaxagoras, the friend and master of 
Euripides: 
raw. j.lSricmJ Kal .1zas ailhjp, 
o j.lEV av6pwnwv ICal 6smv rsverwp, 
ry 8' Vrpo{30Aovs OTarOvas vonas 
napa8s~aj.levTf nlCrsl 6vTfrous, 
nKrsl 8E f30pcX.v c/JOM rs 617pWv, 
o6sv OUK a8iKws 
I I I j.lTf'rTfp navrwv VSVOj.llOTal. 
XWpSl 5' omow 
ra j.lEV eK ra1as t/Juvr' sis ra'iav 
ra 8' an' ai6sp{ov f3MOTovra rovijs 
sis OUpaV10V naAlv ,jABs noAov' 
6vnOlCS1 5' ou8ev rmv r1yvoj.levwv, 
81alCplvOj.lSvoV 8' a-Uo npOs a-Uov 
j.lOPt/JrlV erepav ane8sN~sv. 
The same doctrine is seen in Euripides' Melanippe (fr. 484): 
WS ovpavos rs ra'ia r' ryv J.lOpc/Jq j.lia· 
eneZ 8' eXCtJplOeTfoav aAAt]A.CtJv 8ixa, 
I I "s: ' A. I nICrovCJl navra KaVSuCtJKav SIS 'I'aos 
8ev8p17 , nS'rTfw.l:, 6ijpas, ous 8' aAp17 rpec/Jsl 
revos rs 6v17rmv. 
and the conception of the return of the elements to their own place is 
found in Supplices 532-4: 
OBsv 5' 6ICacnov es ra omJ.l' ac/JIICsro, 
evraU9' ansABslv, 1CVeUJ.la J.lEV npOs ai6epa 
ra om}Ja 5' es rijv.'34 
Greek drama was still very much alive on the Roman stage, as is clear 
from the echo of the same idea in Pacuvius: 
mater est terra; ea parit corpus, animam aether adiugat3S 
Bailey ii pp. 956-7 
frag. 115 (Warmington) 
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What is going on here? Bailey points out astutely that: 
' .. the idea of the return to the elements to their places (999-
1001) after death meant something very different to Lucr. from what it 
did to Euripides. For the latter, as is clear from the Supplices passage, 
it was the body which returned to earth, and the spirit (1rVsu/Ja) to the 
sky~ this would have been an easier doctrine for a Stoic than for an 
Epicurean. '36 
Ifwe are looking for watertight arguments, then, Lucretius has chosen 
a poor passage to imitate; but of course it is the argument of this thesis 
that such watertight logic is not - or at least not always - top of the 
poet's list of priorities. 
What the poet is doing is complex: seen in one way the 
passage is simply allegory, which explains the atomic theory (that we 
sentient beings are in fact composed of insentient matter) in a flowery 
tale for entertainment value. Gale neatly explains this: 
'In Lucretius, the image of the hieros gamos comes at the 
conclusion of an argument for the proposition that bodies with 
sensation can be composed of inanimate matter, and also follows the 
Magna Mater digression; it is again a rejection, not a justification of 
the myth. Line 998 (quapropter merito matemum nomen adepta est) is 
particularly significant, recalling S98f and explaining the origin of the 
myth: in a sense earth and sky are our mother and father, but it is vital 
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to be aware that neither is a god nor even a living being. It is only after 
the Magna Mater digression and the intervening arguments that 
Lucretius adds the significant word merito.'37 
David West, in a typically lively passage of interpretation38 
shows how the poet's own beliefs are clear ('Lucretius, it must be 
repeated, does not believe in this drive1'39) but that 'it is wholly in 
accordance with the empathetic genius of this poet, with the virulence 
of his polemic and with his own penchant for word-play to mimic the 
ingenuity of the allegorising technique.'40 Nor is this something which 
the poet just turns on for a single performance: the metaphor of 
Mother Earth has already been explored in the poem and will occur 
again later41 in even greater detail. The point at issue here is clear; 
Lucretius chooses to use imagery from a world of mythology to dispel 
myth, to take the weapons of the superstitious and shatter their 
illusions with them. This process has at times been seen as one of 
wistful longing whereby the rational philosopher harks back with regret 
to the magic world of myth which his science must alas leave behind42, 
the famous anti-Lucrece chez Lucrece of Patin43 - such is the vigour of 
the language with which Lucretius expresses a view of the world which 
he is concerned to rebut. The inconsistency is plain to see: having 
36 Bailey ii. pp 957-8 
37 Gale (1994) 41 
38 West (1969) 103-114 
39 West (1969) 109 
40 West (1969) 104 
41 1.250-261, 2.598-9, 5. 796-836 
42 Masson (1907) 390, Regenbogen (1932)73-4, both cited by West (1969) 104 
43 
44 
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used scientific arguments to demythologise the world - removing the 
gods from the thunderbolts, for instance - he feels free to 
remythologise the world in the form of the poetic text, using material 
from poetic sources to do so. Gale and West point out how the poet 
behaves in treating mythology in this way, but neither of them offers a 
convincing rationale to explain it. Why does he compromise his logical 
tightness with such superstitious nonsense? 
In the first place, as we have seen, there is a multiplicity of 
voices going on in this text. The previous chapter attempted to show 
how the poet uses material from the theatre to illustrate the mechanics 
of perception and also the folly of illusion: it is also obvious from the 
poet's use of apostrophe44 that he wishes to engage the reader in a 
dialogue rather than subject him to a monologue. The passages from 
Aeschylus and Euripides here illustrate the bold way in which the poet 
takes risks with his material in the interests of the intertextual weight 
which such famous passages bring and also in the interests of 
'dramatising' the debate going on inside the text. Lucretius gives the 
opposition more than a run for their money: he quotes the world-view 
of the superstitious and allows it to work its poetic magic on the reader 
while also dismantling the ideas which support it. What is left is of 
course poetry: indeed Lucretius explicitly leaves the notions of Magna 
Mater as the peculiar province of poets: 
Patin (1868) 
sec below 149-S4 
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hanc veteres Graium docti cecinere poetae4S 
which is interesting coming from the mouth of a doctus poeta himself 
One receives the same ironic frisson when Euripides has the wretched 
Heracles express a view of the gods remarkably Epicurean in form and 
dismiss tales of their wickedness: 
eyw 8£ rovs fJeous ou-re AEIC-rp' a m~ fJEP1S 
aTEpyelv VOjll'()), 8eojla r' i~aNrrels Xepolv 
our rI~lEFFla 1rc01ror ou-re 1relOOjlal 
ov8' &A.A.oV &A.A.oV 8eCJ1C0r77v 1ret/JvICEval. 
8el-ral yap 0 fJeos, e'{1rep 6a'r' opfJiiJs eeos, 
I~ , , ~J fir: r:' 12 46 ovuevoS· aOlu())V Olue uVCJf17VOl lWyOl. 
although we have seen that Heracles' philosophical words here are in 
fact belied by the activities of Hera. Heracles' words are 
philosophically far superior to any notion that gods send avenging 
demons to drive us mad - and yet we have 'seen' that happen on the 
stage. The 'myth' on the stage is held up to the light of Heracles' 
reason and found wanting, both in the moral superiority of the man 
over the gods and also in the simple likelihood of the events taking 
place at all. As in the tragedy, so in Lucretius: there is a debate 
going on in which two sides have positions which are incompatible and 
in which the evidence of what we see is not always congruent with the 
results of reasoning - rather like the sequence of optical illusions 
discussed in 4.P24J4S8~ Lucretius here is seeking to show us a picture 
with which we are familiar from mythology but to rehabilitate it to a 
philosophical purpose, reclaiming it for science and allowing its 
language to survive only as a mental picture and a verbal set of 
45 2.600: cf. 6.754 
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metaphors. The notion of the hieros gamos extends beyond the 
passages cited into the tales of the Spartoi of Thebes, of Jason sowing 
the dragon's teeth, of the autochthonous heroes of Greece, all of which 
use the notion of the earth as producing more than mere crops but also 
people. The use of themes from well-known tragic texts upon which 
to base the digression thus allows the poet more licence to do this: it 
recalls an archaic vision from an old play, it summons up a world-view 
which sits happily in tragedy but would be less sustainable on the Via 
Appia (rather as Heracles' sufferings are the peculiar stuff of art and yet 
his words quoted above are a sensible 'prosaic' conclusion about the 
nature of the gods) and thus it provides the poet with the required 
distance between his philosophy and his poetic imagery to be able to 
balance the one against the other without serious damage to either". 
The end-product of this manner of poetry is clearly more 
aesthetic than logical: it uses the imagery of a philosophically unsound 
world-view for a variety of purposes - light sarcasm as the poet seeks to 
'mimic the ingenuity of this allegorising tecbnique'48, self-conscious use 
of metaphorical language to display a way of seeing and at once deny it, 
intertextual subtlety as the poet draws on a famous piece of poetry and 
rehabilitates it for more philosophical treatment, thus keeping the 
artificiality of the text visible between the poet and the reader, the 
46 Euripides Heracles NP4N~ 
47 see further Clay (1983) 240-243 for other important factors relatiDi to this passage: he 
shows the discrepancies between the Euripides fragment and the Lucretian text, principally 1) the 
stress on mother earth rather thanfathcr actber, 2) L's lackofmeDticm of the JOdI, 3) the 
dwelling on the sentience/insentience transformation (2.1006) and 4) the way in which 2. NMNp~ 
presents 'an image of the origins of the world of four elemeDb aDd heaveD aDd earth and they are 
nowhere in Euripides. ' 
48 
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dramatising of the 'opposition' viewpoint to allow greater vividness of 
expression and consequently greater dramatic interest in what is 
otherwise a solo tract, and finally a sense in which the poetic creation 
of the metaphor of the Earth Mother is itself a part of the universe even 
though the earth herself is not actually a mother. The text becomes a 
part of the universe which is its subject, and thus, far from being merely 
a tool in the armoury of the philosopher, passages of myth such as 
2.991-1001 are seen as mental constructs which have their own place in 
the world of the poem even though their scientific credit-rating is low~ 
along with the centaur, these notions only exist in the sub-world of 
poetic imagination, but have their existence none the less. 
In all this the poet is anxious to dispel the misconception that 
rational philosophy will somehow rob the world of all its colour and 
turn it into a monochrome universe of drab atoms~ there is still room 
for poetry and even magic, even though there is no room for fear and 
superstition. The 'magic' side of atomist philosophy is plain both in the 
range of counterfactual examples used to dispel false ideas (e.g. 1. 215-
264) - examples of adynata which prove what is there on the familiar-
logical grounds of: [ifP, then Q; but not-Q: therefore not-P] - and also 
in the factual wonders of the world, such as the magnet and Avernian 
lakes, which atomist philosophy can understand and explain. 
West (1969) 104 
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IPHIGENEIA 
So far we have examined two famous passages where the poet 
has drawn on tragic material. The most celebrated example of such 
'borrowing' has a very pronounced ethical standpoint and is a key 
passage in this thesis. The poet begins with his protreptic programme: 
illud in his rebus vereor, ne forte rearls 
impia te rationis inire elementa viamque 
indugredi sceleris.49 
The slaughter of Ipbigenia in book 1 so is not narrated in 
Homer but found its most famous expression in drama, in Aeschylus' 
Agamemnon, Euripides' Iphigeneia at Aulis and also (in the similar 
figure of Polyxena) in Euripides Hecuba: there are also echoes of 
Sophocles' Antigone. The question posed in chapter one - why did the 
poet choose a legendary incident in the Bronze Age to discredit religion 
when he might have chosen a 'real' event in Greek or Roman History? -
still needs an answer. After all, a better instance of religion abused out 
of superstition would be the human sacrifice conducted before the battle 
of Salamis recorded by Plutarchs 1 and having the advantage of being a 
tale from a 'real' warS2. Roman history is similarly full of instances of 
the misuse of religion for political ends - from the execution of unchaste 
Vestals to the antics of Bibulus in 59 - and this would have killed both 
birds (religion and politics) with the same Epicurean stone. The death 
49 1. 80-82 
so 1. 84-101 
S 1 Themistocles 13 
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of a mythical virgin in the past does not have the same contemporary 
power with which to persuade the Roman reader to change his (Roman) 
behaviour. The whole passage is anachronistic, it might be argued, 
and misses the protreptic point. Answers such as those of Browns3 
which state that Iphigenia's death 'sums up human sacrifice throughout 
the ages' will not do, as the poet's readers are thus being asked to see 
symbolic value in the incident when the point at issue is too important 
for such symbolism, and the symbolism is not brought out anyway. 
One partial answer is that the poet wished to 'dramatise' his philosophy 
and so deliberately chose an incident from tragedy which would 
obviously be well-known to the audience and would already carry a 
charge of pathos and tragedy from its earlier versions~ a protreptic 
short-cut, by which the reader supplies the extra emotion which the tale 
has accumulated in its tragic settings to add to the poetic power which 
Lucretius can give it in the present passage. 
More to the point of t~s thesis, the passage shows the 
'theatricality' of the protagonists involved~ Agamemnon and his men are 
sarcastically described as ductores Danaum delecti, playing a role and 
acting out a part in order to shore up their flimsy power. The stage-
directions of servants trying to hide the weapons from her54, of the girl 
falling dramatically to her knees, before being hoisted up by the hands 
52 it is however Dot universally agreed that this event took place at all: see Mosmtann 
(1995) 145 D. 11 
S3 P. M. Brown (1984), 59 
54 1.90 
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of the men, the progression of events - all come across as powerfully 
as do the equivalent scenes in Aeschylus and Euripides. 
Lucretius locates the narrative in the argument that religion is 
more often the cause of evil than protection against it: Iphigeneia's 
death is an example (quo pacto) to prove the general rule: 
Aulide quo pacto Triviai virginis aram 
Iphianassai turparunt sanguine foede 
ductores Danaum delecti, prima virorum. 
cui simul infula virgineos circumdata comptus 
ex utraque pari malarum parte profusast, 
et maestum simul ante aras adstare parentem 
sensit et hunc propter ferrum celare ministros 
aspectuque suo lacrimas effundere civis, 
muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat. 
nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibat 
quod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem; 
nam sublata virum manibus tremibundaque ad aras 
deductast, non ut solemni more sacrorum 
perfecto posset claro comitari hymenaeo, 
sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipso 
hostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis -
exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur. 
tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. " 
The poet reports the scene in the style of a messenger speech, his 
words painting the scene with telling details such as the blood on the 
altar (85), the girl's tresses (87-8), the servants trying to hide the 
weapon (90), the tears (91), the girl lifted up on the hands of the men 
(95), and so on. This is of course no objective account: there is 
ample moral indignation in the sarcastic ductores Danaum delecti, 
prima virorum56, as in the sardonic sacrifice of a virgin to a virgin 
goddess, there is abundant pathos in the girl's calling the king her father 
and the 'if only ... ' wistfulness of the wedding adumbrated in 96-8 being 
55 1. 84-101 
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dashed by the brutal language of hostia concideret mactatu with the 
final indignity being that the sacrificing was being performed by her 
parent; there are those adjectives and adverbs which load the issue 
unbearably ifoede... maestum... muta metu... miserae... tremibunda ... 
casta inceste ... maesta), culminating in the savage contrast of 
maesta .. felix faustusque. 
~S 1. 86 
Ifwe look at Aeschylus' account we can compare the two: 
, ~.I "s: 1.! s: S1CSl u avayrcas SuU l\.G1CauVOV 
qIpsv~ 1fVemv oUCJCJe/3i7 rpo1Caiav 
" , , '£1 avayvov aVlepov I rOl7ev 220 
ro 1CavroroApov q,povelv pereyvm. 
f3p0rovs (}paaVvel yap aiCJx.pOp1]ns 
raAalVa 1Caparco1Cf7. 1Cpc:orOm7pmv. ErAa 5' oOv 
9vrr,p yevea6al 9vyarpOS, 
, '1 ~ , , yvvalrco1Colvmv 1Corw;.JJmv apc:oyav 
rcal1CporeAela vamv. 
, s:' '.'\ S:' , hras uS rcal rcA1]Uovas 1Carpc:olOVS 
's:' .- ".,.Jl' 1Cap' OUuSV alm r£ 1Cu,pvev£lOv 
£(}evro q,r.A..OpaXOl {3paf3ijS. 
q,paCJev 5' aOS-OlS 1Carr,p per' eVXllv 
o"cav l'palpaS Utrep8e f*»poo 
225 
230 
235 
S7 
S8 
S9 
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re ICaMl1Cpc!>pOU q,u).axar ICaraoxerv 
q,8oyyov apawv OLICOlS, 
f3iq. xahvwv r' avav8cp /Jevel. 
"f3a11' " 9u' '" e IV\. eICacnov rT7fX1Jv atr' oIJ- 240 
trpetrouoa rros ev ypaq,ars, trpooevVetrelv 
,,/,,'1_ ' J:_" 
,/,lllAlU rplrOO1COVvvV eutrOrIJov tral- 245 
Ipbigeneia's cries of 'father' in Aeschylus (228) are transmuted 
into the futility of having been the first to call him father in Lucretius: 
Aeschylus' 'war-thirsty commanders' (q,1AO/JaXo1 pPaf3Tts 230) become 
Lucretius' duetores Danaum ckleeti, prima virorum (86). Both 
accounts have the girl seized roughly by the hands of the men (ORN 1. 
9S - Aeschylus Agam. 235) and both have the girl fall forward". The 
contrast between the holy girl and the unholy sacrifice is brought out in 
bothS9. In particular, the pathos of the formerly sweet-singing girl 
Aeschylus Agamemnon 218-245 
trpOVWID1 - terram genibus summissa petebat 
casta inceste - avayvov avtBpOv 
60 
61 
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being now unable to speak except with her eyes is picked up briefly in 
Lucretius' phrase muta metu, a feature of Iphigeneia which suits the 
theatre better than the epic. These, it might however be urged, are all 
standard features of the story and do not prove any borrowing of the 
Greek by the Roman: there are features in the Latin (the play on the 
funeral wedding, for instance, whereby Iphigeneia was brought to Aulis 
with the pretence of being about to marry Achilles) which are not in 
Aeschylus. It is, it might be urged, no more than a rough reminiscence. 
Closer, however, to Lucretius is Euripides, whose Iphigeneia 
is brought to Aulis to marry Achilles - a major sub-plot of the play - and 
who therefore plays a great deal on the 'funeral marriage' idea60 and 
whose Messenger speech61 describing the sacrifice is closer in narrative 
style and content to Lucretius than is Aeschylus: the virg;nis Trivia 
corresponds to the 1(OPll<; of 1543, the ministers of Lucretius hide their 
weapon while Agamemnon in Euripides hides his face in his garment, 
Euripides making Agamemnon groan aloud while Lucretius has him 
merely maestum for two reasons: firstly because throughout the 
passage the poet stresses the deception being practised on Iphigeneia, 
such that the attendants hide the knife and it is only when it is too late 
that she realised (sensit) what was happening and the marriage was not 
to be~ this requires no public declaration of grief or the cover will be 
blown; secondly because the passage is in many ways reminiscent of 
esp. IA 1036-1097 - cfDRN 1.96-8 
1540-1612 
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the silent style of the ecphrasis which indeed it may well be61 0 
Interesting parallels and contrasts abound: Euripides has Iphigeneia call 
Agamemnon 7tatllP - Lucretius has her muta metu but still gets the 
point across in a very close echo ofEuripides'63 
when he brings out the futility of her filial affection: 
nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibat 
quod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem64. 
Iphigeneia's altruistic wish for the fleet's success: 
leal roon"' E/J' eUrolelre" leal VlICTl",pov 
odJpou nJlolre n"arplSa r £9,,0106s rfjv .. 65 
as also Calchas' prayer66: 
leal oos rsve06at n"AoOV vsmv am7/Jova 
Tpo{as rs 1rSpra/J' £~sMiv r,/Jas Sop{ 
becomes the sarcastic sneer in Lucretius: 
exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur 
where feliX faustusque picks up Iphigeneia's etYrolsrre 0 'Iphigeneia 
might have expected an animal sacrifice at her wedding' says P oM. 
Brown ad loe: again picking up an extended piece of dramatic irony in 
Euripides where the innocent girl questions her father about the 
sacrifice that will be conducted at her 'wedding' and her future 'married 
life'67. Lucretius follows Euripides' Clytemnestra in declaring that 
62 Cicero (Oral. 74) tells us there was a famous picture ofthc sacrifice oflpbiaeneia: on the 
ecphrasis see especially Fowler (1991) and Laird (1993) 
63 IA 1220 
64 
6S 
66 
67 
93-4 
1557-8 
NRTR~ 
640-680 esp STP~TS 
68 
69 
70 
71 
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Agamemnon will kill the child himsel~8I although the messenger in the 
play leaves us to assume that the deed was to be done by the priest69. 
The striking disparity between Lucretius and Euripides is of course that 
in the play the girl 'miraculously' disappears from beneath the priest's 
knife leaving a deer in her place, whereas in the DRN Iphianassa is 
most certainly killed, both because in an atomic universe such miracles 
do not happen and obviously because such an ending would make the 
tale lose all its anti-theological point. 
No one single account of a human sacrifice matches every 
detail of the passage from Lucretius. One reason for this is perhaps 
that Lucretius has conflated elements of several virgin-sacrifices in his 
account: one might also usefully compare the deaths of Iphigeneia, 70 
Polyxena,71 Menoeceus72 and even Pentheus73 in Euripides. Polyxena, 
for instance, compares herself to a heifer74, as Euripides does of 
Iphigeneia7s, animal imagery common in marriage contexts76 but neatly 
tied in Lucretius both to the sense of 'unmarried girl' and also 'sacrificial 
victim' as shown by the ribbons which bedeck her like a beast about to 
be slain: 'an animal victim was adorned with an inju/a, from which its 
IA 1178 
e.g. 1578-9 
Iphigeneia in Tauris 1-41, Iphigeneia in Au/is esp. 1543-86 
Hecuba 518-582 
72 in the Phoenissae 
73 In the Bacchae 
74 Euripides Hecuba 206 
7S 1. T. 359, I.A. 1080-3: cf also Deianeira compared to a nopnC; &p11J.W. at Sopbocles' 
Trachiniae 529-30. 
76 cf. Euripides' Phoenissae 947 where Menoeceus is called a 'colt' in justification for 
sacrificing him rather than the married Haemon. 
77 
78 
79 
80 
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ends (vittae) depended as streamers. '77 Similarly intriguing are the 
deaths of the virgin Antigone in Sophocles - who dies for an issue of 
religious ritual which the author of DRN 378 would by no means 
endorse - and that of the (equally unmarried) Pentheus in Euripides' 
Bacchae, who is tom apart by religious fanatics, one of whom is his 
parent Agaue. Antigone indulges to the full in the marriage! death 
tension in her famous final speech, 79 while Pentheus is slain by his own 
mother who sees him as a wild animal and does not see the truth in the 
way that we the audience can. The difference is plain, of course: 
Agaue would not have killed her son if she had known it was him, 
while Agamemnon is all too aware of the identity of the person he is 
killing and still goes ahead - as does Antigone - and yet in Epicurean 
terms both of them are wrong. Similar conclusions may be drawn from 
both acts of supersitious madness, then: and it is no coincidence that 
the Lucretian motto tantum religio potuit madere malorom has been 
used to summarise the 'anti-theological' interpretation of the Bacchae. 80 
The Greek background does not however exhaust the passage. 
Lucretius has neat Roman detail, such as the six plaits of hairS1 and the 
deductio8'l of the Roman bride side by side with Greek such as the 
Hymenaeus. The purpose of all this is to put a new focus on the 
question posed above: why did Lucretius choose a mythological 
heroine rather than a historical event to demonstrate the wickedness of 
Bailey (1947) vol.2 p. 614 
see esp. 3.879-881 for criticism of human concern about the fate of the corpse. 
891-928 
See Dodds (1960) xli 
81 
82 
83 
84 
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superstition? One answer should by now be clear: the advantage of 
Iphigeneia over 'real' events is precisely the emphasis on a10017C1lS 
which the tragic context brings out. Lucretius is, on one level, raising 
his poetry above the level of a tract or a philosophical pamphlet by 
composing it in tragic form with tragic content, infusing elements from 
a variety of plays to deepen the intertextual weight of his argument and 
to add a visual theatrical dimenslon to what is otherwise simply a piece 
of logic backed up by a historical theme. With typical irony, we see 
the spectacle of Iphigeneia as she is killed but the narrative of her death 
is partly focalised through her eyes,83 and partly focalised through the 
eyes of the others on stage,84 thus giving us a mise-en-abime effect as 
we see her seeing and also see others seeing her. The virtue of 
choosing a scene from tragedy is that the visual aspect is already there 
and only needs the right words to trigger the associations, even if some 
of them are inappropriate - some of the tragic virgins suggested, after 
all, chose to die8' and some chose to die for superstitious reasons, thus 
becoming both their own Iphigeneia and their own Agamemnon all at 
once. 86 Furthermore, if the ethical wisdom of the Epicurean wise man 
consists in observing the world as if in the theatre, then theatrical 
examples are very much what we would expect to see; the poet's 
choice of material thus underscores his 'aesthetic' ethical precepts. 
1.87 
1.96 
cr. sensit 90 
aspectu suo 91 
8~ 
86 
87 
88 
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DRAMATIC FORM AS POETIC MEDIUM 
'Indeed, he makes of the poem an occasional dialogue ... The 
mere fact that the voice of de rerum natura is not that of the poet and 
philosopher throughout speaks for a complexity of communication ... '87 
Drama - and tragic drama especially - has always been the 
perfect medium for presenting opposing viewpoints in an agonistic 
framework. One thinks immediately of Pheres and Admetus in the 
Alcestis, of Creon and Antigone in the Antigone, of Agamemnon and 
Menelaus in Iphigeneia at Au/is, Creon and Oedipus in Oedipus the 
King, and so on. The epic poet, by comparison, has apparently only 
one 'voice' with which to present his view of the world, and yet recent 
studies of Vergil and Lucan have shown how even in this genre there is 
ample scope for 'further voices'88. Lucretius does this quite obviously 
and more explicitly than both Vergil and Lucan, and it is these aspects 
of dramatic style in the narrative didactic voice that we shall now 
examine. 
In the first place Lucretius uses apostrophe. The reader is 
personally brought into the text on many occasions such as 1.102-3: 
tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore, vatum 
terriloquis victus dictis, desciscere quaeres. 
Euripides' Ipbigeneia inIA. 
Sophocles' Antigone, for instance. 
Clay (1983) 214 
e.g. Lyne (1987), Masters (1992) 
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Sometimes it is made plain that the 'reader' is Memmius, as at 1.140-5: 
sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas 
suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem 
suadet, et inducit noctes vigilare serenas 
quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum 
clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, 
res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis. 
while for most of the poem the text is couched in inverted commas as 
an extended speech in the first person direct to the reader in the second 
person. 89 The poet directs the reader towards the truth in an overtly 
didactic manner, although he markedly shifts in book 4 towards a first 
person plural stance as he draws attention to the shared perception 
which his argument demands if it is to escape the toils of Scepticism90. 
The reader is brought into the text as the interlocutor of the 
philosophical argument, as the subject of the shared perceptions which 
it provokes and describes, and as the object of the converting zeal of 
the poet. 
More interesting conclusions follow on the apostrophe to 
Epicurus, however, at the opening of book 3: 
o tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen 
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae, 
te sequor, 0 Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc 
ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis, 
non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem 
quod te imitari aveo: quid enim contendat hirundo 
cycnis, aut quidnam tremulis facere artubus haedi 
consimile in cursu possint et fortis equi vis? 
tu pater es, rerum inventor, tu patria nobis 
suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis, 
floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant 
89 countless exx: e.g. the nonne vides figure of 2.263, 5.382 the noscere ut hinc possis 
figure of 2.832, 3.124 
90 e.g. videamus 4.125, nostras 248, nostros 252, videamus..l55, 
tundimus ... tangimus ... sentimus ... sentimus 265-8 
91 
92 
93 
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omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta, 
aurea, perpetua semper dignissima vita. 
nam simul ac ratio tua coepit voceferari 
naturam rerum, divina mente coortam, 
diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi 
discedunt, totum video per inane geri res.91 
The commentators point to the hymnic style of the address: 'it may be 
compared with the traditional epic invocation of a god, for to the 
Epicurean his master is a god (5.8) and his mind divine (3.15)'92 More 
recently Kenney remarks that 'the style and feeling of the address to 
Epicurus are hymnic; later in the poem he is actually called a god. '93 
Neither scholar seems to feel the tension between such an address and 
the teaching which its addressee actually propounded, even though that 
tension is present in the book in several forms. Firstly, the poet tells 
us that the aurea dicta ofEpicurus are perpetua semper dignissima vita 
and calls upon him as pater as if the dead master were able to hear him -
although he falls short of making any request of the master as he does in 
the case of Venus in book 1. This is in marked contrast to the poet's 
use of Epicurus later in the book as an example of a great man who is 
dead, the only passage in the poem where Epicwus is named: 
ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, 
qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis 
restinxit, stellas exortus ut aetherius sol94 
The poet cannot simultaneously use Epicurus as an example of a happily 
dead man and also address him in a hymn. This, it might be urged, 
misses the point: the poet calls upon Epicurus in a stylised panegyric 
3. 1-17 
Bailey vol ii, 985 
Kenney (1971) 74 
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which does not assume the man's continued existence but calls upon his 
example and his memory, both of which are very much alive and which 
are themselves perpetua semper dignissima vita. But even this falls 
foul of the poet's insistence that the whole world will one day die, an 
insistence which ends the previous book and could be expected to be 
fresh in the minds of both poet and reader95. Only the atoms will last 
for ever: but nothing composed of them will do so, not even the 
thought of Epicurus or the poetry in which Lucretius expresses it, a 
tension well known to Ovid and lurking behind his famous praise of the 
poem: 
carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti, 
exitio terras cum dabit una dies96 
Secondly there is a tension of time felt most markedly towards the end 
of the apostrophe quoted above: 'as soon as Epicurus' ratio began to 
proclaim the nature of things, the terrors of the mind flee and I see the 
whole world ... '. The poet ignores the couple of centuries separating 
the death of the master and the birth of the poet and sees the stream of 
time as divided only once, by the thinking of Epicurus which 
transformed the way the world can be seen as it really is. This sharp 
dichotomy of pre- and post-Epicurus, combined with the heavy use of 
imagery relating to light and darkness (tenebris .. .Iumen. . .inlustrans) 
and seeing (video) combines to create an emphasis on aia91JCJlS 
whereby the transformation in the way the world is seen amounts to a 
94 3. 1042-4 
95 2. 1144-1174 
96 Amores l.15.23-4 
97 
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transformation of nature itself and our attitude towards it: terrors flee, 
but the moenia mundi also disappear along with the apparently 
unshakable certainties about the universe which obtained before 
Epicurus. Once the master began to speak, then for all time 
afterwards the boundaries are redrawn97. Now it is very difficult to 
imagine how the poet might have achieved this temporal unity of 
himself, the master and the reader without the use of apostrophe - one 
can readily see how the use of this poetic device runs the risks of 
inconsistency outlined above but still earns its keep in that it can bring 
Epicurus into the action as a key participant; not simply as an historical 
figure from conventional epic, whose past exploits are worth recording 
with pious reverence, but rather as ratio incarnate, an active force 
which animates the poet and the reader into writing and reading the 
poem. The use of vivid present tenses (diffugiunt ... video) underlines 
the active force at work in the poet and through him in the reader. 
This use of the artificial device apostrophe once again creates a 
vividness and a dramatic effectiveness which brings poet, reader and 
Epicurus on to the same stage and allows the divisions of time and 
space between all of them to be ignored and transcended. The effect is 
aesthetic in the sense that it re-creates a scene which by definition 
cannot occur - the long-dead Epicurus, the poet and the absent reader 
all being summoned onto the stage of the text, the transference of ideas 
from one to the other being dramatised and made visual in palpable 
form. 
e.g. S. 89-90 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
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Apostrophe is one form of direct address, and the narrator 
apostrophises Venus, Epicurus and Memmius as well as the reader 
throughout the text, who is cajoled with encouragement98, mockery99, 
indignation at the thought of his words being ignoredlOO and all three in 
the diatribe against the fear of deathlOI - along with warnings of the 
consequences of ignoring his wordsl01. The poet also puts imaginary 
words ironically into the mouths of Nature herselfl03 and of imaginary 
moumers104 in the diatribe against the fear of death. 
The diatribelo, often composed this sort of prosopopoea: but 
Lucretius apparently goes out of his way to give his opponents the 
chance to persuade: 
'iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta, neque uxor 
optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati 
praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent. 
non poteris factis tlorentibus esse, tuisque 
praesidium. misero misere' aiunt 'omnia ademit 
una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae'l06 
This is no cheap In Memoriam verse in bad Latin: there is a neat 
tricolon crescendo of the house, the wife and then the children, each 
with their own adjective of approval - the house is /aeta (a nice pathetic 
fallacy), the wife is optima and the children are dulces, reinforced by 
dulcedine in the next line, complete with the psychologically plausible 
tacit a expressing the inner feelings of the father rather than any outward 
e.g. 4.522-3 
e.g. 4.44 
e.g. 1.50-53 
encouragement: 3.1024-1044: mockery and indignation: 3.1045-52 
e.g. 6.68-79 
3.931-977 
3. 894-908 
on the diatribe and popular philosophy see Freudenberg (1993) 8-21 
106 
107 
108 
109 
lSS 
show, as also the vignette of the children fighting for the kiss 
(occurrent ... praeripere) encapsulating both the meeting of the parent 
and children and also the root -curro suggesting their haste developed 
in the prefix prae in praeripere. From emotion to pride and strength, 
as the lament bewails the future insecurity of the bereaved lacking their 
protector, a fate similarly bewailed by Andromache of the future fate of 
her son Astyanax in Homer107, just as earlier Priam lamented his future 
humiliation108. Kenneyl09 remarks that Epicurus himself left a will 
which 'included full instructions for the care of his dependants and the 
freeing of his slaves', adding that Lucretius' answer 'that these things do 
not trouble a man when he is dead, is totally beside the point.' This is 
simply wrong; the care for one's family is laudable but will be 
impossible to maintain once the person is dead and the man being 
lamented is by now (iam iam) very dead, and anyway the reader most 
naturally takes earum ... rerum to refer to the praemia which death has 
removed. The mourners are, therefore, factually wrong to ascribe 
suffering to the dead man, even such morally acceptable suffering as 
the altruistic care for one's dependants - the time for such care is (as in 
the case of Epicurus himself) before death, not after. However, 
Kenney's natural revulsion affords us a nice example of the aesthetic 
over the logical: the fate of the dependants is a familiar lament from 
3. 894-899 
Iliad 22. 490-507 
Iliad 22. 66-76 
Kenney (1971) 205 
110 
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epic and tragedy 11 0, and allows a glimpse of the undeniable sorrow of 
death - if death were not so there would be little need of a whole book 
of the poem to deal with it. The wistful nostalgia of the lines is not 
simply mockery or parody: it evokes feelings with which the reader can 
associate, much as the speech of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias likewise 
expresses views which Socrates will destroy but which deserve a 
powerful presentation of immediate persuasive force. 11 1 The mourners 
are wrong to ascribe unhappiness to the dead - and so the repeated 
misero misere is transferred feelings from themselves to the corpse - but 
the poet's 'answer' does not take away the entire force of the speech, 
and it does justice to the feelings which exist in the reader. 
Only in the second speech of the mourners does the poet begin 
to mock with real edge : 
'tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris aevi 
quod superest cunctis privatu' doloribus aegrls; 
at nos horrifico cinefactum te prope busto 
insatiabiliter deflevimus, aeternumque 
nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet. 112' 
Here the focus of the attack shifts to the unworthy recriminations of the 
bereaved who paradoxically envy the corpse safely and happily dead 
(cunctis privatu' doJoribus aegris is a neat summary of the Epicurean 
ideal of a:rapa9a) while they live on to mourn, thus confirming the 
epicurean stance that death is not painful in itself while also parodying 
the selfish sorrows of the bereaved. The style also become more 
many exx. could be cited: cf. e.g. Euripides Troades 6n-8 
Plato Gorg;as 482c4-486d1 
3. 904-908 
113 
114 
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inflated and less ingenuous than their earlier speech: the long words of 
907, the pair of compound words horrifieo einefaetum, the hyperbolic 
adverb insatiabiliter, whose 'only other use in Lucretius is of swine 
rolling in filth, 6.978'113 The mourners of course give the poet an easy 
target in their confident assertion of everlasting grief 
the dead man is safely free of pain 
they will themselves one day die 
Therefore they cannot have everlasting pain. 
The poet has thus switched from pathos to satire, both informed by 
reasoning, in the space of 17 lines. The shifting of the register of 
language shows that this is no monolithic epic voice but rather a set of 
voices which occasionally clash. We have here not a simple suasorium 
but anagon. 
There are oth~r examples of tragic style and attitude in the 
text: there is dramatic irony in the depiction of human beings ignorant 
of truths which the reader and the poet know, collusion between author 
and audience against the human foils portrayed such as the mourners, 
the lover, the politician striving for power. This process takes its most 
extreme form in the prologue to book 4, where the reader is both 
audience and actor at the same time, being told that he is being 
deceived with poetry like the child with honey on the rim of the CUp114, 
just as the audience in the theatre knows that it is 'only a story' but still 
finds itself moved. A more extreme form still is the ironic use of myth, 
D. West (1969) 29 
see the detailed discussion in chapter three above (pp. 86-87) 
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as we have seen earlier in this chapter: the poet will produce a passage 
of great beauty and religious awe and wonder, only to knock it down 
with a rationalistic stroke such as: 
quae bene et eximie quamvis disposta ferantur 
longe sunt tamen a vera ratione repulsallS 
which teases the reader with the philosophical equivalent of one of 
Odysseus' 'Lying Tales'. 
Elsewhere the poet puts words into the mouths of deluded 
lovers116, and of the nostalgic fanner117. The opening address to Venus 
reads like a hymn written by somebody else, its 'theology' (of divine 
assistance) refuted by the end of the page118 by the voice of the poet. 
Opponents of Epicureanism have their theories described and then 
refuted, thus indirectly introducing alternative explanations of matter 
into the argument even when such explanations were no longer current 
in Republican Rome. The motive behind such passages is no doubt 
variation of the teaching style, the injection of mockery of opponents 
being good for Epicurean morale; but the effect is (again) to make us 
feel that we are attending a dramatic debate rather than simply a lecture, 
especially when the ridicule of the presocratics imitates the style of each 
thinker being satirised1l9. At least some of Patin's famous anli-
Lucrece chez Lucrece material may better be seen as the poet allowing 
discordant voices and dissonant ideas to enter the discussion in order to 
liS 2. 644-5 
116 4. 1160-1170 
117 2. 1164-1174 
118 1. 44-49 
119 as well shown by RD. Brown (1983) 
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enrich the texture of the poem. The tragic precedent for this kind of 
discussion - virtually every tragedy extant has an agon scene of some 
kind - is obvious: and the tragic precedents for the poetic debate are not 
all models of logical excellence. The arguments used in the trial scene 
of Aeschylus' Eumenides, for instance, are poor arguments but they 
make extremely good theatre~ Lucretius often sways us more often by 
the visual impact of the evidence described than he is coercing us with 
the power of logic. It is hardly the pursuit of ataraxia to court discord 
- but such agonistic writing is highly aesthetic in this 'safe' context 
where the opponents are safely dead presocratics or mythological beasts. 
The irony here is that 'opponents' such as centaurs are in fact 'killed' 
verbally by having their existence refuted rather than by being slain by a 
Heracles. Epicurus, by contrast, slew the giants of fear by showing that 
these fears were empty paper tigers. The logical connection of ethics 
and aesthetics here is that our appreciation of the world of human facts 
and human values rescues us from the suffering which tragedy expresses. 
The spectacle of false opinion being refuted in argument affords 
aesthetic pleasure in itself and also furthers the ethical aim of the text by 
correcting our perception of the world. Pleasure thus is the means and 
the end of this sort of text. 
Tragedy may also be seen to have provided something of the 
flavour of the poet's ethical theory. If: as we saw in chapter two, 
happiness and goodness rest on our correct apprehension of the truth 
through the senses, then we are suddenly close to the notion of 
aJ,laprla whereby illusion brings about disaster; the 'mistakes' of 
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Oedipus, Ajax, Heracles are clearly ones of simple perception rather 
than any moral flaw120; the familiar Sophoclean theme of 
opsimathesis121 is one that Lucretius would have recognised, whereby 
seeing the truth is essential in order to live a good life and disaster 
strikes if the truth is seen too late. The Aristotelian concept of the 
tragic anagnorisis also points towards the same primacy of sense-
perception in shaping the lives and destinies of the tragic characters. 
The path from ignorance to knowledge is one that Lucretius 
recommends to us all, especially as the mode of recognition is through 
C1TIJle1a 122, a term well known to the Epicurean philosopher123 . 
More immedately relevant to this thesis is the experience of the 
audience in the theatre. The tragic theatre depicts the suffering of 
characters on stage which is painful and yet turns this pain into the 
pleasure of the work of art - a paradox examined by Gorgias124: 
DDDN~ N.~~~ "e iI.,.1- ~ , '11_ I leal BAtiiOS fCOIU.Jvu.1CpOS leal fCO OS 'f'VlAJfCBVv"S, Btc' aAAU'rpu»v 'rB 
We are suddenly back in the world of the proem to hook 2 
where the wise man watches the sufferings of others as if in the theatre 
120 cf. the apologia of Oedipus to 'moral' criticism in Oedipus at Colonus 960-1002. This 
assumes a sharper definition of hamartia which not all scholars would perhaps accept: see Jones 
( 1971) 15: 'the Greeks did not distinguish wickedness and stupidity with anything like Christian 
definiteness.' Intellectual error may after all derive from moral negligen<::e; see Stinton (1975). 
121 e.g. Antigone 1270 
122 Aristotle Poetics 1454b21 
123 cr. e.g. Diogenes Laertius 10. 87, 97; Philodemus de signis and Sedley (1982) 
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and derives pleasure (suave) from doing so. Macleod comments 
astutely on the Gorgias passage: 
'This exactly corresponds to the common Greek conception of 
pity as a sentiment caused by seeing that another's troubles are the same 
as troubles we might endure or have endured ourselves: cf Soph. Ajax 
121-6, o.c. 560-8, Hdt. 1.86.6., Thuc. 5.90-1, Aristotle Rhetoric 
1385b13ff. The Greeks also carefully distinguish between the feeling 
evoked by our own suffering or the suffering of those very close to 
ourselves, and by others' suffering (Hdt. 3.14, Aristotle Rhet. 1386aI7-
28); only the second kind is proper material for tragedy (Hdt. 6.2l.2)112' 
Only the second kind, we might add, is material for the wise man 
to enjoy watching according to Lucretius: it is the suffering of the 
unnamed alterius who gives us pleasurell6. It is not inconceivable, 
therefore, that the pleasure being espoused in the opening of book 2 is 
close to that tragic pleasure which the Greeks saw as belonging 
peculiarly to tragedy: the oiKeia 1joowl of tragedy comes from pity and 
fear127 even though such feelings are a form of ~N28 and we are left 
again with the paradox that Gorgias alludes to: pain may be turned into 
pleasure through the ministration of artl29 as was already seen by 
Gorgias Helen 9 
Macleod (1982) S n.l 
2. 2 
127 Aristotle Poetics 14S3blO-14 
128 Aristotle Rhet. 1382a21-22; 138Sb13 
129 Macleod (1982) 7 n.4 cites parallels to this: Plato Jon 53,.,.536d, Phi/ebus 47e-48b. 
Republic 6OSc-606b. Timoc:les C.A.F. ii. 453.5-7: see also Mumy (1996) 225 
Homer130. Indeed Homer even seems to envisage something like the 
'fetishisation of the aesthetic' theory: 
roy oe eEOl J.lev rbv~avI 67cEKMOoavro 5' o/..£6pov 
, Ll' ff 1" , , , " 
aVupOJ1CoIS, Iva nOl Kal E000J.lEVOIOlV aOI01]l3l 
with the implicit assumption that suffering is almost justified as it gives 
the subject matter of poetry to later generations, a concept with a long 
and distinguished history132. 
One problem with the above is that Lucretius in the proem to 
book 2 does not observe that watching others suffer will bring 'pity and 
fear' or Gorgias' ~p{hN] 1CEplq,O{30S Kal E/..£OS 1COAVOO1CpVS Kal 1Co6os 
q,zA.o1CEv67]S but simply pleasure on its own. Lucretius does however 
elsewhere133 allude to his own divina vo/uptas .. atque horror and there 
is abundant material in the poem to show that he saw the unpleasant side 
of life as well as the prettiness of it all: from the taste of wormwood 134 
and the biting on a stone in a piece of bread 13S to the woes awaiting the 
new-born infant: 
tum porro puer, uel saevis proieorus ab undis 
navita, nudus humi iacet, infans, indigus omni 
vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras 
nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit, 
vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut aequumst 
cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum. l36 
130 Odyssey IS. 399-400, 23. 301-8 (cited Macleod (1982) 7 n.4 
131 Odyssey 8.S79-80; cf. 3.203-4, 11.433,24.200-1, Iliad 6.357-8 
13% cr. Nietzsche Die Geburt der TragiJdie § S, § 24 (on which see Silk and Stem (1981) 
294,3*6-7). On the term 'Fetishisation of the Aesthetic' see Martindale (1993) 41-2 
133 3. 28-29 
134 1.936 
US 3.692-4 
136 5. 222-227 
137 
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where the suffering of life is still part of the experience which the poet 
gives us and which even allows him a wry joke (the infant might well 
cry, in view of what is ahead of him ... ). Above all else, there is the 
Plague. 
The pessimism of the de rerum natura's closing pages is often 
contrasted with the apparent optimism of its opening, and doubts are 
raised about whether the poet was 'really' asfelix as Vergil would have us 
believe 137. Why, it is felt, should the poet who preaches that human life 
is capable of being as good as that of the gods close his poem with the 
inexorable pain and degradation of a whole city dying? We saw in 
Chapter 1 how this presents a problem for the 'straight' reading of the 
poem, as it might be said to negate the optimistic tenor of the rest of the 
poem: death is nothing to fear, the poet argues at length in Book 3, and 
yet here we have a lengthy exploration of one particularly grisly way to 
die; Book four ends with an almost cosy picture of family life and yet 
here we see the breakdown of all ties of affection in the face of suffering 
and death. Some didactic points are being made, of course - the plague is 
an atomic event carried and caused by atomic movement, and above all it 
has nothing to do with the displeasure of the gods (unlike the theological 
plagues of (e.g.) Homer Iliad 1 or Sophocles Oedipus the King) and the 
immoralities of the human victims are the result of the plague and not its 
cause. This still leaves the 'straight' reader aching for a 'final' closure 
which will draw morals and conclusions and leave us with the sort of 
Georgics 2. 490-492, but see Thomas ad loc. for qualification 
138 
139 
140 
141 
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positive view of the world which the poet time and again promises with 
characteristic imagery of light and reason: 
hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque138 
The epilogue on the plague at Athens, then, is a stumbling block 
to those who see the poem as a facile essay on the joys of being 
Epicurean, but it presents fewer problems in the context of a 
contemplative aesthetic ethic which enjoins the reader to observe the 
world in all its pleasure and horror and thus acquire wisdom and live the 
good life. Wisdom is acquired through pain in tragedy, and yet 
wisdom may also be acquired by the watching of others' tragedies on the 
stage. Once again, the logic is clear: if pleasure is the good, and if 
watching tragedy can give us pleasure, then it is good to watch tragedy. 
The 'peculiar pleasure' of tragedy is so close to what the poet calls suave 
at the beginning of book 2 that it is an irresistible conclusion that the 
explanation of the plague at the end of the poem is precisely the tragic 
dimension within which the text is composed. Other explanations rely 
on the reader decoding the symbolism 139 whereby the plague stands for 
mental curael40 or the unredeemed state of man before Epicurusl41 . 
Miiller142 on the other hand is surely right to stress the universal nature 
of the plague as something that could recur at any time. Minyard's 
account would make Lucretius promote the apolitical side of 
3. 91-3 
see e.g. Gale (1994) 22S-8 
e.g. Commager (19S7) 
Minyard (198S) 60-1 
142 
143 
144 
14' 
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Epicureanism by using the plague as 'proof that political societies do not 
work; it turns the Hippocratean catalogue of symptoms into satire, 
which it patently is not; and it is inconceivable that Lucretius would 
have left the 'before and after' point so obscure if that were the point of 
the whole passage. Commager's account relies heavily on the reader 
deciphering points which the poet might well have made explicitly rather 
than leaving them to be drawn out later. Clay143 argues that the plague 
passage is a test of the reader's conversion, a final tableau to prove that 
the wise man may look even on suffering of this order unmoved. This 
interpretation is on the right lines, but it does not draw the parallel with 
tragedy without which it ends up leaving the poem as 'a course of 
instruction culminating in a final examination paper'144. 
In broadly general terms, the de rerum natura has the shape 
and sweep of a tragedy. The poem begins with the joy and power of 
creation (modelled as we saw at least partly on Sophocles14') and ends 
with the dismal death of the city in the plague; a pattern reminiscent in 
particular of tragedies such as Oedipus the King but in this case with 
the plague at the end rather than the beginning. It is after all difficult 
to see why the poet should choose to end his poem with such a 
depressing picture of suffering, unless his intention were at least partly 
to project the tragic view of the whole human community. This is quite 
well seen by Penwill: 
Mf1ller (1978) 220 
Clay (1983) 266 
Penwill (1996) IS2 
frag.941 
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'We have the sense of an ending here, and the ending is a 
tragic one ... For Lucretius the tragedy is that of the common man, the 
person most truly 'undeserving' and 'like ourselves'l46 - because s/he is 
ourselves. 147' 
This thesis wishes to take things a great deal further. The 
peom has an ending which is not merely tragic but Tragic~ the 
comparison with the proem to book 2 (sneered at by Penwilll48) is vital 
here as it ties up the attitude of mind of the wise man contemplating 
with pleasure and the tragic scene before his gaze. Only the 'peculiar 
pleasure' (oz,cela ~8ovgjF of tragedy can do justice to both without 
leaving us with Bailey's notion of the poet's 'unpleasant egoism and 
even .. cruelty'149 on the one hand and bleak unredeemed misery on the 
other. Penwill sees the tragic nature of the ending and even brings in 
our Aristotelian feelings of pity and fear, and yet stops short of 
asserting that the tragic form gives any sense of redeeming the text; for 
him the ending is a mimesis of the ending of life, a recreation in textual 
form of the process of death itselflSO 
For the comparisons with Sophocles are more than 
coincidental: it was after all a plague which prompted Oedipus to 
146 Aristotle Poetics 14S3a2-6 
147 Penwill (1996) 160. The tragic dimension of the poem had already been seen implicitly 
by Arragon (1961) 387-9 and more explicitly by Wormell (I96S) 61; both of whom, however, see 
the text as indicative of the poet's attitude and malaise (cf. Perelli (1969» rather than a conscious 
artistic decision. Nobody would dare do the same with Sophocles. 
148 'Is Lucretius expending the full force of his poetic talent to create a picture of devastation 
and misery in order to give us pleasure?' (Penwill (1996) IS2). Sophocles and Euripides did! 
149 Bailey (1947) ii. 797 
ISO 'infection (the invasion of noxious particles), multiplication of symptoms, physical pain, 
increasing mental derangement (be it delirium or senility), increasing solitude as one loses contact 
with those around, and finally the moment of death, which ends it all. After death there is no 
more sensation, no more feeling, no more words. The rest is silence.' (Penwill (1996) 163) 
lSI 
152 
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make his fateful inquiries which lead to his downfall, and his relentless 
pursuit of truth, come what may, is akin to that of Epicurus - or (for 
that matter) Lucretius himself The poem begins with high spirits, 
youth and happiness as the poet celebrates the forces of life and 
creativity: the poem then examines the moral option of seeing the 
world as it is and living the life of wisdom rather than pursuing the folly 
of luxury or power, vignettes such as the nostalgic fanner, the old man 
reluctant to die, the foppish lover all figures from light drama and 
comedyl~lI one-sided in their moral persuasiveness. The poem ends 
with death, disease, degradation: there is no redeeming 'moral' twist, 
no clouds of glory and no life after death: simply heaps of bodies with 
nobody to bury them after the plague has ruined both the bodies and the 
finer feelings of the whole community. 
The best sense, then, which can be made of the poet's 
decision to end the poem here is as follows: the reader at the end of 
the poem is left rather like the sp,ectator at the end of a tragedy; 
impressed by the aesthetic pleasure of a depiction of what is in 'real life' 
suffering, safely looking down with pleasure at the pain of his fellow-
men as he was doing at the beginning of book 2. Just as the ending of 
tragedies such as Euripides' Troodes or Hippolytus or Bacchoe sees 
human beings destroyed mentally, physically and morally often through 
and for their best qualities, so also here the good men die because they 
try to save their fellows while the bad die as weU1.52. The only 
as will be examined in chapter 7 
6. 1239-46 
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redeeming feature of this bleak landscape is the artistic and aesthetic 
beauty of the means of its presentation and the pleasure to be gained 
from this knowledge. The medium is here the message, namely that 
the aesthetic contemplation even of extreme suffering is the only source 
of pleasure (and therefore happiness) in a world which (like ourselves) 
is doomed to death and oblivion. The tragedy of death spells out this 
grim truth with all too graphic detail. The contemplation of the truth 
brings pleaure, and may be (as here) the only pleasure available to 
mortalibus aegris, the tragic realisation of the inevitability of death its 
only means of transcendence through the immortalising power of 
poetry: paradoxically, the gloomy ending to the poem is the only 
fitting way to end a work whose message is that we can look for no 
abiding happiness or pleasure except through the transitory senses of a 
body which is soon facing extinction. Wisdom will bring happiness -
but wisdom means accepting the certainty of tragedy, and the poem has 
the aesthetic qualities of tragedy. 
Ironically, however, this tragedy of death spells the death of 
tragedy. It is, after all, the argument of the poem as a whole that death 
comes to all and that there is no hope in seeking help from disinterested 
deities. The Sisyphean labour of the politician is a folly because 
political power is not worth striving for, and the wise man is right to 
mock the follies of others, just as he is right to mock the superstitious 
folly of praying to the gods when they do not hear us. The 
consequence of the Epicurean life-style, however, would remove much 
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of the trappings of tragedy from the world: gone would be all the 
stories of gods interacting with human beings, thus removing Heracles 
altogether and changing the plots of many plays (Ajax and Hippolytus 
for example). Gone would be the Sturm und Drang of the Seven 
against Thebes or the Trojan War (fought senselessly for a woman and 
so not worth beginning) and Antigone's self-sacrifice for her brother's 
corpse would find little sympathy with the author of de rerum natura 3. 
879-83. Even incest such as that of Oedipus is of no concern to the 
uncaring deities in their intermundia and his consequent self-blinding is 
as unnecessary as it is foolish - as is, for that matter the agonised 
matricide of an Orestes who should have learnt Epicurean aurapK:£la 
and outgrown the dependence on his family. The tragic fate of Creon 
arising out of his exercise of political power would be a lesson to all 
Epicureans, and the crafty deceit of Odysseus in Sophocles' Phi/octetes 
shows the evils of mendacity, although the intervention of Heracles 
would raise the Epicurean eyebrow. The god Dionysus and the great 
hero Reracles find especial mention, not least because the myth of their 
divinelhuman parentage is directly contrary to the Epicurean belief in 
divine unconcern for us. Hercules - who 'was regarded ... as the 
supreme benefactor of mankind and had been adopted as their patron by 
the Stoics'153 earns a lengthy passage of parodistic anti-encomium, the 
style being ironically epic and overblown: 
Herculis anti stare autem si facta putabi~ 
Bailey (1947) iii. 132S 
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longius a vera multo ratione ferare. 
quid Nemeaeus enim nobis nunc magnus hiatus 
ille leonis obesset et horrens Arcadius sus? 25 
denique quid Cretae taurus Lemaeaque pestis 
hydra venenatis posset vallata colubris? 
quidve tripectora tergemini vis Geryonai 
tanto opere officerent nobis Stymphala colentes 
et Diomedis equi spirantes naribus ignem 30 
Thracis Bistoniasque plagas atque Ismara propter? 
aureaque Hesperidum servans fulgentia mala, 
asper, acerba tuens, immani corpore serpens 
arboris amplexus stirpem, quid denique obesset 
propter Atlanteum litus pelagique severa, 35 
quo neque noster adit quisquam nee barbarus audet? 
cetera de genere hoc quae sunt portenta perempta 
si non victa forent, quid tandem viva nocerent? 
nil, ut opinor: ita ad satiatem terra ferarum 
nunc etiam scatit et trepido terrore rep leta est 40 
per nemora ac montes magnos silvasque profundas~ 
quae loca vitandi plerumque est nostra potestas. 154 
Costa155 well brings out the sardonic and hyperbolic qualities of the 
passage: 'It is a sardonic passage, with the labours ironically described 
in turgid and inflated language: Nemeaeus magnus hiatus 24, 
venenatis val/ata colubris 27, tripectora tergemini vis Geryoniai 
28 .... the series of questions beginning with quid 24 is finally answered 
bluntly and unequivocally with nil, ut opinor 39.' The case is made 
all the more convincing by the mock epic language and the denigrating 
tone of Arcadius sus, the redoubled trebles of tripectora tergemini156, 
the sarcastic spirantes naribus ignem, the tricolon crescendo of asper, 
acerba tuens, immani corpore serpens appropriately building up the 
monster in layer upon layer of language, the geographical exactitude of 
154 5. 22-42 
155 (1984) 51-2 
156 trlpectora only occurs here. 
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line 31, and so on. The argument is bluntly and cruelly put: these 
monsters would be dead by now, and Hercules is not with us to rid us 
of the monsters which now need shooting, and these monsters live in 
places where nobody with any sense would go anyway. Once again, 
the world of 'heroic' myth and legend is sent up by its own style and 
subverted in the interests of philosophy; the myth is left in place as a 
poetic construct but its subject is held up to Epicurean ratio and found 
wanting. Similarly, the idea of Ajax killing cattle in deluded 
hallucination thinking that they were the Greek chiefs whose death was 
deserved because of a dispute over glory - all this would be rendered 
quite ludicrous on Epicurean principles; just as is the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia to make the gods send wind. 
In conclusion, the poem thus uses the language and the 
mode of tragedy sometimes in order to destroy the world-view it adopts, 
the argument using the style of one world-view while systematically 
substituting another one with greater philosopbical justification; at other 
times the poem remythologises the world, salvaging the imagery of 
superstition for poetic effects and recontextualising such material in a 
new philosopbical world but maintaining the essential wonder at the 
world and also the tragic view of the aesthetic nature of all such 
contemplation and speculation in a world doomed to destruction. In this 
way the aesthetic experience can be clearly separated from the contents 
of the drama which give rise to it, the pleasure of contemplation being 
as ever contrasted favourably with the fony which is being contemplated, 
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the aTapa~{a of the wise man secured not only in contradistinction to 
the anxiety and folly of the unenlightened, but actually secured through 
the contemplation of the folly which it eschews. In this sense the 
poem's tragic form and content is itself its own object of aesthetic 
contemplation, the wise reader looking down on the text in his hands 
just as securely and wisely as the man on the heights at 2.1ff or again at 
2. 331-21S7. This self-referential irony is yet another feature of the 
poem's many-layered complexity, another example of the conflicts at the 
heart of the text and the voices at work to make the poem less of an epic 
monologue and more of a tragic mise-en-scene with clashing of 
arguments and dramatic irony whereby the reader knows more than the 
characters in the story and is colluding with the author and Epicurus in 
the discovery of the truth. The poem not only recommends 
contemplation as a way of life (Aesthetics being the ethical ideal) but 
uses the aesthetics of theatricality to enshrine this aesthetic attitude in a 
form which recreates the experienge for the reader. He is not simply 
told to go away and look at the world: the poet is the theatrical 
producer who puts on the show for the reader and who represents the 
comedy and the tragedy of the world as a display which alone gives both 
meaning and pleasure to the human spectator. 
IS7 see De Lacy (1964) 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COMEDY OF ERRORS 
The content of the Tragic drama provides, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, a rich fund of imagery and persuasive material for the 
poet, and the tragic outlook pervades the poem in many ways. The 
text is also, however, one of exuberance and comedy, and this chapter 
will look at the debt Lucretius owes to the world of comedy, most 
obviously in the form of social satire in his depiction of love, politics 
and religion. If the world is a tragedy to the man who feels, it is also a 
comedy to the man who thinks: and nobody thinks about the world 
more than Lucretius. 
The aesthetic stance of the wise man is after all more obviously 
close to comedy than to tragedy; comedy allows its audience to enjoy 
the spectacle of human misfortune with none of Bailey's agonising about 
'egoism and even cruelty'l. The butts of the poet's mockery include the 
foolish behaviour of the typical lover, the typical mourner, the typical 
politician, the typical superstitious man, the typical rich bored man, 
the typical rustic; as well as the specific mockery of named 
Presocratics and mythical 'heroes' such as Hercules and Dionysus. 
There are elements of comic style as well as these instances of comic 
material to be analysed. 
1 
2 
3 
23 
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SATIRE 
Some of this is in the satiric tradition of the diatribe satire with 
its spoudogeloion mixture of laughter and serious moralisingl . This 
aspect of Lucretius has received scant attention since Murley's 
important article in 1939 and Dudley's short piece in 1965. Murley 
noted the quantity of satire in the text and even lists the relevant 
passages as follows: 
1.80-101, 635-44, 1021-2; 2.11-58, 973-990, 1095-1104; 3. 41-93, 
870-1094; 4.469-521, 1121-1191; 5. 195-234, 1007-1010, 1115-1135; 
6. 17-23, 379-422. 
One could disagree with some of these passagesJ and include others4, 
but he carries his case that the satiric element amounts to at least 10% 
of the whole and is therefore not to be ignored - and his list is perhaps 
conservative and underestimates the amount of satire to be found. 
The immediate problem is one of definition. Murley's line of 
argument is to find passages in the DRN which were imitated by later 
satirists and thus locate Lucretius' place in the tradition on the implied 
assumption that if later satirists imitate him, then they must see him as a 
satirist too; Dudley' on the other hand contents himself with going 
Bailey (1947) ii. 797 
ridentem dicere verum Horace Sol. 1.1.24 
I have reservations about including: l.80-101 (Ipbigeneia), 1.1021-2,5. 1115-35, 6.17-
4 e.g. 1.102-126,705-920; 2.500-514, 598-660, 1164-74; 4.580-94,962-1006,1058-1114, 
1137-1191;5.13-42,156-94,988-1006 
s Dudley (1965) 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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through those passages of the text which contain elements of all sorts of 
humour and social criticism; he thus implies that 'satire' is the same 
thing as these two, especially when combined together. Satire is of 
course difficult to define~ Quintilian6 straighforwardly defines such 
poetry in historical terms as beginning with Lucilius and going on to 
Horace. He, like many others7, ignores Lucretius' place in the tradition. 
Dudley sees the need to 'bring into sharper focus the debt of Lucretius 
to Lucilius'8 but devotes to this a mere two pages.9 
Johnson's dictionary gets to the point when he defines satire as 
a poem 'in which wickedness or folly is censured', although there is 
usually also a mood of enjoyment of such censure, whether the 
enjoyment is laughter or merely prurience. The OCDIO defines the 
term for Roman literature as: 'a humorous or malicious expose of 
hypocrisy and pretension', a definition which will suit Lucretius well, 
as his ethical stance has a great deal to say about hypocrisy and 
pretension - eripitur persona: manet res. 11 For if the conclusions of 
Chapter 2 are accepted, and if ethics is for Lucretius a matter of 
perceiving the truth and then acting upon it, then we can expect his 
attitude towards vice to be to see it as subsumed under folly. The tragic 
heroes whom we looked at in the previous chapter were people who 
went wrong by failing to see the truth and incurred disaster~ so also the 
butt of Lucretius' humour is the person who ignores the truth and makes 
10.1.93 
see Murley (1939) 380 
Dudley (1965) 115 
Dudley (1965) 124-5 
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a fool of himself in a 'comedy of errors'. The difference between the 
two will be the attitude of the poet and the reader towards the suffering 
depicted: we do not feel particularly sorry for the romantic lover 
wasting his father's money on a worthless womanl2, but we are clearly 
meant tc;> feel pity for the suffering of Iphigeneial3, rather as the plot of 
many a comedy (e.g. Curculio) would end up a tragedy of incestuous 
guilt like Oedipus the King were the plot to delay the recognition of the 
truth too much. 
If this is so, then we can in turn expect his satirical voice to be 
mockery of the fool rather than the castigation of the wicked; of the 
Epicurean poet it could also be said, as Horace said of Lucilius l 4, that 
he sale multo/ urbem defricuit; but Lucretius' attitude is more one of 
tout com prendre, c'est tout pardonner in his resolute determination to 
show us the truth. Satire is always something of a mirror in which the 
audience (including the narrator himself1S) may expect too see 
themselves reflected and learn from it - and the didactic tone of Lucilius 
is certainly comparable to Lucretius. Lucilius, for instance, engages 
the reader with the benefits of philosophy in Book 15: he attacks the 
superstitious belief in portenta: 
multi homines portenta in Homeri versibus ficta 
monstra putent; quorum in primis Polyphemus ducentos 
Cyclops longus pedes; et porro huic maius bacillum 
10 OeD (1996) s.v. 'Satire' 
11 3. 58 
12 4. 1129-30 
13 I. 80-101; I am surprised that Murley counts this passage as 'satire' 
14 Sat. 1.10.3-4 
IS e.g. Lucilius 929-30W, Horace Sat. 1.5. etc 
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quam malus navi in corbita maximus ulla16 
and even closer to Lucretius he compares the superstitious to children: 
T erriculas Lamias, F auni quas Pompiliique 
instituere Numae, tremit has hic omnia ponit. 
ut pueri infantes credunt signa omnia aena 
vivere et esse homines, sic isti somnia ficta 
vera putant, credunt signis cor inesse in aenis. 
Pergula pictorum, veri nil, omnia fieta. 17 
For Lucretius' attitude to portenta see 4. 590-594: 
cetera de genere hoc monstra ac portenta loquuntur 
ne loca deserta ab divis quoque forte putentur 
sola tenere. ideo iactant miracula dictis 
aut aliqua ratione alia ducuntur, ut omne 
humanum genus est avidum nimis auricularum 
where the poet adds the cynical assertion that superstition arises firstly 
because these people cannot bear to face the fact that not even gods live 
in their remote regions and they are all alone (sola is stressed) and 
secondly because people are gullible. 
It is however with ethical matters that we are most concerned 
in this thesis, and Lucilius (even in. his fragmentary state) has plenty of 
ethical comment to offer: his attitude to sexual love, for instance, was 
as cynical as anything in the de rerum natura: he seems to have shared 
Cato's view of the virtues ofbrothels18 and in the following passage he 
demythologises the 'beauties' of myth and legend: 
num censes calliplocamon callisphyron ullam 
non licitum esse uterum atque etiam inguina tangere mammis, 
conpemem aut varam fuisse Amphitryonis acoetin 
Alcmenam atque alias, Helenam ipsam denique - nolo 
16 fragment 520-3W; all fragments ofLucilius are cited acx:ording to the Loeb edition of 
Warmington (1979) 
17 frag. 524-9W; d. DRN 2.55-58= 3.87-90- 6.35-8 
18 frag. 927-8W 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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dicere: tute vide atque dissylabon elige quodvis -
lCovPl1Y eupatereiam aliquam rem insignem habuisse, 
verrucam naevum punctum dentem eminulum unum?19 
which prompts immediate comparison with DRN 5. 13-42 for the 
demythologisation of the hero(ine) and also DRN 4 for the use of Greek 
euphemisms and the poet's conso/alio: 
nempe aliae quoque sunt; nempe hac sine viximus ante 
nempe eadem facit - et scimus facere - omnia turpi 
et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa 
quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachinnant20 
The satirist's attitude towards greed: 
deniQue uti stulto nil sit satis, omnia cum sint21 
is remarkably close to Epicurus' dictum that 'nothing is enough for the 
man for whom what is enough seems a little'22 and underlies Lucretius' 
mockery of the bored dissatisfied rich man23 and the theme of 
tltrArprla as in the allegorical explanation of the Danaids24. 
The unscrupulous striving for political power is sent up by Lucilius: 
nunc vero a mani ad noctem festo atque profesto 
totus item pariterque die populusque patresque 
iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam; 
uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti -
verba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose, 
blanditia certare, bonum simulare virum se, 
insidias facere ut si hostes sint ommbus omnes.25 
in language whose tone is later recalled by Lucretius: 
denique avarities et honorum caeca cupido 
quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines 
frag. S67·73W from a book lampooning the Odyssey 
4. 1173-6 
frag.591W 
Epicurus fragment 68 
3. 1060-67 
3. 1003-1010 
frag. 114S-S1W 
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iuris et interdum socios scelerum atque ministros 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae 
non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur. 
turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 
semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 
et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante; 
unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 
effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse, 
sanguine civili rem conflant divitiasque 
conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes, 
crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris 
et consanguineum mensas odere timentque. 26 
The 'ethical' distance between these two extracts is instructive. Lucilius 
points out the wickedness, while Lucretius attempts to explain it away 
as being reducible to the fear of death. Both poets enjoy the view of the 
'rat race'27, but only Lucretius finds a way to explain the observed facts 
by means of the known facts of human nature. Lucilius clearly knew 
and wrote of Epicurus28 but it is impossible to place him in any 
philosophical schoo~ any more than Horacel9 . The autobiographical 
elements in both poets are part of the satiric tradition~ but in Lucilius it 
becomes the telling of anecdote such as the narrative of a journeylO or 
an amorous escapadel1 while for Lucretius the persona is always that of 
the didactic poet pointing to observed features of the world or sharing 
his experience of writing itseIP2. 
26 3. 59-73 
27 the comic touches ofLucilius: the bigh-flown populus patresque are all crooks. the 
comic hyperbole of 'from morning till night, nowhere leaving. .. all of them', the reminiSQ'!llLX! of 
Strepsiades in Aristopbanes' Clouds in verba dare ut coute possint, the hypocrisy of bonum 
simulare virum se, and so on. For detailed analysis of the Lucretius passage see above pp. 28-42 
28 d. frag. 820 'eidola atque atomus vincere Epicuri volam' 
29 famously eclectic; Epistles 1.1.14 
30 frag. 102-SW; d. Horac:e Sat I.S 
31 frag. 898-9W 
32 e.g. 4. 969-70 
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There are of course major differences between Lucilius and 
Lucretius: Lucilius engages in topical satire of named individuals (such 
as the mock-trials of Lentulus Lupus and Mucius Scaevola) whereas 
Lucretius avoids such contemporary jibes. Literary satire is Lucilius' 
genre, while for Lucretius it is merely one means to a protreptic end. 
ROMAN COMEDY 
Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae, 
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, 
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur, 
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui 
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant. 
hinc omnis pendet Lucilius, hosce secutus 
mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque.33 
Literary satire such as that of Lucilius clearly depends on 
Stage Comedy, as asserted by Horace, and is eclipsed by it in social 
and literary importance. The readership of satire was small compared 
to the vast numbers who filled the theatre, and it would be surprising if 
Lucretius did not make use of this abundant source of material, just as 
Cicero was wont to do in his political speeches and treatises. 
One clear example of Lucretius' use of such material is in his 
account of romantic love. Book 4 depicts the life of love in a grossly 
exaggerated and overtly theatrical manner; the lover is hardly the 
'normal' Roman but a figure cut from comedy, with his serenades, his 
33 Horace Sat 1.4.1-7 
34 
3S 
36 
37 
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flowers, his wasting of his father's money, his idealised infatuation for 
the beloved. This passage has often been seen as evidence for the 
behaviour of real Romans in the late Republic34 on the grounds that 
Lucretius would not tilt at windmills and thereby ruin the plausibility of 
his satire - although he is happy to tilt at the windmills of kings 
slaughtering their daughters. Horace similarly satirises the lover of 
libertinae Sallustius in a satire whose main thrust is directed at 'insane 
romanticism'3s. This is treading close to the familiar 'life vs literature' 
argument which has engaged critics for many years and whose main 
premises do not need to be repeated here36. The rather crude 
distinction between 'real life' and 'literature' will not do justice to the 
debate here: if both Lucretius and Roman comedy are satirising the 
same foolish behaviour, it is impossible to say to what extent either is 
imitating the other or to what extent either is reflecting 'reality'. It does 
seem however in principle likely that Lucretius' reader would have 
experience of this sort of folly as a spectacle on the comic stage more 
than on the via Appia, and that Horace's text differs from Lucretius in 
that he actually names his quarry (unlike Lucretius who remains 
steadfastly imprecise and generalised). There are a great many sources 
for the 'foolish lover' figure in stage comedy37 from Lucretius' own day: 
young rich foolish men infatuated with girls and spending their fathers' 
e.g. Lyne (1980), 3, 13 
Horace Satires l.2: phrase from Lyne (1980) 13 
see e.g. Griffin (1985) 1-31, 48-64 
listed and discussed in Rosivacb (1980) 
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money on them38, the life of youthful desidia39 given over to parties, 
drinking and garning40, the traditional Roman priority of negotium and 
officia over this sort of otium being rejected in favour of idle folly41 and 
leaving the lover still wretched and miser, whether because they are 
aware of their folly or because of jealousy of rivals42. Typical of this 
way of life is young Phaedromus in Plautus' Curculio, for instance, 
deeply and foolishly in love, and singing a paraklausithyron43 such as 
Lucretius' sad lover offers44, or Lysidamas in Casina who is even more 
foolishly in love on account of his age and the farcical humiliation to 
which the play subjects him. Casina is said to be insane - as are all 
romantic lovers, Lucretius would urge - and then the old man finds that 
what he thinks is his beloved is in fact his slave in drag (a nice example 
of an actor acting a part within a part) - only to be betrayed by his own 
bailiff Olympio. Amphitryo sees the wretched Alcmena seduced by 
Jupiter in the guise of her husband Amphitryo, deceived by 
appearances by a being whom we are told to worship - again a neat 
combination of Lucretius' twin preoccupations with superstition and 
hallucination. In matters of romantic love, one can trust neither one's 
servants nor one's senses, it seems, and the whole business reeks with 
deception and self-seeking (on the part of Jupiter for instance), while 
38 for the gifts to girls (Lucretius 4. 1125-30) cf. Plautus Cist. 487. Men. 739, Miles G. 
1109, 1302, True. 52: for the spending of father's money (Lucr. 4. 1129) cf. PlautusMere. 42-58, 
Trin. 13, 682, Naevius com. 84 Ribb .. 
39 desidiose agere aeiatem 4.1136 
40 4.1131-2: cf. TerenceAd. 117, PlautusMost. 295,309, Asin. 803. 
41 4.1123-4: cf. P1autus Trin. 261, 651,Most.I44. 
42 guilty conscience: 4.1133-6, Plautus Mere. 79-82, Most. 149-56, Trin. 655-9. Fear of 
rivals: 4.1137-40, TerenceH.T. 256-63, PlautusAsin. 792, 769-70. 
43 264-279 -
44 
4S 
46 
47 
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the real happiness which all of them seek could only be obtained by 
knowledge such as Epicurus offers. Their folly leads inexorably to 
humiliation and sadness. Phaedromus in Curculio could well be the 
model for Lucretius' scathing sketch4s: 
at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 
floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos 
unguit amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit 
where the poet exercises all his satirical force in the mockery of the 
lover: the lover performs three actions (covering with flowers, 
smearing with matjoram, implanting kisses) on three words for doors 
(limina ... postes .. joribus) complete with the pathetic fallacy of a door 
as haughty as the mistress it protects (superbos). There is an 
excruciating loss of dignity on the part of the lover which is reinforced 
by the disillusion suggested in the following passage: 
quem si, iam ammissum, venientem otfenderit aura 
una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas 
et meditata diu cadat aIte sumpta querella, 
stultitiaque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi 
plus videat quam mortali concedere par est. 46 
where again the key idea of the superstitious attribution of divine power 
to a mortal is brought out by the vital word videat as with all things, 
seeing the truth is everything you need. In this case the truth is 
hyperbolically awful: a mistress whose 'divine'47 aura in fact is a foul 
bodily odour48, one breath of which will have him looking for a decent 
excuse to leave the woman he has importuned for so long, his sincere 
4. 1177-9, quoted below: on the topos see Copley (1956) 
4. 1177-9 
4. 1180-4 
cr. Veneres at NN8~I discussed below. 
184 
and long-considered lament evoked in a parodistically lengthy Latin 
phrase (meditata diu .. alte sumpta querella) but falling to bits in two 
short syllables (cadat). The comedy is obvious, and one might 
further compare the opening scene of Terence's Eunuch. In both texts 
the lover exhibits 'a .. mixture of desire, anger, irresolution and self-
reproach. 49' 
The poet consciously uses a theatrical metaphor in describing 
the secret truth behind the fake beauty of the society madam as her vitae 
postscaeniaso, a word only occuring here in extant Latin and 
anticipating the later use of scaena to indicate histrionic and deceitful 
behaviours 1, while also playing on the similarity with obscena which 
better describes the back-stage realities which these ironically entitled 
'goddesses of love's2 seek to keep hidden. This completes the ironic 
circle as he depicts a scene familiar from drama which however points 
out the cosmetic and meretricious theatricality of the 'real-life' women 
whose love the reader is urged to avoid. The irony deepens when one 
realises that in the theatre everybody knows that the person on stage is 
only playing a part, whereas these people are believed to be acting 
sincerely but really are playing a role - actresses of insincere love - and 
48 aura picks up the point of 1175-6; the giggling maids are referred to again at 1189, 
neatly providing closure for this satirical passage. 
49 RD. Brown (1987) 136 
so 4. 1186 
51 OLD s.v. 'scaena' 5 
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so offer the lover nothing substantial except the images. What is more, 
crediting these superficial women with divine powers is another form of 
the superstition which it is the poet's aim to dispel. The theatrical 
irony of postscaenia, then reminds us of the manner in which Roman 
comedy indulged in Stimmungsbrechung of the same kind, as where 
Charinus opens the Mercator with a dig at other comedies: 
non ego item facio ut alios in comoediis 
vi vidi amoris facere, qui aut Nocti aut Oii 
aut Soli aut Lunae miserias narrant suas 
a feature of Aristophanic comedy'3; or where Mercury opens the 
Amphitryo claiming to be able to change the genre if the audience 
wishes'4. Beacham sums up this aspect of 'generic self-consciousness' 
as 'the sense of a consummate control of the theatrical medium, 
through which both audience and performers are involved in a carefully 
coordinated and integrated aesthetic act. ISS The de rerum natura is 
precisely such an 'integrated aesthetic act' in the self-conscious 
discussion of'deception's6 of its protreptic. 
The relevance of this to the rest of book 4 - and the reason for 
concluding book 4 with the diatribe against love - is that the lover is an 
extreme version of the 'hallucinating' man who does not use his senses 
to the full and who misinterprets the evidence. Just as we could be 
fooled by optical illusions (the bent oar, etc, of 4.324-468) if we did not 
Sl the term Venus for a mistress had already been found in the mouth of the besotted lover in 
Plautus Curculio 192: it is later used by eo~ (Odes 1.27.14; 33.13) and - in the mouth of 
another besotted lover - Vergil (Eclogues 3.68). 
'3 e.g. Frogs 1-34, Clouds '35-62, Wasps 54-66, Peace 739-47 
'4 Amphilruo 51-63 
ss Beacham (1991) 42-3 
S6 of the reader with the honey (4.1-25); see pp. 85-6 above 
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'correct' our sense-data with the interpretation of the mind, so the lover 
is fooled by appearances into believing that his beloved is perfect even 
when her blemishes are all too apparent to the impartial observers7. 
Love, in this sense, is the product of a failure to see the truth. As in 
the theatrical predecessors whom we have cited, truth is established at 
the end of the book and the comedy of errors is rectified by the light of 
reality: in much the same way, Lucretius in Book 4 gives us our own 
comedy of the sensesS8, allowing us to enjoy the comic spectacle of 
uneducated senses and illusions before facing the far preferable reality 
of seeing the truth and settling down to (scientifically informed) child-
rearingS9 with a good woman rather than the vain and frustrated pursuit 
of the evil meretricious mistress. The book adopts comic stereotypes 
and ends happily with the optimistic motto that pertinacity will be 
rewarded: 
quod superest, consuetudo concinnat amorem; 
nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 
vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. 
nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis 
umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa?60 
where the repetition of the actions is well brought out by the repetition 
of words (in longo spatio ... longo in spatio: saxa ... saxa; 
tunditur ... pertundere). The ending of book four has often been seen 
S7 4.1153-1170 
S8 the series of optical illusions dwelt on (324-461) and yet also explained away by the ratio 
of the philosophy; the illusions thus become almost like artworks to be admired and yet seen 
through. 
S9 hence the poet's ending of the book with advice on conception and heredity at 4. 1192-
1287 
60 4. 1283-7 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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as neurotic61 and disturbed - in fact it is only as neurotic and disturbed 
as many a comedy62 and ends with the light of truth revealed and a 
bright future available to all. Just as tragedy allows us to enjoy 
watching other people suffer63, comedy allows us to find it funny~ and 
just as the actors on the comic stage cannot tell Mercury apart from 
Sosia or Jupiter from Arnphitruo but the audience can easily do so, so 
also the 'audience' of the de rerum natura sees through the deception 
and can enjoy the comedy safe in the knowledge of the truth. 
One of the most celebrated passages of social satire in the 
book is the catalogue of euphemisms used to paint the beloved in a 
better light than she merits: 
nigra'melichrus' est, inmunda et fetida 'acosmos', 
caesia 'Palladium', nervosa et lignea 'dorcas' 
parvula pumilio 'chariton mia' 'tota merum sal', 
magna atque imrnanis 'cataplexis plenaque honoris'. 
balba loqui non quit - 'traulizi'; muta 'pudens' est. 
at flagrans odiosa loquacula 'Lampadium' fit; 
'ischnon eromenion' tum f\t cum vivere non quit 
prae macie; 'rhadine' verost iam mortua tussi; 
at tumida et mammosa 'Ceres' est 'ipsa ab laccho', 
simula 'Silena ac saturast', labeosa 'pbilema'.64 
The immediate source of this passage usually quoted is Plato Republic 
474d4-475a2: 
e.g. StJerome: Perelli (1969) 
e.g. Plautus Casina 
as we saw in the previous cbapter in the discussion of~rgias (pp. 147-8 above) 
4. NlSM~9 
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eJ-Lperponara exe1V, peAavas 06 avopllcovs ioezv, AeVICOVS 06 
gewv nazoas dval' J-LeA.LxAWpOVS 06 lCal rouvopa o'l'el nvos aUov 
noi1]pa dval ij epaarou unolCopl~opevov re lCal evxepws 
¢lepovros n7V wxpor7]ra, eav em ropq. n; lCal eVI MYCP naaas 
npo¢laae1S npo¢laal~eage re lCal naaas ¢I{J)vas a¢llere, roare 
s: ' , f.l~ '1 '1 ~ ~ 'll' '., p1]ueva anOJAAIIJ1"t.1V r{J)v avuovvrrov ev ropq.. 
This passage does of course resemble our text in many ways, and one 
could add Thucydides account of the 'revaluation of terms' in the stasis 
chapters of his HistorY'S: but a closer parallel to the Lucretian theme is 
to be found in a fragment of a comedy of Alexis, discussed by 
Domenicucci66: 
npWra P6V yap 1CpOS ro lCepOos lCal ro OUMV rovs 1CeAaS 
navra rall' avrazs nape pya riveral, pa1CrOVal os 
naalVemfJovAas' e1CelOaV 8' eV1COP17a{J)alV nore 
aveAafJov lCalvas era {pas nfXIJr01Celpovs rijs reXV1]S. 
ev9Vs aVa1CAaITOVal ravras roare pr7re rous rpo1Covs 
pr7re ras o'l'£tS o/Jolas OlareAelv ouaas en. 
rvyxave1 PltcpO. ns ooaa, ¢lev..Ds ev rai's {3aVJClalV 
eyJCelCarrvral' /JClICpl1. ns, 0la{3a9pov Aenrov ¢lopez 
, "I., '1' " , l' aI..DN~J 'J!' r1JV re lCe."aA1JV em roy {J)/Jov lCaraJAA/Wva' e..,epxera1· 
rouro rou /Jr7lCovs a¢lElA£v. OUIC EXe1 ns iaXla 
u1CEveova' eppa/Jev' aVrr7v, roarE n}v EV1rVYlav 
avafJoav rous £ialoovras. 1C0lAlaV aopav EXE1, 
~ II~ ,- , 1''' •• -' ' 
VH/V'" bv~ aVralal rovrcov coy exovu 01 ICCO/J11C01' 
op()a 1Cpoa9iioal rOlaura rovvovrov rijs 1C0lAlas 
dxmEpEi 1C0vro'iaz roorolS £is ro 1CpOa9' anrlyayov. 
ras oq,pVs 1rVppO.S £XE1 ns, ~{gFypaqIlrals aaf30).q>. 
OlJ/J!3s!31JIC' elval/JSAalVaV, lCarS1CAaaE 'IflJ.lvelcp. 
A£vICOlJ'WS Alav TIS ean, 1Caloep{J)r' Bvrpl/3Eral. 
lCaMV BXE1 rou aW/Jaros n , rouro rv/Jvov oE{lCVVral. 
ev¢lvEzs ooovras BCJXev, e~ avaYK"1JS ot:'i YEMV, 
Tva 9Ewpiixt oi 1CapOvrES ro crro/J' Ws ICO/J'I'0V ¢lOpEZ. 
av 06 /Jry xalpn yeAiix:Ja, 01arEAei n}v ry/Jepav 
Bv80v I /1x:mEP rots J-LayelpolS a napalCEl9' BlCaarorE, 
ryVlle' av ncoMOO1V aiywv ICpavla, ~ArT¢NNMs 
J-LvpplV1JS Bxovaa Ae1rt"OV opfJov BV rois xmAEalV, 
roarE rqi vxJvcp aSCJ1]pev, av rE fJoVA1Jr' av re /Jr7. 
Thucydides 3. 82-83 
Alexis Fr. 98 Edmunds, discussed by Domenicucci (1981) 
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the subject of the verbs is either the pimps who decorate their girls to 
allure customers, or the girls themselves: the satire reveals the tricks 
of the trade (cork in the shoes of short girls, low slippers for the tall, 
rouge for the pale girl, whitelead for the dark complexion, rubbing 
soot on red eyebrows, etc.) and amuses while it unmasks the deception. 
The verbal parallels with Lucretius are close67 and the situation of the 
'beauty' being not even skin-deep but applied as a costume suits both the 
theatrical depiction of love in the poem and also the comic purpose of 
this text. It may be that the topos explored by Alexis was imitated in 
Roman comedy (it is hard to believe that it was not); at any rate, there 
is a direct theatrical source for this most famous section of the diatribe 
against romantic love - a source which also removes some of the grim 
seriousness with which Lucretius' account of love has often been 
invested by critics. As often, the serious point is made through a 
light-hearted piece of humour, the theatricality of love being shown 
(with typical irony) by an allusion to a passage from a theatrical text. 
Religion (or better Superstition) is also handled in a similar 
manner. As described earlier, comedy is used to satirise the practice 
of superstition. The pathetic impotent man, for instance: 
nec divina satum genitalem numina cuiquam 
absterrent, pater a gnatis ne dulcibus umquam 
appelletur et ut sterili Venere exigat aevum; 
quod plerumque putant et multo sanguine maesti 
conspergunt aras adolentque altaria donis 
67 J.l6A.a&Vav= nigra 1160, J.llKpcZ = parvula 1162, ~ = magna atque immanis, ICowav 
a5pav = tumida et mammosa 1168. 
68 
69 
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ut gravidas reddant uxores semine largo. 
nequiquam divom numen sortisque fatigant68 ... 
Here the poet mocks both the man's sentimental desire for children with 
the sardonic dulcibus and exaggerates his wretched attempts to placate 
the gods wth the hyperbolic gifts of 1237, all so that he might render his 
wife 'heavy' with a grotesque amount of seed, belabouring the numen 
when all he needs is semen. This is the sort of caricature which we 
expect to find in comedy and which lurks behind the impotent man in 
(e.g.) Catullus 67 who needs his more robust father to deflower his 
virgin bride - a scenario reminiscent of father-son rivalry for a girl in 
(e.g.) Plautus' Asinaria. 
The depiction of the gods in comedy is light-hearted and 
debunking, especially in the Amphitruo. The Father of Gods and Men 
is built up and then run down by his son Mercury as a weak mortal in 
the Amphitruo: 
lovi' iussu venio: nomen Mercuriost mihi: 
pater huc me misit ad vos oratum meus: 
tam etsi pro imperio vobis quod dictum foret 
scibat facturos, quippe qui intellexerat 
vereri vos se et metuere, ita ut aequom est lovem; 
verum profecto hoc petere me precario 
a vobis iussit leniter dictis bonis. 
etenim ille quovis huc iussu venio, luppiter 
non minus quam vostrum quivis formidat malum: 
humana matre natus, humano patre 
mirari non est aequom sibi si praetimet; 
atque ego quoque etiam, qui lovis sum filius, 
contagione mei patris metuo malum. 69 
4.1233-1239 
Amphitruo 19-31 
70 
71 
72 
73 
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This is surpnsmg, asserts Sega}1o, in VIew of the Roman 
O£lCJlOalj.lOvla71 ; what, he asks, would be the reaction of Plautus' 
audience to Agorastocles' outburst: 
ita me di amabunt, ut ego, si sim Iuppiter 
iam hercle ego illam uxorem ducam et Iunonem extrudam foras!n 
'we imagine with horror Punch and Judy on Olympus' he comments: 
'even at his most irreverent moments, Aristophanes never abuses 
Hera'73. The argument from Aristophanes is weak: we only have a 
proportion of his comedies, and female gods such as Iris in the Birds 
come in for abuse. Dover74 is probably right when he asserts that 'fifth-
century comedy provided an outlet for this kind of self-assertion by 
depicting deities not only as worsted by aggressive humans, as in Birds, 
but also as stupid, greedy and cowardly ... he (the ordinary Greek) did 
not ask himself "What is the nature of a god who expects sacrifices but 
accepts mockery?'" Lucretius' view of the gods will be examined in the 
final chapter: it is obvious however that his anti-theological stance 
which ridicules divine agency in the world is close to the irreverent 
world of comedy, old and new. In Rome as in Athens the plays passed 
off with no thunderbolts or playwrights prosecuted for blasphemy - an 
indication surely that the ancient tolerance of blasphemy was greater 
than we (or Polybius) think, and that Lucretian ridicule of divine 
intervention was perhaps less daring than one might suppose. 
Segal (1968) 30-31 
citing Polybius 6.56.7 
Poenulus 1219-20 
Segal (1968) 30-1. 
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The ridicule of divine intervention is repeated many times 75 as 
is the corresponding advice not to seek the help of the gods as it is 
useless 76. Elsewhere, the poet uses satire taken from Greek comedy to 
discredit pathetic arguments in support of superstitious beliefs, most 
obviously his rehearsal of a sequence of arguments from Aristophanes 
Clouds applied to the divine origin of thunderbolts77; the argument 
from the fact that wicked men are untouched by the thunderbolt of 
Jupiter although he is said to shoot at sinners, while the innocent are 
hit 78, coupled with the fact that he often hits his own temples or oak 
trees79, and the argument against the divine origin of rain from the 
necessity of a cloudy sky80. These arguments are augmented by comic 
original touches of the poet's own: the cartoon-like picture of the gods 
using thunderbolt-throwing as a form of exercise81 and the subsequent 
obscenity of Jupiter 'blunting his bolt'82 followed by the caricature of 
Jupiter the bad marksman squatting low in the clouds to get a better 
shot at the target, complete with.a double entendre as he 'enters' the 
clouds and there 'aims the blows of his weapon'83. Jupiter is sent up in 
lines 404-5: 
quid undas 
arguit et liquidam molem camposque natantis? 
74 Dover (1972) 32-3 
7S 1. 152-4,2.167-83,2. 1090-1104,4.1233-9,5.76-90,5.110-234,6.59-89,6.379-422 
76 e .. g.4. 1233-9,6. 1272-1277 
77 6.379-422 
78 Aristophanes Clouds 397-400; DRN6.391-5 
79 Clouds401-2=DRN6.417-22,2.1101-4 
80 Clouds 368-71= DRN 6. 400-1 
81 6. 397 
82 6.398 _ 
83 6. 402-3; the clouds of Aristophanes were distinctly female (Clouds 341) 
84 
8' 
86 
87 
88 
89 
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in the inflated rhetoric of the tricolon crescendo, the three phrases 
being precisely the sort of inflated rhetoric which arguit suggests~ 
Jupiter is a barrister flinging verbal assaults of vapid rhetoric against an 
innocent sea - words as futile as his thunderbolts. There is also clever 
sophistry to prove that Jupiter is either not acting or else is very stupid 
in the way that thunder signals the thunderbolt and so gives us time to 
get out of the way~ and there is the parody of epic style in the depiction 
of the sinner struck by the thunderbolt of Jupiter: 
quod si Iuppiter atque alii fulgentia divi 
terrifico quatiunt sonitu caelestia templa 
et iaciunt ignem quo cuiquest cumque voluntas 
cur quibus incautum scelus aversabile cumquest 
non faciunt icti flammas ut fulguris halent 
pectore perfixo, documen mortalibus acre ... 84 
the high-flown language of the gods8' and the punishment of the 
sinner86 are brought out for parodistic purpose and to be dismissed in 
the tart documen mortali bus acre where Lucretius suggests that the 
thunderbolt might indeed be a lesson to mortals if the gods used it 
morally and consistently. This is also, however, comedy versus tragedy 
and epic, as the 'theological' interpretation of thunderbolts finds its 
finest expression in Aeschylus87 and Hesiod88 as well as the Romans 
Accius89 and Varro Atacinus90. Again, the poet is prepared to use 
themes and ideas well-known from Greek and Roman drama rather than 
inventing more original or philosophical concepts with which to 
6.388-92 
Emout compares Ennius Scaenica 380 templa caeli summa sonifu concutit with 388 
cf. Accius' in pectore/fulmen incohatum flammam ostentabat lovis 
Seven against Thebes 444f. Agamemnon 468-70 
Theogony 820-880 
Accius flag. 241-2W (from Clytemnestra) 
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demonstrate his case, and (again) the supposedly serious and unsmiling 
Lucretius is quite prepared to use sources from the most irreverent 
genre in the ancient world (Old Comedy) to lend both weight and 
humour to his account of the world. 
The comic connection does not cease with sex and religion. 
The exploration of bodily functions in general and sexual activity in 
particular is no stranger to comedy - as witnessed by all those who have 
sought to bowdlerise Aristophanes - and Lucretius' account of the 
physiology of sex in book 4 is a masterpiece of science and caricature 
mixed together - note the hyperbole of: 
sic in amore Venus simulacris ludit amantis, 
nec satiare queunt spectando corpora curam 
nec manibus quicquam teneris abradere membris 
possunt errantes incerti corpore toto. 
denique cum membris conlatis flore fruuntur 1105 
aetatis, iam cum praesagit gaudia corpus 
atque in eost Venus ut muliebria conserat alVa, 
adfigunt avide corpus iunguntque salivas 
oris et inspirant pressantes dentibus ora -
nequiquam, quoniam nil inde abradere possunt 1110 
nec penetrare et abire in corpus corpore toto; 
nam facere interdum velIe et certare videntur: 
usque adeo cupide in Veneris compagibus haerent, 
membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt. 
tandem ubi se erupit nervis conlecta cupido, 1115 
parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper. 
inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit, 
cum sibi quod cupiunt ipsi contingere quaerunt, 
nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat: 
usque adeo incerti tabescunt volnere caeco. 1120 
90 frag. 10 (Morel) (context unclear). For the topic of the thunderbolt as divine weapon see 
Blinkenberg (1911) 
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The quasi-scientific objectivity of (e.g.) iunguntque salivas! oris fools 
nobody. The act of love-making becomes an attempt to remove parts 
of the lover's body (abradere 1103) even though the hands doing the 
deed are teneris, the exchange of saliva91 (1108) and the pressing of 
hard teeth against soft lips (1109). The obscene notion of the (male) 
lover disappearing into the body of the female (abire in corpus corpore 
toto) is a cartoon-like exaggeration; and never, one feels, has 
synecdoche been applied to the act of sex with such devastating 
reductive effect. There is no identification with the lovers here - no 
elegiac empathy with the feelings being described, but rather the gaze 
of the bemused philosopher watching the folly of his fellow human 
beings with the sort of detached incredulity which we find in the 
opening of book 2. And yet there is also effective imagery here - the 
passage opens with euphemistic imagery (jlore9'l aetatis, muliebria 
arva93) before launching into an alarmingly explicit account of sex; here 
also the imagery is effective and appropriate - note the liquid image of 
liquescit, and the suitably contorted word order of 1119 expressive of 
the lovers' confusion. The depiction of the act is itself effective, but 
the passage is remarkable in its union of philosophical contemplation of 
a phenomenon and the comic exploitation of the absurdity of physical 
sex for literary purpose. 
91 the point recalls the act of eating greedily: cf.4. 1091-1100 
9'1 see OLD S.v. 'flos' Sa 
93 see Adams (1982) 82J~ for parallels~ cf. especially PlautusAsinaria 874, Casino 922, 
Curcu/io ~SI True. 149 
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Ancient comedy is of course at least ostensibly didactic, and 
Aristophanes claims that the dramatic poets of Athens were seen by 
themselves and by their fellow-citizens as in some senses educators of 
their audience94 and as people who could certainly have a great 
influence on the behaviour of the spectators9~. The same was also said 
of Homer96, of course, and one remembers how Agamemnon left his 
wife Clytemnestra in the company of a poet to maintain her moral 
standards while he was away. 97 There is thus little if any compromise 
of the poem's didactic purpose for it to use the techniques and materials 
of the comic stage - and there is surely no better way to boost the 
morale of the poet's side than by mocking the philosophical opposition, 
such as we find in the mockery of Empedocles98, Heraclitus99, 
Anaxagoras1OO, Thales perhapslOl and the Sceptics102 but interestingly 
not the StoicS103 . In most of these cases the philosophical refutation is 
done at least partly through ridicule: Heraclitus being ironically 
described as clams ob obscuram linguam and then parodied, the 
Sceptic being back-to-front and upside down like a circus performer104, 
94 Aristophanes Frogs 1009·10, cf. Wasps 64, Dover (1993) 16, Plato Gorg;as 501e10·11 
9S although Dover is probably right to say «1993) 16) that 'many, if not most Athenians 
would have assented to the general proposition that a tragic poet has a responsibility to "make his 
fellow citizens better people" (as demanded by Plato's Socrates in Grg. 50 Ie), but that is not to say 
that they actually went to the theatre in the hope of moral improvement.' 
96 P1atolon54Oe-541b 
97 Homer Odyssey 3.267·9: though West «1988) 176-7) has her doubts about the 
significance of the term and suggests that the poet might be a singing eunuch 
98 1. 734-829 
99 1.635-704 
100 1. 830-920, on which see Brown (1983) 
101 The lengthy account of the magnet at 6. 906-1089 is a disproof of Thales, who stated that 
'magnets have souls'. On this see now Penwill «(1996) 157.8) 
102 4. 469-521 
103 see Purley (1966) 
104 4.472, cf. Burnyeat (1978) 
lOS 
106 
107 
108 
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Empedocles the 'flawed visionary', lOS Anaxagoras being abused with a 
whole range of satirical techinques. 106 Once again, the didactic poet 
and the satirist blend together and turn the text into a piece of 
protreptic which both amuses and instructs, and which uses ridicule as 
one weapon in the destruction of the opposition. Lucretius in 
particular applies this comic tactic to his aesthetic ethical views - if the 
ethical ideal is pleasure and if ethics is a matter of contemplation rather 
than action, then it is not difficult to see why the poet should show us 
pleasing spectacles of comic fantasy as part of his construction of the 
'good life' through his poetry. 
We come back again to the vital passage which opens book 2. 
We saw in chapter 4 that the practice of cheering oneself up by 
comparing one's own sufferings with those of others is neither new or 
even particularly disgraceful, especially if one is a god; and one 
common response of the gods to suffering is laughter as in the comic 
theatre. Laughing at the misfot1t;mes of others is the prerogative of 
gods in both Homer, where the Olympians amuse themselves at the 
wretched Hephaistos with his limpl07 and also in tragedy, where 
Athene encourages Odysseus to enjoy laughing at his enemy Ajax in his 
misfortune: 
Brown (1983) 149 
fully described and documented in Brown (1983) 152-60 
Homer Iliad 1. 600 
Sophocles Ajax 79 
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just as Dionysus in Euripides' Bacchae mocks Pentheus before having 
him killed. Medea asks the messenger to narrate slowly the tale of the 
deaths she has caused for the sake of pleasure: 'you would please me 
twice as much if they died horribly'l09. More obviously, this sort of 
laughter is proper to comedy, especially in topical cases of public 
embarrassment causing mirth such as Cleonymus' throwing away his 
shield at the battle of Deliumllo and Cleisthenes' inability to grow a 
beardlll . There is scope for inquiring if Lucretius here, in turning the 
tables on the rich and powerful, is not indulging in what Dover calls 
comic 'self-assertion'l12 over against those who appear to have 
everything but who in fact are more vulnerable than the poor man in the 
street - just as he mocks the useless luxuries of the rich which have no 
effect against diseasel13 . 
There are then other COmiC parallels for this sort of 
Schadenfreude. Athenaeus114 quotes a passage of the comic poet 
Timocles which is of more than passing similarity to Lucretius in 
thought: 
J, 'l'aV, alCouaov ryv n aOI j.lEAN.tJ AEr£IV. 
avOpw1Cos Bcm 'wov Bm1Covov lPOO£1 
lCal1CoAMl Avm1P' <> f3{os BV eau'l'qJ lPEP£I. 
, 1'.A. 's: ' , 1CapaVlUXaS ouv .,;povnu(J)v av£up£'l'O 
'l'ao'l'as· <> rap vous 'l'WV ic5{(J)v AQOl1v AapIDv 
, '11_' ~D 'Ll 1CpoS allAV'l'pup 'l'£ VlUXar(J)r'lv£IS 1Cau£l, 
j.l£O' ~cRovijs a1tijA.9£ 1Calc5£u9eis apa. 
'l'OUs rap 'l'parcpc5ovs 1CpW'l'OV, ei /300A.eI, CJlC01C£I, 
cOs cOlPeA.Dum lrav'l'as. <> j.lEV mv rap 1Csvl1S 
109 Euripides Medea 1134-5 
110 e.g. Aristophanes Wasps 15-27, Knights 1369-72, Clouds 353, Peace 444-6, etc 
111 e.g. Aristophanes' Lysistrata 1092, Clouds 3SS etc 
112 Dover (1972)31-41 
113 2.34-6 
114 223 
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7rrOJIOrEpov avrou 1<araj1a6mv rov TryAetPov 
YEV0j16VOV 11<51] n}V 7r6vlaV Pfl,ov tPBpet' 
o VOoWV <5e j1aVl1<Ws 'ANcj1BOJV' £(JICel/laro' 
otm9aF.p.l~ ns, sial CPZV6lc>al rutPAoi. 
rB9vTl1<e rep 7rars, r, NlOf31] 1<61<OUtPl1<6. 
IOJA.OS rEs scm, rov cl>tAolCn}'t7W o,x,.. 
yepOJv ns aruIE', 1<arBj1a66v rov OivBa. 
a7ravra yap ra j1eiC;ov' ~ TrErCOV66 ns 
arumj1ar' allols Y6YOVOr' CVVOOUj1EVOS 
ras aurOs auroU OVj1tPOpcZs fXt.OV tPBpet. 
The enjoyment of this spectacle, in other words, is pure comedy fed by 
tragedy and suggests both the therapeutic value of seeing other people 
worse off than ourselves on the stage and also the pleasure of doing so. 
The theatrical medium is again the key element here; the audience 
watching a comic play refer to their experience of the tragic theatre and 
contemplate the idea of people putting their sufferings into perspective 
by watching the plays. The contemplation of the world of the theatre 
is thus itself therapeutic; but Lucretius, as we have seen, uses his 
theatrical material to .show that the same attitude towards life is 
ethically the best one to adopt outside the theatre as well as in it. 
This concludes our discussion of the theatre as metaphor, 
simile and source of material for the poem. No art-form in the ancient 
world had anything like the impact of the theatre; and in the late 
Roman republic the theatre was not merely the arena where fine 
literature was disseminated to vast crowds but also the place where 
ambitious politicians could stage vote-pulling shows - hence the 
importance of the aedileship in a political career and the significance of 
Pompey's new theatre in 55 B.el1'. The Roman triumph was an 
liS probably dedicated within Lucretius' lifetime: his date of death was said to be Vergil's 
seventeenth birthday (lSth October S3) (Donatus Life ofVerg;16) 
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obvious show of success, but the use of the Iud; for demagogic 
purposes was particularly pronounced in Lucretius' lifetimel16 and 
continued to be so used by Augustus and his successors. The theatre 
was also an arena for political protest such as we find in the case of 
Cicero in 58 BCll7 as well as being a nice image for the political 
machine which elevated actors who could persuade their fellow citizens 
with powerful rhetoric. For any Roman living in the 1st century B.C. 
there was no medium to touch it for power and immediacy of effect; 
and Lucretius' use of the theatre as a metaphor for the aesthetic ethics 
he is propounding as well as a fund of literary imagery is therefore 
hardly surprising. The de rerum natura opens with a prominent paean 
to the goddess Venus - it may be significant that in the new theatre of 
Pompey there was 'the provision of a temple to Venus Victrix at the top 
and rear of the auditorium placed directly vis-a-vis the stage and 
scaenae jrons'118 
116 well discussed by Beacham (1991) 133, 157-8, 163 
117 Beacham (1991) 159 
118 Beacham (1991) 161 
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE DIVINE AUDIENCE 
This thesis has examined the ethics of the poem and has 
attempted to show that the poet's ethical stance is one whereby ethics is 
a matter of seeing the truth about ourselves and whereby aesthetic 
contemplation of the world through philosophy is advocated rather than 
direct engagement in the world of politics, love and business. The wise 
man will appreciate the world as if watching a show in the theatre; and 
the reward promised him for his doing so is aesthetic pleasure which 
affords him serenity and happiness. 
Yet the poet promises even more. After explaining the elements 
of different natures which man has inside him and which no amount of 
training can eradicate, such that one is prone to anger, another to fear, 
the poet makes a startling claim to offset the obvious objection that if 
character is fixed then 'conversion' - even conversion to Epicureanism -
is impossible: 
illud in his rebus video firmare potesse, 
usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui 
parvola quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis 
ut nil impediat dignam dis degere vitam. 1 
1 3. 319.322 
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The purpose of this final chapter is to examine how the aesthetic ethical 
ideals propounded by the poet qualify the wise man 'to lead a life worthy 
of the gods'. 
Epicurus seems to have been certain that the gods do not 
represent any threat to us: their existence is not doubted if only 
because they impinge on our experience both when awake and when 
dreaming, and all perceptions are in some sense true at least to the point 
that all physical events must have a physical cause2, and yet whatever 
the intrinsic nature of the material things which cause the perceptions of 
gods, Epicurus is at least certain that they do not concern themselves 
with us, on the syllogistic reasoning that: 
The gods are self-sufficient and contented 
they would not be so if they concerned themselves with us 
therefore they do not concern themselves with us. 
The reader must no longer believe the old 'poetic' tales of gods 
demanding human sacrifice and fighting each other over human beings, 
as told in Homer and Hesiod: gone, too, the need to placate angry 
deities before they punish us with (e.g.) a plaguel or a thunderbolt4. 
Epicurean theology is very different from the stuff of 'heroic' 
superstition which has humans and gods mating and fighting: the tales 
2 see Taylor (1980) 105-124 
3 such as in Sophocles Oedipus Tyrannus or Homer Iliad! 
4 cf. Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 444f, Agamemnon 468-70, Herodotus 7.10 
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of love and strife between and among gods and humans make for good 
stories, but they do not amount to much as theology, and Epicurus' 
theological thinking, by contrast, might be seen as poor encouragement 
to a 'traditional' poet. As will be seen, however, Epicurus' view of the 
gods is radical and accords well with his ethical views of human 
happiness: between Pindar's 'one is the race of gods and men" and 
Lucretius' apotheosis ofEpicurus is a clear line of reasoning. 
Lucretius nails his militantly anti-theological colours to the 
mast very quickly. No sooner has Book 1 got under way when we are 
treated to a garish account of human sacrifice to discredit state religion, 
and the fool who believes in the teleological explanation of natural 
phenomena is ridiculed throughout the poem6, just as the pious man 
who believes that the gods might make him fertile 7, and the 
superstitious believer in tonnents (or anything else) after death8 are both 
mocked. The Epicurean view of indifferent gods - in contrast to the 
superstitious caricatures - is stated within a couple of pages of the 
opening of the poem: 
omnis enim per se divom natura necessest 
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 
remota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe; 
nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri, 
nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira' 
, Nemean 6.1·2 
6 2. 167-82, 4. 823·S7, S.110·234, 6. 379-422 
74. 1233-41 
8 3. 830-1094 
9 l. 44-49 
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and repeated several times 10. The gods do not live in the world as 
their nature is too fine to be touched by coarse things~ Epicurus and 
Cicero imagine the gods to live in the intermundia or J-lE-raICOOJ-lla, 
although Lucretius' only comment on the abode of the gods is a version 
of Homerll : 
apparet divum numen sedesque quietae 
quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis 
aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina 
cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether 
integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet. 
omnia suppeditat porro natura neque ulla 
res anirni pacem delibat tempore in UllO. 12 
where the gods' physical independence and untouchability is singled out 
for emphasis. 
It is no accident that this description of the abode of the gods 
comes straight after the praise of the Epicurus, the one man who 
deserved the title of god13 - and it would appear to follow that to live 
like a god means to live like Epicurus, who earned the title for himself 
There are some important conclusions to be drawn from the paraphrase 
of Homer in the context of the apotheosis ofEpicurus. 
In the first place, Lucretius' gods are nothing like Homer's 
gods14. Homer's gods are such by virtue of their power and immortality, 
not because of their nirvana-like peace; in many cases they display 
powers superior to those of men but their behaviour is fundamentally 
10 2.646-51,1093-4,5.82,148-52,6.73 
11 Odyssey 6.42-6, on which see Kenney ad loco and West (1969) 31-3 
12 3. 18-24 
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similar. They fight and mate with each other and humans, they beget 
children and weep over their death such as Ares over his dead son 
AscalaphuslS or Zeus over Sarpedon16. At the death of Sarpedon, 
Glaucus complains that Zeus has ignored the suffering of his own child 17 
which is ironic as we have witnessed the grief of Zeus who, for all his 
powers, is not able to save his son. The gods of epic, like those of 
tragedy, are often seen by human beings as carefree and unconcerned 
with man, their deathless life a cynical abandonment to selfish 
hedonism. This sets up a contrast with the poet's view who sees the 
suffering of gods, who cannot die (and so cannot be in a full sense 
heroic) but who can experience the pathos as well as comic enjoyment 
of life. None of this finds its way into the de rerum natura, whose gods 
are seen in dreams as images1S, capable of movement but not 
susceptible of any outside interference, thus rendering Homer, Glaucus 
and indeed Zeus offside. The nearest we get to the gods of Homer in 
the poem is the embrace of Mars and Venus19 reminiscent of the love-
making of Zeus and Hera20 with its similar association of the divine 
embrace and the fertility of nature all around21 as well as the obvious 
parallel of Ares and Apbrodite22 which will be pursued further later on. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
3.1S, S.7-12 
on this topic sec Godwin (1993) 
Homer Iliad IS. 116-8 
Homer Iliad 16. 458-61 
Homer Iliad 16. ~2NJ2 
S.1169-82 
1. 31-40 
Homer Iliad 14. fpPJP~N 
Homer Iliad 14. 341-9 
Homer Odyssey 8. 266-366 
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Lucretius' gods do not do anything13 in the world - one reason why their 
abode is given such lavish detail as their daily life of divine inactivity can 
hardly be described; whereas Homer's gods are imperfect players on the 
stage who will win and lose against each other and against men, 
Lucretius sees the gods as perfect beings incapable of either harming or 
being harmed in any way14. 
In the second place, Lucretius places his gods in a paradise 
where everything is provided by nature and nothing exists to wrinkle the 
divine brow. This is quite unlike the slow crawl of men from animal to 
human existence~ progress achieved by trial and error and resulting in a 
form of society which is materially superior to the primitive state but 
morally as backward as ever, as we saw in chapter two. This is also 
not in Homer, for whom the gods simply 'enjoy themselves all their 
days' .15 The divine independence is stressed by Epicurus who places it 
as the first of his Kuriai Doxai'l6; he seems to be stressing that their 
freedom from cares is what makes them gods just as much as the 
constant regeneration of their bodies. When Epicurus says that divinity 
does not trp&ypam 81&1 he is setting up two distinct ideas: gods do 
not have anything to do (tcpQ.y/Ja in its literal sense of 'doing') and also 
gods 'do not cause trouble'l7. The first sense appears to be elevating 
idleness to a virtue, and Cicero's Cotta complains18 of Epicurean gods 
23 except perhaps commit adultery as in 1. 29-40 
14 as proved in atomic terms at 5. 146-54 
15 Homer Odyssey 6. 46 
16 Diogcnes Laertius 10. 139 
17 cf. LSI s.v. 'nparJJa Ill.S citing e.g. Mdt 1. ISS, 7.147 
18 Cicero de natura deorum 1.102 
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for having no negotium, but other ancient authors are less worried by 
the prospect of idleness: look at Hesiod's men of the 'golden race' who: 
yijpas brijv, aid 06 1rOOOS Kal1BlpaS OIlOlo' 
, , ~ ~ .! ' ., J.IJ • ~ '6 '1 ' aUTollaT17 1t'OIVWV TB Kal all"'0vov· 01 v B BlI.l1J.lOI 
1101)101 £py' iVEIlOVTO oUv ia6AolmV 1rOAEBOOlV 
This is a close parallel to the picture of Lucretius' carefree gods who 
simply enjoy existence. Hesiod's men of the golden race did not suffer 
grief and pain like Homers gods; as they were not gods they did have to 
die but the gods and men still sprang from the same source3°. 
Lucretius of course has it both ways. He adopts and adapts the 
imagery of the golden age - where men and gods walked together and 
were happy in the springtime of the world - and adapts it to Epicurean 
theology which teaches that such interplay of god and man can never 
have taken place. The reader is thus teased with a set of images with 
which she will be familiar but whose value as cultural history he will be 
taught to reject. The philosophy does not violate the strictures of 
Epicurean theology but gives the divine autarkeia espoused by Epicurus 
29 Hesiod Works and Days 112-120 
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its most moving and sublime evocation ever. We are thus free from the 
gross anthropomorphism found in traditional epic and criticised by 
philosophers and poets for centuries; his gods are not the schemers of 
Homer and tragedy. Yet neither are they faceless verities or the Platonic 
Forms; and this is surely the poet's ethical motive in using the Hesiodic 
'golden race' language of the gods; to establish the contiguity between 
ideal human and ideal divine life which provides a bridge between the 
two states as an assurance of the availablility of this sort of life for men 
as well as for gods, if they follow the master and avoid unhealthy fears. 
This playing on the common ground between man and god in tum 
allows Lucretius to 'deify' Epicurus and thereby incorporate the 
traditional language of heroic panegyric more normally associated with 
'real' demigods such as Hercules. The reader will see the depiction of 
divine life in 3. 18-24 as an amalgamation of the happy gods of Homer 
and the happy men of Hesiod, thereby consolidating the concept of the 
'divine life' attained by men with a literary amalgamation which captures 
it in language with which the reader is already familiar. Once again, 
literary effects can have surprising philosophical and protreptic results. 
This still leaves the moral and ethical side of the gods 
unaccounted for. Fear of divine punishment was apparently a major 
fact of life in the ancient world: 'many individuals appear to have lived 
30 Hesiod Works and Days NM8~ cr. Pindar Nemean 6.1-2 'one is the race of 
gods and men' 
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their lives in constant dread' asserts Rist31 . Lucretius tells that it was 
Epicurus who dispelled this fear and freed us from our slavery 
humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret 
in terris oppressa gravi sub religione 
quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat 
horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans32 
and certainly Epicurus' and Lucretius' description of the divine ataraxia 
and autarkeia leaves no room for any divine concern about our 
behaviour, either to each other or to them. In the first place they are out 
of contact with us and so do not even see (let alone care) what we do~ 
in the second place they are not moved by our activities or feelings33 and 
so cannot accept our sacrifices which being tactile are not touchable by 
their superfine bodies34 nor can they be angry therefore when such 
rituals are not performed. Anyone who looks to the gods for vengeance 
will be disappointed as they are not even looking at our sufferings and 
sins and so a whole tradition of (e.g.) Zeus Horkios and Zeus Xeinios35 
is discarded with a stroke of the pen, just as is the tradition of appeasing 
their 'wrath' with 'supplication' when natural disaster strikes36; once 
again we are close to the comic ridicule of the ;J't'rQ)V Mros in 
Aristophanes' Clouds who points out the incongruity between regarding 
the gods as guardians of moral behaviour and their own shocking record 
31 Rist (1972) 147 
32 1.62-5 
33 Cicero de natura deorum 1.18 
34 5. lSO-1 
35 see e.g. Homer Odyssey 6.206-8 
36 e.g. Livy 25.12.15 
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of sleazel7 which in tum moved Plato to banish tragedy from his 
republic38. 
'The Justice of Zeus' is thus a joke for iucretius~ and if the 
gods are icons of moral excellence then the wise man will be as 
indifferent to others' sins and sufferings as the gods are. The pursuit of 
autarkeia will involve this essential element of being able to live a life of 
pleasure untroubled by sin and suffering in ourselves and others. The 
paradeigmatic role of the gods - even though they are unaware of us 
using them in this way - is well brought out by Obbink39: 
'Epicurus seems to have substituted for the causal and 
governing roles accorded to the divine in earlier Greek philosophy the 
notion, already familiar from Plato and Aristotle, of the divine as a 
normative object of moral emulation (OJ,lOlCOOlS B£ep). Since, for 
Epicurus, the gods share with men pleasure as an ethical telos, and since 
our conceptions of them embody the Epicurean ideals of blessedness and 
tranquillity, the gods stand in relation to the wise virtually as paradigms 
of moral excellence. Their example is to be imitated, a consideration 
which accounts for Epicurus' insistence that we conceive of the gods as 
anthropomorphic and capable of speech. While the intervention of the 
gods in the world is ruled out by its incompatibility with their own 
blessedness, they do nevertheless have a very real, if indirect, influence 
on the world of humans, inasmuch as one's own view of the gods would 
37 e.g. Aristophanes Clouds 1080-2 
38 see Plato Repub/ic 391E 
39 Q)biDk (1996) 9 
211 
naturally have a major impact for better or worse on one's own c)u19£CJlS 
or psychosomatic constitution.' 
Diogenes Laertius informs us of Epicurus' piety towards the 
gods4O and Philodemus tells us that Epicurus 'loyally observed all the 
forms of worship and enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not 
only on account of the laws but for physical reasons as well. For in On 
Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods 
would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the 
understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may 
realise our fulfilments and social conformity with the laws ... '41 It has 
been a source of much scholarly debate to investigate just how a man 
who professes divine indifference can pray. 
So why did Epicurus worship them? In the first place there is 
the element of conformity with the laws of the land; Epicurus 'advised 
obedience to the laws and customs of one's own country as a means of 
living a life untroubled by political storms'42 but Obbink has good 
reasons to wonder what (if any) limit the Epicurean would place on such 
conformity of worship: 
'But will the Epicureans at Athens keep the Spartan Kameia or 
the Persian Mithrakana or the Roman Feralia? (cf. Lucretius' 
ambivalence towards the Magna Mater at Rome.) Is there justification 
40 Diogenes Laertius 10.10 
41 Pbilodemus On Piety 1.26.730-750 (translation by atink (1996) 157) 
42 Rist (1972) N~T 
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in Epicurus' tenets for participation in the religious rites of every deity, 
including Isis, Cybele, Attis (i. e. cults of dying or suffering gods), 
Mithra, Zeus Hypsistos, cults of rulers? .. What about rituals of 
purification or traditional rites of mourning (since, according to 
Epicurus, death is "nothing to US")?'43 
Worshipping weird gods with one's tongue in one's cheek is 
hardly a recipe for the life inspired by the true light of reason or the quiet 
life - especially where the rites involve human sacrifice such as that of 
Iphigeneia. A better set of reasons is available if we examine what 
Philodemus might mean by what he calls q,uoEIKas ainasM. Religious 
worship has to be shown to be actually good for our bodily and mental 
physis and Lucretius, as often, supplies more information: 
quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis 
dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum 
delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta 
saepe oberunt; non quo violari summa deum vis 
possit, ut ex ira poenas p~ere inbibat acris, 
sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos 
constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus, 
nee delubra deum placido cum pectore adibis, 
nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur 
in mentes hominum divinae nuntia formae, 
suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis. 
inde videre licet qualis iam vita sequatur. 45 
Lucretius seems to be angry that men should hold wrong 
opinions about the gods and threatens punishment as a result. He 
43 Obbink (1996) 392 
44 Philodemus On Piety 1. 26. 736-7 
45 6.68-79 
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appears to be undermining his own premises, however, by alluding to 
the famous stories of divine vengeance (Niobe, Pentheus etc) - the 
language of 70-1 (delibata ... oberunt) offers no other meaning - but then 
he qualifies this with a mocking rejection of the sagas of 'avenging gods'. 
After all, their peace and holiness can hardly allow them to be seen 
venting their fury on insolent mortals. So the 'damage' done to the gods 
is one of reducing their divine powers (numina) and yet the poet goes on 
to assert that the gods cannot be damaged by men (sancta has a strong 
sense of 'inviolable'46) and that they would not become angry and 
vengeful; the first and last words of line70 thus appear to contradict 
each other. 
Lucretius has stated that the false opinions of the gods will hurt 
us and it is superficially plausible to see this 'hurt' as being the 
impairment of our own ataraxia by believing in terrifying stories of 
divine wrath (line 74); this is the interpretation of Ernout. Does it 
makes sense of the contradiction of delibata. .. sancta? The gods 
themselves are sancta but can we 'lessen' their 'force' upon us by 
wreaking havoc with our own (note the emphasis of lUte tibi) mental 
peace? Surely such actions are an increase of supposed divine power 
over us rather than a decrease? It: after all, the gods in fact take no part 
in our lives, then any change from this (caused by our superstition) will 
be an increase rather than the reverse? 
46 see OLD S.v. 'sanctus' l~ and cf. the ironic: use of the word in 2. 4P4J~ 
where if the divum nJlmina arc really sancia then they will not feel lactus at all. 
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Lucretius' twist of the argument is to argue that the 'loss' is of 
what Bailey calls 'communion with the gods', i.e. the ability to 
apprehend the truth of the gods. The fog of our superstitious beliefs will 
cause their natures to remain hidden. The poet teases us with the 
paradox that the gods will 'punish' us for our faults but that they would 
not do so if they were not carefree and indifferent to us. Lucretius 
rejects the do ut des attitude towards religious worship and instead 
substitutes a 'contemplative' view of the gods whereby the benevolence 
of the gods is obtained when we contemplate the divine serenity and 
absorb the simulacra of such serenity into ourselves. Their influence is 
thus aesthetic. 
This is also clear from Book 5. 1161-1240, where the poet 
explains the origins of religion. Men right from early days had visions of 
the gods which they endowed with sensation as they appeared to move 
and act; in ignorance of the real causes of things they attributed the 
ordering of the world and the heavens to the gods, thus causing misery 
and anxiety to themselves. Lucretius mocks the superstitious rituals of 
man: 
o genus infelix humanum, talia divis 
cum tribuit facta atque iras adiunxit acerbas! 
quantos tum gemitus ipsi sibi, quantaque nobis 
volnera, quas lacrimas peperere minonbu' nostris! 
nee pi etas ullast velatum saepe videri 
vertier ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras, 
nee procumbere humi prostratum et pandere palmas 
ante deum delubra, nec aras sanguine multo 
spargere quadrupedum, nec votis nectere vota, 
sed mage placata posse omnia mente tueri. 47 
47 S. 1194-1203 
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The mumbo-jumbo of ritual is here scornfully dissected as men tum 
towards the stone, lie on the ground48, spatter the altars49 with blood of 
quadripeds50 and weaves chains of prayers; the language is calculated 
to express scorn, from the alliteration of line 120051 and the polyptoton 
of endless prayers in votis .. vota to the ritual archaic language of the 
infinitive vertier and the tenn quadrupedum. Costa sees the word 
videri as signifying ostentation52, and so it might: the word has a 
deeper significance however when one gets to the end of the passage. 
True religion for Lucretius is not to be seen by unseeing gods but rather 
to see (tueri) everything with a peaceful mind. The past participle 
pacata has the advantage over (e.g.) placida that it is made up of three 
long slow syllables; but also the word has the sense that our minds do 
not start out as placidus by nature but that they become so by 
worshipping the gods. This is exactly how we can alter our nature to 
become more 'divine' - and this is presumably what Philodemus meant by 
t/x>aeucas ainas. Religion - true religion is good for us if we see the 
untroubled nature of the gods and emulate it in our lives. 
Clearly the contemplative element of religion is vital to this 
thesis. If true religion is placata posse omnia mente meri then the 
ethical ideal of aesthetic contemplation of the world rather than 
engaging in it directly takes on a religious as wen as a human dimension. 
48 
49 
SO 
51 
52 
rw:alliD8 1.63 in terris oppressa gravi sub religione 
like the infertile man at 4. 1236-8 
such as that oftbe calf in 2. 3S2-366 
noted by Costa ad loc. 
Costa (1984) 13S 
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It is no coincidence that the passage in book 5 where the poet describes 
false and then true religionS3 begins with early man astounded at the 
aesthetic qualities of the gods as they appeared to him: 
egregias animo facies vigilante videbant, 
et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu. 
his igitur sensum tribuebant propterea quod 
membra movere videbantur vocesque superbas 
mittere pro facie praeclara et viribus amplis. S4 
where the primacy of the visual is stressed (videbant ... videbantur) as is 
also the wonder this provoked (egregias... mirando... praeciara ... 
amp/is). Men even then (iam tum) had a philosophically respectable 
concept of gods formed of aesthetic judgements rather than anything 
else; but this later was perverted into superstitious terror supported 
(again) by what we see: 
nam cum suspicimus magni caelestia mundi 
templa super stellisque micantibus aethera fixum.5s 
this later becomes a reminder of the opening of book 2 as the wretched 
mortals are filled with fear at a vignette of the terrors of war combined 
with a storm at sea56; 
summa etiam cum vis violenti per mare venti 
induperatorem classis super aequora verrit 
cum validis pariter legionibus atque elephantis 
recalling the storm of 2.1-2 and the military commander of 2. 5-6 and 2. 
40-43, a neat reminder that the aesthetic attitude espoused in book 2 of 
being able to derive pleasure from such sights is here being reclaimed for 
a religious purpose as part of the poet's ideal pacata posse omnia mente 
53 5. 1183-1203 
54 S. 1170-4 
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tueri. The mighty empires of men and their pre-occupations are 
dismissed here, as in book 2, by the poet as 'a kind of darkness - the 
darkness of the contemporary and infantile view of the world. They are 
ludibria.'57 Clay goes on to quote the poet's general conclusion given in 
book 5: 
usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam 
opterit et pulchros fascis saevasque securis 
proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.58 
but does not see the theatrical edge in ludibrio, which he acknowledges 
as an illusion59 but whose range of meaning extends to the theatrical 
imposturing and sham which the poet sees in public life60 and which its 
derivation from ludus makes abundantly clear. It is again impressive how 
the words are again an echo of the opening of book 2: 
quod si ridicula haec ludibriaque esse videmus61 
The wise man, and the truly religious man, watch both the world and 
the gods with impassive pleasure as if watching a show. They differ 
from the rest of mankind in that u,.ey see what is really ludibria in real 
life and are not terrified by it any more than they are by the show in the 
theatre. 
The next stage in the argument is to examine the nature of the 
Lucretian gods in more detail against the background of epic. We do 
55 
S6 
57 
58 
S9 
60 
s. 1204·' 
s. 1226-8 
Clay (1983) 220 
S. 1233·' 
Clay (1983) 334 n.130, citing Curtius 4.1'.26 
see OLD s.v. 'Iudibrium' 4; e.g. Uvy 37.41. 12,-Martial 10.4.7 
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not need to investigate the vexed philosophical questions of the divine 
nature62 here~ what is important is to see what use Lucretius made of 
the gods in determining his ethical and aesthetic attitudes. 
The gods of Homer are proverbially )laICapes63 as are some 
men64 in the poem; they are deathless and 'enjoy themselves all their 
days'65. Part of this enjoyment is doubtless the entertainment they 
receive from watching each other and the human race. 'One of the most 
striking features of the Iliad is that the gods are constantly present as an 
audience.' is the opening sentence of an article of enormous importance 
for this thesis.66 Griffin points out that 'a god who watches is normally a 
god who intervenes, a patron and an avenger67' but that the gods watch 
the events of the Trojan war in two different ways: as spectators 
enjoying the show as if it were just entertainment68 on the one hand, and 
as spectators of tragedy with tears in their eyes on the other69. Human 
beings in the poem show confidence in the gods' interest in right and 
wrong - calls to the gods to witness events bespeak this sort of 
confidence in the divine urge to avenge wrong, just as does the usage of 
~epDopav in the sense of 'overlook, i.e. allOw'70. The attitude of the 
gods is often the sort of Schadenfreude one expects in comedy: this 
61 2.47 
62 on which see e.g. Rist (1972) 140-156, Bailey (1928) 449-467, Festugiere 
(1955) 51-72 
63 see e.g. Homer Iliad 1.339, Odyssey 10.299 
64 e.g. Homer Iliad 3.182 
65 Homer Odyssey 6.46 
66 Griffin (1978) 1 
67 as e.g. Apollo in Book 1 
68 Griffm cites: Iliad 4. 1-4, 7.61, 8.51-2 
69 e.g. 16.430-3,8.350,22. 166-70 
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mirth 7\ 'proceeds from a delighted sense of one's own superiority~ at 
ease oneself, one enjoys the spectacle of others struggling or humiliated 
for one's pleasure. rn In the song of Demodocus, for instance, 
Hephaistus tricks the adulterous Ares and Aphrodite and then invites the 
gods to come and look so that they enjoy laughing at the sight~Tg some 
of the gods invest the spectacle with moral force (role QpG'rq. lCalea 
epya 329) but this is undennined both in the subsequent dialogue where 
Hermes wishes he could sleep with Aphrodite and in the way the pair of 
them escape all consequences of their actions. The gods of Homer do 
not need moral compunctions as men do and part of their 'blessedness' is 
this freedom from moral sanctions. 
Of all the 'mythical' stories of Homeric gods, this is the only 
one to find a place in the de rerum natura in the Romanised form of 
Venus and Mars embracing. 74 The significance of the passage has been 
much discussed, but this parallel has not been given sufficient attention 
in the welter of words unpacking the Empedoclean symbolism when, as 
Bailey points out," Mars 'appears to be in these verses nothing more or 
less than the Greco-Roman god of war, Ares-Mars.' If one examines 
the vital few lines in Lucretius: 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
7' 
effice ut interea fera moenera militiai 
per maria ac terras omnis sopita quiescant; 
LSJs.v. n 
over Aias falling in cow-dung at 23.786 
Griffin (1978) 6 
Homer Odyssey 8. 325-7 
1. 31-40 
Bailey(1947)i.S90 
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nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare 
mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mavors 
armipotens regit, in gremium qui saepe tuum se 
reiicit aetemo devinctus wlnere amoris 
atque ita suspiciens tereti cervice reposta 
pascit amore avidos inhians in te, dea, visus, 
eque tuo pendet resupini spiritus ore. 
hunc tu, diva, tuo recubantem corpore sancto 
circumfusa super, suavis ex ore loquellas 
funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem: 
nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo 
possumus aequo animo nec Memmi clara propago 
talibus in rebus communi desse salutP6. 
we find the passage first linked backwards with the opening 
prelude's universal panorama (per maria ac terras) and forwards with 
the notion of sleeping (sopita). The goddess has the supreme 
Epicurean quality of tranquilla pace to offer men (note also the way line 
32 begins with mortalis and ends with Mavors punning on the derivation 
of the name Mavors from mors). We are mortals, but they are not; and 
the wound oflove is accordingly aeterno. He 'feeds' his 10ve77 from the 
sense of sight: suspiciens... visus; and the object of the poet's prayer is 
again placidam ... pacem which appears to be a prayer for military peace 
but may well in the Epicurean context be rather a reference to ataraxia. 
Rome was of course in the throes of civil war at the time, and there is 
abundant reason for the poet to pray for release from this; but when this 
picture and this prayer is immediately followed by a theological summary 
of the tranquillity of the gods one begins to wonder if the divine peace is 
more than merely freedom from civil war and more a state of mind. 
76 1.29-43 
77 cf. 4.1068 
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When we go back to the Homeric original, we see that the 
whole episode is one of seeing. The sun-god Helios sees the guilty pair 
and tells the wretched Hephaistos, who then contrives to make their 
adultery into a theatrical show for the rest of the gods. Hephaistos 
himself is a figure of visual fun in the Iliad 78 and here he appropriately 
turns his misery79 into laughter, transforming pain into pleasure in a 
visual manner without any 'moral' conclusion being drawn or imposed by 
the poet. Gods, it seems, are there to enjoy themselves as aesthetic 
hedonists80 and thus make a good role-model for Lucretius' ethical 
teaching. 'To complete their bliss they need one thing more: a subject 
to interest them. That subject is provided by the existence of mortal 
men and their 1tOVOI. The nature of men and gods is exactly calculated 
to set off and define that of each other. Thus as the life of the gods is 
blessed, so that of men is miserable: as they are typically J.l(XXap6S 
(JSOI, so oi,upolOl pPo-rolOl is an Homeric phrase for "men" and 
06lAolm f31xnoiOl is a common one ... '81 The Homeric gods do show 
pity for wretched mortals, however: the Epicurean gods enjoy all the 
benefits of living like Homeric gods but without any toil or pity for us. 
It is hardly a surprise that Cicero satirised such gods for this: 
78 Homer Iliad 1. 599-600 
79 Homer Odyssey 8.273 
80 ct. Odyssey l. 159 where the suitors are desc:ribed in terms more 
appropriate to the life of gods but who pay for their arrogance 
81 Griffin (1978 11; one thinks of the Luaetian imitation mortalibllS aegris 
at 6.1 
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comprehende igitur et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in 
omni aeternitate nisi 'mihi pulchre est' et 'ego beatus sum' cogitantem.82 
Nisbet and Hubbard83 declare that (in a context of war as spectacuia) 
'the gods were assigned the role of bloodthirsty spectators' and cite a 
range of references84, mentioning also the traditional 'insatiability' of 
Mars8s . Homer does not go so far, and neither does iucretius~ and yet 
the gods of Homer show concern for men and interest in their interests 
to a degree inconceivable in Epicurean deities. 
Men, says Lucretius, can live the life of gods~ this means in 
the first place that they can live the life of gods free of all cares and able 
to enjoy the spectacle of the world with pleasure. This grants the 
reader the status of the Homeric gods looking down on the world and 
enjoying the spectacle. 
The irony here is that the 'real' gods in the poem do not care 
about mortalibus aegris at all and do not respond to our prayers or our 
mockery. This leaves us with the t~asing paradox that we humans can 
live like Homeric gods if we aspire to the degree of detachment enjoyed 
by the Epicurean gods but also grant ourselves the Homeric gods' 
pleasure of watching the world - a pleasure which the Epicurean gods do 
not themselves have. 
This is the aesthetic sense in which Epicurus was divine. He 
enjoyed the 'divine' freedom from fear of death and pain - though 
82 Cicero de natura deorum 1.114, cited Griffin (1978) 13 n. 40 
83 Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 331 
84 Seneca dial. 1.2.7, Luc.6.3 
85 Horace Odes 1.2.37, cf. Homer Iliad 5.388 
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actually free of neither as his death makes all too clear. 86 He was 
however also capable of pitying mortal men and, like Prometheus, of 
bringing salvation to them87 in a manner reminiscent of the Homeric 
gods: just as Athene brings help to the struggling Odysseus, for 
instance, or as Thetis aids her son. Epicurus behaved in this way like a 
Homeric god but in his doctrine taught us not to believe in such deities 
nor to behave like them ourselves; the ethical code is rather one of 
watching the world suffer without suffering ourselves, being capable of 
seeing the truth behind appearances and deriving pleasure from the view. 
Epicurus was also the aesthetic epic hero,' mastering the 
universe by the force of his eyes alone; he opened up the universe to 
human view and saw that the gods live a life of untroubled peace; he 
took on the force of religio which ground men underfoot and dared to 
outstare it, raising his eyes against it88 and with them shattering the bolts 
of nature's gates. Seeing the truth was all that was necessary - and 
Epicurus did so. 
Finally, the status of the aesthetic poet is left. The Homeric 
gods see everything and enjoy the spectacle; if we too are to live like 
gods, then we too are to see everything and enjoy the spectacle. The 
ethical advice to avoid engaging in the world actively but to contemplate 
the truths of philosophy raises us to the status of gods looking down on 
the world of men with superior wisdom and fearless pleasure. Poetry 
86 
87 
88 
Diogenes Laertius 10.22 
3. 14-30,6. 1-34 
1. 66-7 
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was always seen as the guarantor of immortality for the subject; and yet 
this poetry raises the reader - for all the proof of mortality in Book 3 - to 
the status of the immortal gods in his privileged position as spectator of 
the show - both tragic and comic - and also in his position as one with 
the ability to see behind the appearances into the heart of things to the 
truth. Poetry, finally, embodies the beauty of the world and thus allows 
the poet to demonstrate what he is describing, giving us textual proof of 
the aesthetic pleasure which he recommends as the ethical goal of 
philosophy itself 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis began by examining the relative poverty of ethical 
material in a poem whose avowed aim is the 'conversion' of the reader 
to a new way of life. The ethical teaching which we find is based on the 
science and treats states of mind and body as being interdependent and 
themselves explicable in the same atomic terms which explain the rest of 
the universe. Pleasure is the summum bonum for all living things, and 
the thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the aesthetic pleasure of 
seeing and studying the nature of things is itself an ethical goal when it is 
elevated to a way of life which will pursue philosophy rather than 
politics and seek a"Capag,a rather than excitement. The watching of 
the world is a source of pleasure, and so (if pleasure is the highest 
good) this watching of the world is the ethical ideal to be followed. 
The watching of other men engaging in foolish behaviour is itself a 
source of pleasure, not because the poet maliciously enjoys 
em xazpslCa.a.a but for the same reasons that going to the theatre and 
seeing folly and suffering on stage is a source of pleasure to the 
audience. 
For Lucretius, then, aesthetics and ethics are one and the same~ 
the question of the proportion of ethics and physics has been answered 
in the manner in which the poet tells us that looking at the world is what 
we ought to do as our ethical goal. Seen in this light everything in the 
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poem is ethical, and the literary aesthetics being proposed is much wider 
and more all-embracing than many aesthetic theories which have 
followed his but quite in keeping with the aesthetics of the ancient 
world89 . 
This aesthetic reading of the text rescues both sides of the 
familiar 'poet versus philosopher' debate. The apparently metaphrastic 
sections on such areas of science as the magnet and the waterspout 
become a source of aesthetic pleasure in themselves and thus show us 
q,OC1l0Aoria as a way of life, while other areas of atomic physics (such 
as the proofs of the mortality of the soul) are the essential factual basis 
for the naturalistic ethics being propounded. On the other hand the 
poetic mode of presentation embeds the pleasure of looking in the 
powerful medium of poetic (aesthetic) pleasure. Neither poetry nor 
Physics is 'mere' decoration - both serve the aesthetic ideal of detached 
pleasure in the world which the text recommends as the way of life for 
the Epicurean. 
89 'Proponents of aesthetic autonomy are sometimes dismissive of the strong 
ancient tendency to connect both art and beauty to more general accounts of human 
needs and values. But it is part of the importance of this tendency that, 
notwithstanding its many internal modulations, it marks out a vital alternative to 
aesthetic self-sufficiency; an alternative which rests on the conviction that a 
historically sensitive aesthetics should engage with the intricate network of factors -
psychological, ethical, religious, political - underlying the practices and categories of 
human culture.' <>CD s.v. 'aesthetics' p. 30 
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